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Nationality and Human Rights
I. Delimitation of the Problem
In a world of ever-increasing transnational interaction the impor-
tance to individuals of protection within transnational processes of au-
thoritative decision correspondingly increases. The claims with which
we are concerned here are those by an individual for membership in
a territorial community for the purposes both of obtaining external
protection against other territorial communities and of securing richer
participation in the value processes of his chosen community and the
world community. The traditional linkage of the individual with ter-
ritorial communities for such purposes has been through the concept
of nationality.' Individuals are said to be the "nationals" of a state
when that state asserts, and the larger world community honors, claims
to protect and control such individuals for all the comprehensive pur-
poses of states, as contrasted with occasional particular exercises of
competence under varying principles of jurisdiction. 2
It is, thus, of critical importance how the concept of "nationality"
and all the ancillary rules about the conferment and withdrawal of
nationality are managed in the allocation of competence among terri-
1. On nationality see generally NATIONALITY LAWS (R. Flournoy & M. Hudson eds.
1929) [hereinafter cited as R. Flournoy & M. Hudson]; United Nations Legislative Series,
LAWS CONCERNING NATIONALITY, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/4 (1954), and SUPPLEMENT
To LAWS CONCERNING NATIONALITY, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/9 (1959); H. VAN PAN-
IIUYS, THE ROLE OF NATIbNALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1959); P. IVEIs, NATIONALITY
AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1956); Brownlie, The Relations of Nationality
in Public International Law, 39 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 284 (1965); Harvard Research in
International Law, The Law of Nationality, 23 AMx. J. INT'L L. Sus'r. 11 (1929) [here-
inafter cited as Harvard Research]; Hudson, Report on Nationality, Including State-
lessness, [1952] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. Co.im'N 3-24, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/50 (1958); Silving,
Nationality in Comparative Law, 5 At. J. Co.ir. L. 410 (1956). See also S. Greenleigh
& R. Margenau, The International Law of Nationality: A Policy-Oriented Inquiry, 1962
(unpublished student paper in Yale Law School Library); C. Liu, The Control of
People as a Base of Power: International Law of Nationality and Access to Territory,
1957 (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation in Yale Law School Library). The authors have
found the study by Messrs. Greenleigh and Margenau particularly helpful.
2. The concept of "nationality" is often reified into a pseudo-absolute comparable
to "title." The concept, in fact, serves as a chameleon-like term for making ambiguous
references to facts, claims, relevant policies, and legal consequences. The facts embrace
many differing degrees of membership in one or more groups; the claims are made
by both states and individuals; the relevant policies vary with a great range of prac-
tical problems; and legal consequences are commonly fashioned to serve both inclusive
and exclusive policies as problems vary.
The pervasive ambiguity in the concept can be escaped only by keeping entirely dis-tinct at least the following:
(1) the facts in global social process which comprise both "group memberships" andthe interactions of individuals across nation-state lines;
(2) the claims that nation-states make, under their varying national laws, to protect,
control, and impose burdens upon individuals;
(3) the policies of a transnational law which seek to protect both the human rights
of individuals and the common interests of states; and
(4) the decisions taken in transnational arenas of authority in regulation of the
claims of both states and individuals about protection, control, and burdens.
The flexibilities of the concept of "citizenship" are indicated in Bickel, Citizen-
ship in the American Constitution, 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 369 (1973).
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torial communities to protect individual human beings against de-
privations by other territorial communities and in determinations of
what states are authorized to impose what burdens upon individuals
in different value processes. In a world arena still largely state-or-
ganized, decisions about nationality may affect both the degree to
which the individual person has access to a protector and the sub-
stantive content of his rights. It is a distinguishing characteristic of
nation-states that they claim a special competence to impose upon
their members unique burdens with respect, for example, to taxation,
military service, and subjection to civil and criminal jurisdiction; how
these burdens are distributed, and maximized or minimized, through
assertion by one or more states, importantly affects the aggregate en-
joyment of human rights by individuals.
The central focus of our present inquiry is upon the allocation of
competence to protect individuals and the decisions which most di-
rectly affect this allocation. Given a decentralized world arena in which
nation-states are still the principal official participants, if the indi-
vidual human being does not have some state as a protector, the
larger community aspiration for human rights is meaningless. Thus,
the stateless person-the person without formal membership in any
body politic-is treated as an international outcast, an "unprotected
person."3 The possible value deprivations to which such a person may
be subjected are severe and all-encompassing, far beyond those com-
mon to aliens; he has little or no access to authoritative decision, on
either national or international levels. Similarly, the individual who
is confronted with administrative obstacles or legal complexities in
establishing a nationality, whose acknowledged state refuses to protect
him, or who is denied a claim against a state of his nationality may be
made equally to suffer a deprivation of human rights in the merits
of his claim.
The practices of states in conferring or withholding nationality and
the procedures established by states for such conferment or withhold-
ing may of course directly affect not only access to a protector but
also the quantity and quality of participation in all value processes,
both national and international. Hence significant inquiry about ac-
tual and potential deprivations of human rights must make detailed
examination of the flow of decision about practices and procedures in
the conferment and withholding of nationality.
3. For further elaboration, see pp. 960-62 infra.
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Individuals who, in contrast with the stateless person, are claimed
by more than one state-i.e., who have multiple nationality-may some-
times enjoy the advantages of greater protection. They may also, how-
ever, be held subject to greater responsibilities and be subjected to
greater burdens. Thus, they may be in danger of multiple jeopardy
in terms of military service, taxation, and subjection to jurisdiction.
The more detailed claims to authoritative decision with which we
are here concerned may, hence, be summarized as follows:
(1) claims by the individual to a protecting state;
(2) claims relating to the conferment of nationality;
(3) claims relating to the withdrawal of nationality (including volun-
tary expatriation);
(4) claims relating to statelessness; and
(5) claims relating to multiple nationality.
II. The Clarification of General Community Policy
Historically, in the allocation of competence over peoples the estab-
lished decisionmakers of the transnational community have honored,
in varying combinations in different contexts, two complementary
policies. One policy, most preferred when expectations of large-scale
violence are low, favors human rights and encourages freedom in the
circulation of people and easy changes in group membership, much
the same as it encourages freedom of movement in capital, goods,
services, and ideas. The other policy, especially stressed under condi-
tions of continuing expectations of imminent violence, concedes more
to the interests of states in the exclusive protection of their bases of
power, through stringent controls over people, including restrictions
upon change of national membership.
The long-term policy most compatible with an international law
of human dignity would be one that seeks the utmost voluntarism
in affiliation, participation, and movement, with an easy assumption
by states of a competence to protect such individuals as seek their
protection. The individual should be able to become a member of,
and to participate in the value processes of, as many bodies politic
as his capabilities will permit.
It must of course be conceded that, given the present structure of
the world arena, states do share some common interests which may on
occasion require limitation of this preferred policy of the utmost
individual voluntarism. Despite contemporary technological develop-
The Yale Law Journal
ments, people remain an important base of power for each of the dif-
ferent territorially organized communities of the world. Both the
security, in the minimum sense of freedom from external violence
and coercion, and the quality of society, in terms of the greater pro-
duction and wider sharing of all values, that a community can achieve
are intimately dependent upon the numbers and characteristics of its
members, including their capabilities, skills, and loyalties. It is this
intimate dependence which is reflected in the historic reciprocal
honoring of the principles of jus soli and jius sanguinis in the alloca-
tion of members and of the principles of "territoriality" and "nation-
ality" in the allocation of jurisdiction. Secondarily, territorial com-
munities share important interests in maintaining harmonious rela-
tionships among themselves and in avoiding situations of potential
conflict in their claims about members. The different communities
have, finally, a common interest in a certain economy in the expendi-
ture of resources in their practices for the allocation of members and
the provision of protection in transnational processes of authoritative
decision.
The task of a decisionmaker or other evaluator who genuifiely
identifies with the whole community of mankind is that of achieving
an accommodation in particular instances between the complementary
policies reflected in the demands of states and the demands of indi-
viduals, an accommodation which will best promote in the long run
the largest net, aggregate achievement of human rights.
In search of such accommodation, a strong preference might be
given policies which accord to every individual the protection of at
least one state for the purpose of securing within transnational proc-
esses of authoritative decision a proper hearing upon the merits of
controversies. Thus, to make certain that individuals have at least
one nationality for this purpose, access to community membership
upon both jus soli and jus sanguinis, and even upon the simple re-
quest of the individual, might be authorized in the most generous
degree.
From broader human dignity perspectives the individual's volition
should be accorded the utmost possible expression and respect in all
the different decisions concerning nationality: the conferment of
nationality, the procedures by which nationality is established and
evidenced, the withdrawal of nationality, the minimization and
amelioration of statelessness, and the regulation of multiple nation-
ality. In particular, states should not be permitted to make arbitrary
904
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conferment (that is, upon grounds unrelated to common interest) of
nationality against the wishes of the individual. Nor should states be
permitted arbitrarily to deny (as for purposes of discrimination)
nationality sought by the individual.
Save for conflict with the most urgent state necessities, people
ought thus to be allowed freely to determine their nationality subse-
quent to birth. Their wishes should be made largely the decisive
factor, with only a modest deference toward criteria designed to pro-
tect state interests. In support of these policies procedures for establish-
ing and withdrawing nationality should not be honored when they are
so arbitrary as to negate whatever protection may otherwise be pro-
vided for the individual. Requirements for establishing and proving
nationality need not, in order to preclude fraud, be so strict as to make
compliance impossible. For the further protection of private choice,
comparable policies might be recognized for the withdrawal of nation-
ality. States should not be permitted arbitrarily (as for purposes of
discrimination or punishment) to withdraw nationality, nor arbitrarily
to preclude voluntary change of nationality. Statelessness should, by
some one of many expedients, be abolished.
In keeping with the policy of honoring utmost voluntarism, the in-
dividual might be authorized to choose membership in all the bodies
politic for which he is able and willing to assume responsibility. Such
multiplicity in choice requires, of course, the right to change one's
nationality. Similarly, any state of which an individual is a member
should be authorized to protect him against another state, even one
of which he is also a national. Multiple nationality is to be preferred
in contexts in which it increases the protection available for the indi-
vidual; it should be rejected when it imposes arbitrary burdens upon
him. In a public order of human dignity, the whole international law
of nationality should, in sum, be designed for the better protection of
the individual, with minimum concessions to the organized interests
of the territorial communities.
III. Trends in Decision and Conditioning Factors
Decisions about every major type of claim which we have identified
have, unhappily, expressed and been affected by perspectives, not
of the fundamental rights of the individual, but of the paramount
interests of state elites in the control of people as important bases
of power.
905
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A. Claims by the Individual to a Protecting State
The overwhelming trend of decision has been to permit the state of
nationality, and only the state of nationality, to protect individuals.4
Unfortunately, states are still regarded as having an option with respect
to whether they will protect their nationals, for international law im-
poses no duty on the state to do so. Hence individuals are left to the
arbitrary whim or caprice of state officials.
In addition, under the once dominant theory that states are the only
"subjects" of international law, nation-states alone have been considered
competent in most fora to present claims against other states., Injured
individuals are denied access to transnational arenas to present claims
against external entities; rather, they are made to look to their own
state for protection against such value deprivations.
Similarly, the principle that a state can provide protection only in
cases of deprivations suffered by its own nationals is well established.0
The only "link" generally accepted for purposes of establishing stand-
ing to protect against deprivations is, thus, that of nationality.
The fiction that sustains this inhibiting practice is that an injury to
the individual is an injury to the state of his nationality. The classic
thesis was expounded by Vattel:
4. The reference we make is to direct access to processes of authoritative decision.
It does not escape our notice that many nonterritorial groups-ethnic, linguistic, skill,
religious, for instance-effectively engage in vast and enduring patterns of protest and
appraisal for the protection of the individual.
5. On the subject of diplomatic protection, the classics are E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLO-
MATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (1922), and F. DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NA-
TIONALS (1932). See also L. SOHN & R. BAXTER, CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS (1961); Harvard Research in Interna-
tional Law, The Law of Responsibility of States for Damage Done in Their Territory
to the Person or Property of Foreigners, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. Surp. 131 (1929). Of special
contemporary interest are a series of reports on international responsibility submitted
to the International Law Commission, including, inter alia: First Report on Interna-
tional Responsibility, [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoSM'N 173, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/96 (1956);
Second Report on International Responsibility, [1957] 2 Y.B. INTL L. CONIZWN 104, U.N.
Doc. A/CN. 4/ 106 (1957); Third Report on International Responsibility, [1958] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMIN'N 47, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/Ill (1958); Sixth Report on International
Responsibility, [1961] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CONIN'N 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/134 and Add. 1
(1961). More recent commentaries include F. DAWSON & I. HEAD, INTERNATIONAL LAw,
NATIONAL TRIBUNALS AND THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS (1971); C. JOSEPH, NATIONALITY AND
DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION (1969); R. LILLICH & G. CHRISTENSON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS:
THEIR PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION (1962); F. VALLAT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
PRACTITIONER (1966); Weis, Diplomatic Protection of Nationals and International Pro-
tection of Human Rights, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 643 (1971).
6. The Permanent Court of International Justice declared in the Mavrommatis
Palestine Concessions Case:
It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect
its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by
another State, from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through
the ordinary channels.
[1924] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 2, at 6, 12.
906
Vol. 83: 900, 1974
Nationality and Human Rights
Whoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the State, which
must protect that citizen. The sovereign of the injured citizen
must avenge the deed and, if possible, force the aggressor to give
full satisfaction or punish him, since otherwise the citizen will not
obtain the chief end of civil society, which is protection. 7
Similarly, the Permanent Court of International Justice in the
Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case observed that
in taking up the case of one of its nationals, by resorting to diplo-
matic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf,
a state is in reality asserting its own right, the right to ensure in
the person of its nationals respect for the rules of international
law. This right is necessarily limited to the intervention on behalf
of its own nationals because, in the absence of a special agree-
ment, it is the bond of nationality between the state and the indi-
vidual which alone confers upon the state the right of diplomatic
protection, and it is as a part of the function of diplomatic pro-
tection that the right to take up a claim and to ensure respect for
the rules of international law must be envisaged. Where the injury
was done to the national of some other State no claim to which
such injury may give rise falls within the scope of the diplomatic
protection which a State is entitled to afford nor can it give rise
to a claim which that State is entitled to espouse.S
Under this fiction a state's right to protect is independent of the
individual's interest; a state is put under no duty, but rather accorded
complete discretion, to decide whether or not to press claims against
external entities on behalf of its nationals. In most countries it is left
to the executive branch, which may not be required to conform to
judicial standards of due process, to decide. Given the overriding con-
cern for the so-called "national" interest, nation-state elites tend to
exaggerate, in the words of Frederick Dunn, "the importance of the
political relations of states at the expense of the activities of men as
human beings."9 Individuals' claims are put aside when the "national"
interest so dictates. At times, therefore, the state interest, asserted from
perspectives of the total foreign policy of the state, may be in contra-
vention of the wishes of the individuals concerned.
Because of its negative implications for individual human rights
and its manifest incompatibility with fact, this fiction has been under
7. 3 E. DE VATTEL. CLA.SSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE
PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 136 (C. Fenwick transl. 1916).
8. Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railvay Case, [1939] P.C.I.J., ser. AMD. No. 76, at 16.
9. Dunn, The International Rights of Individuals, [1941] PROCEEDINGS, AM. Soc'y
INT'L L. 14, 17.
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increasing attack. Thus, one commentator has pointed out that a
deprivation to an individual is not necessarily a deprivation to the
state and that the claim of the individual, not that of the state, is basic,
a reality that is implied by the requirement for the exhaustion of local
remedies by the individual. 10 As stated by Umpire Parker of the
United States-German Mixed Claims Commission,
[T]he generally accepted theory formulated by Vattel, which
makes the injury to the national an injury to the nation and inter-
nationally therefore the claim a national claim which may and
should be espoused by the nation injured, must not be permitted
to obscure the realities or blind us to the fact that the ultimate
object of asserting the claim is to provide reparation for the pri-
vate claimant .... 11
These perspectives demand a functional, rather than fictional, concept
of protection. More fundamentally, of course, in an appropriately or-
ganized world the individual would be accorded competence to protect
himself.
In specific application of the "nationality" myth, the doctrine of
"continuous nationality" has for over a century resulted in the rejec-
tion of innumerable claims by arbitral tribunals. As developed under
customary international law, a claimant must possess the nationality
of the espousing state from the moment of deprivation, through the
presentation of the claim, and often to the time of settlement.' 2 Thus,
a claimant whose nationality is changed or lost after suffering a depri-
vation cannot obtain remedy. His state of nationality at the time of
deprivation is precluded from espousing his claim because he is no
longer its national; his new state of nationality is barred because at
the time of injury he was not its national. In recent years the inequities
caused by this requirement have been spotlighted by the post-war
measures of wealth deprivation undertaken by the Eastern European
countries. Large numbers of displaced people, who fled these countries
during World War II and its aftermath,' 3 could derive no international
succor under traditional doctrines of nationality.
10. "If the national State were directly injured its rights could hardly be con-
tingent upon exhaustion of local remedies by the individual." 2 D. O'CONNELL, INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 1031 (2d ed. 1970). Concerning the rule of exhaustion of local remedies,
see E. BORCHARD, supra note 5, at 817-32; H. BRICGs, THE LAW OF NATIONS 620-37 (2d
ed. 1952); L. SOHN & R. BAXTER, supra note 5, at 16170'.
11. Administrative Decision No. V (United States/Germany), 7 U.N.R.I.A.A. 119, 152-
53 (1956).
12. See R. LILLICH & G. CHRISTENSON, supra note 5, at 9-12; L. SOHN & R. BAXTER,
supra note 5, at 200-02.
13. See Kerley, Nationality of Claims-A Vista, [19693 PRocraMINcs, Am. Soc'y INT'L L.
35, 36.
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The harsh effects of the doctrine are especially observable in connec-
tion with stateless persons and new immigrants, although mitigating
measures are sometimes undertaken. For instance, during the nine-
teenth century, the United States made it a practice to afford protec-
tion to individuals on the basis of domicile plus a declaration of intent
to become a United States citizen.' 4 This reflected in part the positive
attitude toward immigration prevailing in the United States at the
time and expressed and emphasized the significant ties other than
nationality that a person may have with a territorial community. Occa-
sionally, out of explicit humanitarian considerations, protection is
afforded or at least asserted for other nonnationals, such as refugees
or members of minority groups. This exception reinforces contempo-
rary concern for human rights and for protection of refugees in par-
ticular."r
Sometimes, in contrast, even the concept of "nationality" itself is
questioned or distorted for the purpose of denying protection to indi-
viduals. Under contemporary international law, states are accorded
a very broad competence for choosing among grounds for the con-
ferment of nationality upon individuals and the practice of states
exhibits a high degree of reciprocal deference to conferments of
nationality in accordance with customary criteria. Yet upon occasion
individuals have been deprived of a protector and of a hearing upon
the merits of their claims either by invocation of variable or spurious
conceptions of nationality or by imposition of tests over and beyond
any traditional conception of nationality. The destructiveness for
human rights of these decisions is dramatically illustrated in such
famous cases as Nottebohm,'0 Flegenheimer,17 and the Barcelona Trac-
tion Company.'5 The importance to individuals of state protection in
a state-organized world is such as to justify a somewhat detailed exam-
ination of these cases.
14. See Copithorne, International Claims and the Rule of Nationality, [1969] PRO-
CEEDINGS, AM. Soc'y INT'L L. 30, 31.
15. On international protection of refugees, see UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR REFUGEES, A MANDATE TO PROTECT AND ASSIST REFUGEES (1971). See also L. HOLBORN,
THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION (1956); F. NORWOOD, STRANGERS AND EXILES
(1969); J. SCHECHTMAN, THE REFUGEE IN THE WORLD (1963); J. STOESSINGER, THE REFU-
GEE AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY (]956); J. VERANANT, THE REFUGEE IN THE POST-VAR
WORLD (1953); Krenz, The Refugee as a Subject of International Law, 15 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 90 (1966); Read, The United Nations and Refugees: Changing Concepts, 537 INT'L
CONCILIATION (1962); Rees, Century of the Homeless Man, 515 INT'L CONCILIATION (1957);
Weis, The Concept of the Refugee in International Law, [1960] JOURNAL DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 928; Weis, The International Protection of Refugees, 48 AMf. J. INT'L L.
193, 195 (1954).
16. Nottebohm Case, [19551 I.C.J. 4.
17. Flegenheimer Claim, 25 I.L.R. 91 (Italian-United States Conciliation Commission
1963).
18. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited,
Second Phase, [1970] I.C.J. 4.
The Yale Law Journal
In the Nottebohm case,19 involving Liechtehstein and Guatemala,
the former sought restitution and compensation on behalf of one
Friedrich Nottebohm for the latter's actions allegedly in violation of
international law. A German national from his birth in Germany in
1881, Nottebohm moved to Guatemala in 1905, residing and doing
business there, without ever applying for Guatemalan citizenship.
Thereafter, he sometimes made trips to Germany to conduct business
and to Liechtenstein to visit his brother, who lived there after 1931.
While still a German national Nottebohm applied for naturalization
in Liechtenstein on October 9, 1939, shortly after the German invasion
of Poland. Relieved of the three-year residence requirements, Notte-
bohm paid his fees and taxes to Liechtenstein and became a natural-
ized citizen of Liechtenstein by taking an oath of allegiance on October
20, 1939, thereby forfeiting his German nationality under the nation-
ality law of Liechtenstein. He returned to Guatemala early in 1940
on a Liechtenstein passport to resume his business activities. At his
request the Guatemalan Ministry of External Affairs changed the
Nottebohm entry in its Register of Aliens from "German" to "Liech-
tenstein" national.
In July 1941, Nottebohm was blacklisted for trade purposes by the
United States and his assets in the United States were frozen. Shortly
afterward, on December 11, 1941, a state of war came into existence
between the United States and Germany and between Guatemala and
Germany. Arrested in Guatemala in October 1943, Nottebohm was de-
ported to the United States, where he was interned as an enemy alien
until 1946. Upon his release Nottebohm applied for readmission to
Guatemala but was refused; therefore, he took up residence in Liech-
tenstein. Meanwhile, the Guatemalan government, after classifying
him as an enemy alien, expropriated his extensive properties without
compensation.
Liechtenstein instituted proceedings against Guatemala in the Inter-
national Court of Justice, asking the court to declare that Guatemala
had violated international law "in arresting, detaining, expelling and
refusing to readmit Mr. Nottebohm and in seizing and retaining his
property." 20 Guatemala's main contention was that Liechtenstein's
claim was inadmissible because of Nottebohm's nationality. Liechten-
stein's competence to protect Nottebohm was challenged. Guatemala
argued that
19. [1955] I.Cj. 4.
20. Id. at 6-7.
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the Principality of Liechtenstein has failed to prove that M. Notte-
bohm, for whose protection it is acting, properly acquired Liech-
tenstein nationality in accordance with the law of the Principality;
because, even if such proof were provided, the legal provisions
which would have been applied cannot be regarded as in con-
formity with international law; and because M. Nottebohm ap-
pears in any event not to have lost, or not validly to have lost, his
German nationality .... 21
The court rejected the Liechtenstein claim by a vote of 11 to three,
declaring that Nottebohm's naturalization could not be accorded inter-
national recognition because there was no sufficient "bond of attach-
ment" between Nottebohm and Liechtenstein. Utilizing multiple
nationality cases as precedents, the court expounded a "genuine link"
theory of "real and effective nationality":
[A] State cannot claim that the rules it has thus laid down are
entitled to recognition by another State unless it has acted in con-
formity with this general aim of making the legal bond of nation-
ality accord with the individual's genuine connection with the
State which assumes the defence of its citizens by means of pro-
tection as against other States. .... [N]ationality is a legal bond
having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connec-
tion of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the ex-
istence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute
the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom
it is conferred, either directly by the law or as the result of an act
of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the popu-
lation of the State conferring nationality than with that of any
other State. 22
The court concluded:
Naturalization was asked for not so much for the purpose of ob-
taining a legal recognition of Nottebohm's membership in fact in
the population of Liechtenstein, as it was to enable him to sub-
stitute for his status as a national of a belligerent State that of a
national of a neutral State, with the sole aim of thus coming
within the protection of Liechtenstein but not of becoming
wedded to its traditions, its interests, its way of life or of assuming
the obligations-other than fiscal obligations- and exercising the
rights pertaining to the status thus acquired.23
21. Id. at 9.
22. Id. at 23.
23. Id. at 26.
The Yale Law Journal
The Nottebohm decision has been widely criticized.2 4 It has never-
theless been invoked and applied to serve different purposes in dif-
ferent contexts. For present purposes, the application of the "genuine
link" theory, borrowed from the very different context of dual nation-
ality problems, has the unfortunate effect of depriving an individual
of a hearing on the merits and the protection by a state willing to
espouse his claim in the transnational arena. The net effect is an im-
mense loss of protection of human rights for individuals. Such a deci-
sion runs counter to contemporary community expectations emphasiz-
ing the increased protection of human rights for individuals, especially
the elimination of statelessness. As Judge Guggenheim stated em-
phatically in his dissenting opinion,
If the right of protection is abolished, it becomes impossible to con-
sider the merits of certain claims alleging a violation of the rules
of international law. If no other State is in a position to exercice
[sic] diplomatic protection, as in the present case, claims put for-
ward on behalf of an individual, whose nationality is disputed or
held to be inoperative on the international level and who enjoys
no other nationality, would have to be abandoned. The protection
of the individual which is so precarious under existing interna-
tional law would be weakened even further and I consider that
this would be contrary to the basic principle embodied in Article
15(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by
the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 8th,
1948, according to which everyone has the right to a nationality.
Furthermore, refusal to exercise protection is not in accordance
with the frequent attempts made at the present time to prevent
the increase in the number of cases of stateless persons and to pro-
vide protection against acts violating the fundamental human
rights recognized by international law as a minimum standard,
without distinction as to nationality, religion or race.25
In the light of the foregoing, it is unfortunate that the drafters of
the 1961 Harvard draft convention on state responsibility incorporated
the Nottebohm doctrine and proposed that a "State is not entitled to
present a claim on behalf of a natural person who is its national if that
person lacks a genuine connection of sentiment, residence, or other
interests with that State."' 26 Condoning unnecessary legalisms of im-
24. See, e.g., H. VAN PANHUYS, supra note 1, at 95-105; De Visscher. L'Affaire Notte-
bohm, 27 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 238 (1956); Jones, The Notte.
bohm Case, 5 INT'L &- Comp. L.Q. 230 (1956); Kunz, The Nottebohm Judgment (Second
Phase), 54 Am. J. INT'L L. 536 (1960).
25. Nottebohm Case, [1955] I.C.J. 4, 63-64.
26. L. SOHN & R. BAXTER, supra note 5, at 199 (draft art. 23, para. 3).
To apply the Nottebohm doctrine to situations in which there exists only a "blood
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precise policy reference, which deny individuals a hearing upon the
merits of their claims, can scarcely augment human rights.
While the Nottebohm decision denied the competence of Liechten-
stein to protect a naturalized citizen, the Flegenheimer27 case involved
the denial of protection to a national by birth. Paradoxically, Professor
Sauser-Hall, defeated counsel for Liechtenstein in Nottebohm who
presided over the Italian-United States Conciliation Commission in
the Flegenheimer case, distinguished and rejected the Nottebohm
decision in such a way as to augment, rather than mitigate, the inequi-
ties perpetrated in Nottebohm.
In the Flegenheimer case, Albert Flegenheimer sought invalidation
of the 1941 sale of his stock in an Italian company, at a nominal sum,
to which he assented because of his alleged fear of prevailing Italian
anti-Semitic legislation and persecution. The Commission declared
the petition filed on his behalf inadmissible on the ground that he was
not a "United Nations national" within the scope of Article 78 of the
Peace Treaty with Italy.
Albert's father, Samuel Flegenheimer, born in Baden, Germany, had
moved to the United States in the 1860's and become a naturalized
American citizen in 1873. In 1874, he returned to Germany to live in
the then Kingdom of Wurttemberg, where Albert was born in 1890.
On August 23, 1894, Samuel Flegenheimer was naturalized in
Wurttemberg; and Albert, age 4, together with his brothers, was
naturalized with his father. Not until 1933, when the Nazis attained
power in Germany, was Albert Flegenheimer aware of his father's
former American citizenship-and hence of the possibility of his own
claim to such citizenship. Thereupon he approached American con-
sulates and embassies in Europe to obtain a determination of his citi-
zenship status, but his inquiries were answered either ambiguously
or negatively.
In 1937, because of his fear of Nazi persecution, Albert Flegen-
heimer left Germany for Italy, Switzerland, and eventually Canada.
On November 3, 1939, he formally submitted his claim to American
citizenship at the United States Consulate in Winnipeg, Canada. In
response later that month, the Board of Special Inquiry of the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service of the United States decided
(erroneously, as later appeared) that he was not an American citizen. In
link" between a national and his state would deny hundreds of thousands of "overseas"
nationals of China, France, and the United Kingdom the protection of their home
government. Goldschmidt, Recent Applications of Domestic Nationality Laws by In-
ternational Tribunals, 28 FORDHAm L. REv. 689, 695 (1960).
27. Flegenheimer Claim, 25 I.L.R. 91 (Italian-United States Conciliation Commission
1963). See 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 944 (1959).
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April 1940, he was divested of German nationality by German decree.
Subsequently, he took up residence in the United States in 1941-42
on a temporary visa. In February 1942, the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service acknowledged that Flegenheimer was an American citi-
zen by birth. In October 1946, the Department of State, after an earlier
refusal, granted him a United States passport. Subsequent to the com-
mencement of proceedings before the Conciliation Commission, Fleg-
enheimer was issued, on July 10, 1952, a certificate of United States
nationality by the Acting Assistant Commissioner, Inspection and Ex-
aminations Division, Immigration and Naturalization Service of the
United States.
By a unanimous decision the Conciliation Commission rejected the
petition on behalf of Albert Flegenheimer, stating that though he
"acquired by filiation the nationality of the United States, at birth, in
Wurttemberg," he "acquired German and Wurttemberg nationality
as the result of his naturalization in Wurttemberg on August 23, 1894,
and thereby lost, after five years' residence in his new home country,
his American nationality, under the Bancroft Treaty concluded on
July 2, 1868, between the United States of America and Wurttem-
berg."28 The Commission further found that Flegenheimer "never
reacquired his American nationality after reaching majority"2 and
concluded that it was not bound by the certificate of American na-
tionality of July 10, 1952.
In rejecting the validity of the certificate of United States national-
ity of July 10, 1952, the Commission substituted its own evaluation of
"nationality" for that of the United States. Clearly, in order to deter-
mine its jurisdiction, an international commission may investigate the
nationality of parties on whose behalf claims are presented. However,
the authorized scope of investigation is confined to establishing the
facts pertinent to nationality and to appraisal of whether or not a state
has exceeded accepted limits in its conferment of nationality. In the
absence of claims by another state to the same individual or allega-
tions that a state accords protection on the basis of spurious, fraudu-
lent or impermissible grounds, the Commission is not authorized to
substitute its own determination of nationality for that of a claimant
state. This would appear the clear import of the Hague Convention
on Nationality, which only makes customary international law explicit,
when it stipulates that "[i]t is for each state to determine under its
28. 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 944, 945 (1959).
29. Id.
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own law who are its nationals"3 0 and adds that "[a]ny question as to
whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular state shall
be determined by the laws of that state."3 ' The one constraint estab-
lished upon the discretion of states in conferring nationality is that
such conferment is required to be recognized by other states only
insofar as it is in accord with the traditional criteria of international
law.3 2
By these commonly accepted criteria of international law the Com-
mission might have been expected to honor the United States' authori-
tative determination that Flegenheimer was its national. The Com-
mission adverted to no facts and to no policies which could give it
authority to override the determination by the United States. There
was no other state asserting a competing claim to Albert Flegenheimer
as its national or offering to protect him. There was no suggestion,
nor could one have been made, that any rule of international law
would preclude the United States from recognizing Flegenheimer as
its national. Even as against Wurttemberg the United States was an
authoritative interpreter of any implied commitment it was alleged to
have made about relinquishment of nationality. There was no sugges-
tion that the United States' espousal of Flegenheimer's claim was in
any way fraudulent or spurious. On the contrary, the United States
obviously accepted Albert Flegenheimer in the fullest degree, and im-
posed obligation on him in the fullest degree, as citizen and national.
Indeed, it did not appear that Flegenheimer's nationality could else-
where be denied in any forum for any purpose.
It has thus been observed that it is "an unwarranted excess of
power" 33 for the Commission to pry into the authoritative decisions
of a claimant state so as to appraise the facts upon which the state has
based its decision, and further to substitute its own evaluation for, and
in negation of, the authoritative determination of the competent state
officials. The net effect, as in Nottebohm, is denial of protection-of
the minimum right to a hearing upon the merits-to the individual
concerned.
The strangling technicalities of the "nationality" myth as applied
to transnational business enterprises may also be employed to deprive
individuals and groups of individuals of a protector which can secure
appropriate hearings upon the merits of controversies. As the role of
30. The Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality
Laws of 1930, art. 1, 179 L.N.T.S. 89, 99.
31. Id. art. 2.
32. Id. art. 1.
33. Goldschmidt, supra note 26, at 714.
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transnational enterprises becomes increasingly important, severe strains
are placed upon the traditional doctrine affirming the nationality of
claims. Based more or less on the doctrine of nationality applicable to
individuals, the traditional doctrine attributes the competence to pro-
tect a corporate entity to the state under the laws of which it is in-
corporated and in whose territory it has its registered office. 34 As with
respect to individual human beings, however, the concept of the na-
tionality of business entities is susceptible to manipulation in arbi-
trary ways. The Barcelona Traction case 35 is a dramatic recent illustra-
tion.
The Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company was incorpo-
rated in Toronto, Canada, in 1911, as a holding company for various
wholly or substantially owned Spanish and Canadian subsidiaries, to
develop and operate an electric power system in Spain. In 1948, a
Spanish court declared it bankrupt and its assets were seized. As part
of the company's unsuccessful efforts to resist the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, the Belgian, British, Canadian, and United States govern-
ments made representations to Spain on behalf of the company. For
reasons not of record, the Canadian government ceased its diplomatic
efforts on behalf of Barcelona Traction after 1955. Since Belgian
nationals owned a large majority of the stock in the company, the
Belgian government, after an earlier application to the court in 1958
and its subsequent withdrawal in 196 1,36 brought this case before the
International Court of Justice in 1962. The Spanish government raised
four preliminary objections, two of which were rejected by the court
in 1964; the other two were joined by the court on the merits. The
court's final judgment, rendered in February 1970, upheld Spain's
third preliminary objection, declaring that Belgium lacked standing
(jus standi) to espouse a claim for its nationals, shareholders in a
Canadian company, for damages allegedly resulting from illegal acts of
various organs of the Spanish government against the company. Bel-
34. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited,
Second Phase, [1970] I.C.J. 4, 42.
35. Id. For comments on this decision, see Briggs, Barcelona Traction: The Jus
Standi of Belgium, 65 Am. J. INT'L L.. 327 (1971); Higgins, Aspects of the Case Con-
cerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd., 11 VA. J. INT'L L.
327 (1971); Lillich, The Rigidity of Barcelona, 65 Am. J. INT'L L. 522 (1971); Metzger,
Nationality of Corporate Investment under Investment Guaranty Schemes-The Rele-
vance of Barcelona Traction, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 532 (1971); Note, Protection of Share-
holder Interests in Foreign Corporations-Barcelona Traction Revisited, 41 FORDHA L.
REv. 394 (1972); 5 j. INT'L L. & EcON. DEVELOI'MENT 239 (1971); Note, Economic Inter-
nationalism vs. National Parochialism: Barcelona Traction, 3 L. & POLICY IN INT'L Bus.
542 (1971); 3 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. 8 POL. 391 (1970).
36. [1961] LCJ. 9.
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gium's application was thus dismissed and the merits of the case were
not considered by the court.
The central issue was the competence of Belgium to extend pro-
tection to Belgian shareholders in a company which is a juridical en-
tity incorporated in Canada. The actual and ultimate deprivations as
caused by the illegal treatment of the "company" were, of course, sus-
tained by the shareholders. The court, however, building upon the
traditional myth of state responsibility (state rights independent of
the injured individual), phrased the issue this way:
Has a right of Belgium been violated on account of its nationals'
[sic] having suffered infringement of their rights as shareholders
in a company not of Belgian nationality?3T
While the court conceded that individual shareholders do ultimately
suffer for damage done to the company, it emphasized that the com-
pany, as a corporate entity, retains its own separate legal personality,
independent of its shareholders. Though the company is "in a pre-
carious financial situation," that condition does not constitute "the
demise of the corporate entity."38 Unless and until there is "the legal
demise of the company," according to the court, there is no "inde-
pendent right of action" for the shareholders and thus for their gov-
ernments to espouse their claims.3 9
The court further observed that the company, endowed with the
"nationality" of Canada because of its incorporation in Canada, would
look only to Canada for protection. Although Canada ceased to es-
pouse the company's claim after 1955, "[t]he Canadian Government
has nonetheless retained its capacity to exercise diplomatic protection"
for Barcelona Traction. 40 The Canadian government had absolute dis-
cretion to decide whether or not to exercise its right of protection:
The state must be viewed as the sole judge to decide whether its
protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when
it will cease. It retains in this respect a discretionary power the
exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a po-
litical or other nature, unrelated to the particular case. Since the
claim of the state is not identical with that of the individual or
corporate person whose cause is espoused, the state enjoys com-
plete freedom of action.41
37. [1970] I.C.J. 4, 34.
38. Id. at 41.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 44.
41. Id. at 45.
917
The Yale Law Journal
The court finally cautioned that a Pandora's box would be opened
if shareholders' governments were allowed to espouse their claims:
The Court considers that the adoption of the theory of diplomatic
protection of shareholders as such, by opening the door to com-
peting diplomatic claims, could create an atmosphere of confu-
sion and'insecurity in international economic relations. The dan-
ger would be all the g-reater inasmuch as the shares of companies
whose activity is international are widely scattered and frequently
change hands... . As the right of protection vested in the national
State of the company cannot be regarded as extinguished because
it is not exercised, it is not possible to accept the proposition that
in case of its non-exercise the national States of the shareholders
have a right of protection secondary to that of the national State
of the company. 42
In contemporary law it is thus apparent that the individual human
being is almost completely dependent upon a state of nationality for
securing a hearing upon the merits upon injuries done to him by
other states.
B. Claims Relating to the Conferment of Nationality
International law accords states a high degree of discretion in the
conferment of nationality. It is far from clear what limitations are
imposed on the competence of states. The Hague Convention on
Nationality of 193043 provides, somewhat ambivalently, both a grant
of competence and a limitation. The grant of competence in articles
I and 2 stipulates that "[ijt is for each State to determine under its
own law who are its nationals" and that "[a]ny question as to whether
a person possesses the nationality of a particular State shall be de-
termined in accordance with the laws of that State." The stated limi-
tation is that the nationality law of each state "shall be recognised by
other States in so far as it is consistent with international conven-
tions, international custom, and the principles of law generally rec-
ognised with regard to nationality."44 Unfortunately, the Convention
nowhere specifies the conferment criteria that are recognized or re-
quired by international law.
Any criteria that limit states' competence to confer nationality must
42. Id. at 49.
43. The Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality
Laws, signed at the Hague, April 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89. See 5 M. HUDSON, INTER-
NATIONAL LEGISLATION 359 (1936).
44. The Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality
Laws, supra note 43, art. 1.
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be inferred from customary practice. Thus, states have commonly
utilized either or both of two major principles: jus sanguinis and
jus soli.4a The older of the two principles, jus sanguinis-conferment
of nationality by blood relation (descent)-is at least as old as Roman
law and is preferred by the civil law countries. The principle of jus
soli-conferment of nationality based on place of birth-is an out-
growth of the feudal system favored by the common law countries.
The overwhelming trend is toward a mixed system that employs both
principles in varying combinations. 4 The uniformity in exclusive
reliance upon these two principles has been such as to suggest to some
commentators the emergence of a customary rule that no other grounds
are permissible. 47
The important point from the perspective of human rights is that
these two principles for conferment of nationality at birth disregard
human volition. The individual selects neither his parents nor his
place of birth. The great bulk of mankind have their nationality
thrust upon them, with little effective prospect of change.48
With reference to grounds subsequent to birth, states have sought
to confer nationality upon a finding of express consent or a variety
of factors, in which consent may or may not be included.4 9 Among
these latter factors are marriage, recognition by affiliation, legitima-
tion, adoption, residence (domicile), immigration animo manendi0 °
land ownership, paternity, appointment as a university professor,51
and holding a public post.
45. See Sandifer. A Comparative Study of Laws Relating to Nationality at Birth
and to Loss of Nationality, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 248, 249-61 (1935); cf. Winter, Nationality
or Domicile? The Present State of Affairs, 128 HAGUE RECUEIL 347 (1969).
"Countries of emigration," observed the Harvard Research, "are inclined to emphasize
the jus sanguinis for the purpose of retaining the allegiance of descendants of their
nationals who have settled in various parts of the world, while countries of immigration,
including some countries of Asia and Africa, as well as those in the western hemis-
phere, are inclined to emphasize the jus soli, in order to have the allegiance of per-
sons born within their territories of alien parents." Harvard Research, supra note 1,
at 39.
46. "From an examination of the nationality laws of the various states," according
to the often-quoted Harvard Research, "it appears that seventeen are based solely on
jus sanguinis, two equally upon jus soli and jus sanguinis, twenty-five principally upon
jus sanguinis but partly upon jus soli and twenty-six principally upon jus soli and
partly upon jus sanguinis. The nationality law of no country is based solely upon
jus soli, A combination of the two systems is found in the laws of most countries."
Harvard Research, supra note 1, at 29.
47. See, e.g., Article 3 of the Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Nationality:
"A state may not confer its nationality at birth upon a person except upon the basis
of (a) the birth of such person within its territory or a place assimilated thereto (jus
sol), or (b) the descent of such person from one of its nationals (jus sanguinis)." Id.
at 13, 27; Hudson, supra note 1, at 7.
48. See pp. 925-28 infra.
49. See Harvard Research, supra note 1, at 83-98; Hudson, supra note 1, at 8.
50. See Brownlie, supra note 1, at 308.
51. See Hudson, supra note 1, at 8.
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Conferment upon the basis of consent is, of course, in conformity
with our recommended policy of human dignity. The "general prin-
ciple" underlying naturalization in its most comprehensive sense is
"the voluntary choice by an individual of a particular nationality." 2
To impose naturalization upon individual persons against their will,
individually or collectively, on the other hand, is incompatible with
the commonly accepted principles of international law. Thus, com-
pulsory conferment upon such bases as land ownership or residence
is impermissible.53 For instance, in the nineteenth century, when
certain Latin-American states (e.g., Peru and Mexico) imposed nation-
ality upon aliens who had acquired real property in the country, that
practice was protested by other states and was held incompatible with
international law by international tribunals. In the Anderson and
Thompson case, 54 Mexico had objected to the jurisdiction of the
United States-Mexico Mixed Claims Commission in connection with
a claim of the United States on behalf of two of its nationals. Mexico
argued that both Anderson and Thompson had become, under the
Mexican Constitution of 1857, Mexican nationals by purchasing land
in Mexico in 1863. Dismissing the Mexican demurrer, Umpire Lieber
declared that, although the Mexican Constitution "clearly means to
confer a benefit upon the foreign purchaser of land, . . . equity would
assuredly forbid us to force this benefit upon claimants . . .merely
on account of omitting a declaration of a negative." 5r Because the
Mexican Nationality Law of 1886 contained the same feature, a sim-
ilar issue arose subsequently in the Rau case before the German-
Mexican Claims Commission in 1930.56 Again, Mexico objected to
the Commission's jurisdiction over the German claim on behalf of its
alleged national who had acquired land in Mexico. Dismissing the
Mexican objection, the Commission emphatically stated that "inter-
national law ... does not permit compulsory change of nationality."5 7
Mexico subsequently withdrew its counterclaim and the objectionable
provisions were abandoned in later Mexican Nationality Laws. 8
Imposition of nationality on the mere ground of residence is sim-
ilarly impermissible. For instance, in 1889, the Provisional Govern-
52. J. JONES, BRITISH NATIONALITY LAW AND PRACTICE 15 (1947).
53. See P. WEIs, supra note 1, at 104-16; Hudson, supra note 1, at 8.
54. 3 J. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRrATIONS 2479 (1898).
55. Id. at 2479-81.
56. In re Rau, [1931-32] Ann. Dig. 251 (No. 124) (German-Mexican Claims Com-
mission 1930).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., art. 30, The Mexican Constitution of 1917, as amended by Decree of
18 January 1934, LAws CONCERNING NATIONALITY, supra note 1, at 307.
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ment of Brazil issued a decree that all aliens residing in Brazil on
November 15, 1889, would automatically be regarded as Brazilian
nationals unless they should declare, within six months, a contrary
intention before appropriate Brazilian officials."0 This proclamation
provoked severe condemnation and protests of nonrecognition by
other states, notably Italy, Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal,
Austria-Hungary, and the United States.60
A more recent example relates to Argentina. A bill purporting to
confer automatic Argentine nationality on aliens after two years' resi-
dence led to such an outburst of protests by other governments that
it was finally withdrawn. 61
Perhaps the most notorious example is the mass imposition of Ger-
man nationality on nationals of territories occupied by Germany dur-
ing World War II. In 1943 Hitler also purported to confer German
nationality on all foreign nationals of "German origin" then serving
in the German armed forces. In 1951, this matter was raised in the
Compulsory Grant of German Nationality Case62 before a court of
the German Federal Republic. The applicant, in German custody,
was sought by Austria for extradition; he was a person of "German
origin" serving in the German army at the time of Hitler's decree.
He thus claimed nonextradition on the basis of his being a German
national. The Court of Appeal of Neustadt declared Hitler's decree
invalid on the ground that only the Reichstag, not the Chancellor,
was empowered to prescribe naturalization matters at that point in
time. The applicant was not a German national and was thus extra-
dited to Austria. Subsequently, in 1955, the German Federal Republic
undertook to enable all persons purporting to have been made Ger-
man nationals under the compulsory Nazi measures to "disclaim Ger-
man nationality by an explicit declaration to that effect."0 3
59. See P. WVEISs, supra note 1, at 105-06.
60. See id. at 106-08.
61. See Hudson. supra note 1, at 8. Note, however, article 31 of the Constitution
of the Argentine Republic:
Foreigners who enter the country without violating the laws shall enjoy all the
civil rights of Argentinians, as well as political rights, five years after having ob-
tained Argentinian nationality. Upon their petition they may be naturalized if
they have resided two consecutive years in the territory of the Nation, and they
shall acquire Argentinian nationality automatically at the end of five years of
continuous residence in the absence of express declaration to the contrary.
1 A. PEASLEE, CONsTUTIONS OF NATIONS 51 (2d ed. 1956).
Dean John H. Vigmore proposed that nationality be based on domicile and that
two years' residence in a state automatically results in acquisition of the nationality
of that state. See Wigmore, Domicile, Double Allegiance, and World Citizenship, 21
ILL. L. REv. 761 (1927).
62. Compulsory Grant of German Nationality Case, [1951] I.L.R. 247 (Court of Ap-
peal of Neustadt, German Federal Republic 1951).
63. Art. 1, Settlement of Nationality Questions Act of 1955, SUPPLEMENT TO LAws
CONCERNING NATIONALITY, supra note 1, at 116.
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In the case of conferment upon such grounds as marriage, legitima-
tion, adoption, and recognition by affiliation, inquiry may be made
to ascertain the degree of volition actually present. Since, however,
the activities described by these grounds are widely known to carry
the consequence of nationality and often entail basic community pol-
icies about collateral problems which make nationality a desirable
consequence, it is a common practice of decisionmakers to infer or
assume a voluntary act on the part of the individual or those repre-
senting him. Thus, an act which has "a direct relation to nationality"
may be considered to show "unquestionably the desire and intention
of a person to take the nationality of a state."6 4
The classic summary is that of Hall:
Consent no doubt may be a matter of inference: and if the indi-
vidual does acts of a political, or even, possibly, of a municipal
nature, without inquiry whether the law regards the performance
of such acts as an expression of desire on his part to identify him-
self with the state, he has no ground for complaint if his consent
is inferred, and if he finds himself burdened upon the state terri-
tory with obligations correlative to the privileges which he has
assumed. But apart from acts which can reasonably be supposed
to indicate intention, his national character may with propriety
be considered to remain unaltered. It is unquestionably not within
the competence of a state to impose its nationality in virtue of
mere residence, of marriage with a native, of the acquisition of
landed property, and other such acts, which lie wholly within the
range of the personal life, or which may be necessities of commer-
cial or industrial business. 65
However, the element of voluntarism or consent may, as in the case
of married women and minors, often be minimal or a mere fiction.
With regard to the effect of marriage on nationality, national laws
differ widely. 0 Basically speaking, there are two opposing principles
governing the law on the nationality of married women. The tradi-
tional principle is the unity of the family, according to which the
nationality of all members of the family-mother, father, and children
under age-should be the same, in order to avoid split loyalty within
the family. The second principle honors the freedom of a married
woman to choose her own nationality. Under the interplay of these
64. Harvard Research, supra note 1, at 54.
65. W. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 267-68 (8th ed. 1924).
66. See UNITED NATIONS, NATIONALITY OF MARRIED WOMEN (1963); UNITED NATIONS,
CONVENTION ON THE NATIONALITY OF MARRIED WOMEN (1962); W. WALTZ, THE NA-
TIONALITY OF MARRIED WOMEN (1937).
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two basic principles, municipal laws about the nationality of married
women can be divided into three categories: (1) the nationality of the
wife follows automatically that of the husband; (2) though marriage
to a man of a different nationality affects the nationality of the wife,
provisions are made to avoid the wife's statelessness or double nation-
ality; and (3) the woman has the right to choose her own nationality
and marriage will not affect the nationality of the wife. According to
a recent United Nations study, an alien woman automatically acquires
the nationality of her husband upon marriage under the law of 28
states; under the law of 68 states, the alien wife may on certain condi-
tions acquire the nationality of the husband; and under the law of 12
states marriage of an alien woman to a national has no effect whatever
on her nationality.67
The United States Supreme Court once suggested that the marriage
of a woman to an alien caused her to lose her nationality because it
amounied to "voluntary expatriation"; the woman freely contracted
the marriage with notice of the consequences.68 Because marriage is
generally stipulated to affect only the wife's-not husband's-nation-
ality, such rationalization is difficult to reconcile with the principle
of the equality of the sexes.
Indeed, from the perspective of individual human rights, marriage
should have no automatic effect on the nationality of either the wife
or the husband. An alien woman, in marrying a national, does not
necessarily signify her intention to identify with the state of which
her husband is a national or to sever her ties with the state of her
nationality. With the growing emphasis on the equality of the sexes,
particularly in the wake of the current movement for the liberation
of women, the trend is away from the principle that a married woman's
nationality is automatically that of her husband. 609 Article 1 of the
Convention on the Nationality of Married Women emphatically af-
firms this trend:
Each Contracting State agrees that neither the celebration nor
the dissolution of marriage between one of its nationals and an
alien, nor the change of nationality by the husband during mar-
riage, shall automatically affect the nationality of the wife.70
67. NATIONALITY OF MARRIED WOMEN, supra note 66, at 122-25 (Annex).
68. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
69. See NATIONALITY OF MARRIED WOMEN, supra note 66, at 7.
70. The Convention was opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly
Resolution 1040 (XI) of 29 January 1957; it became effective on August 11, 1958. UNITED
NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 52 (1967) [hereinafter cited as U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS]. For the history
and commentary of this Convention, see CONVENTION ON THE NATIONALITY OF MARRIED
WO.kEN, supra note 66. For its text see 309 U.N.T.S. 65.
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With respect to minor children, the maintenance of family unity
would seem to compel the rule that the child follows the father's
nationality in the case of legitimation and adoption and that minor
children are naturalized through the naturalization of tlieir parentsJ 1
However, because the element of volition is absent on the part of
minors, it has increasingly been urged that minors be given the option
to resume their original nationality when they attain adulthood.72
Compulsory naturalization has often been associated with territorial
change.73 For instance, when one state cedes a territory to another,
the ceding state is considered competent to transfer the allegiance of
the inhabitants and the transfer is deemed an automatic consequence
of the cession. The acquiring state has been traditionally required, at
the same time, to confer its nationality, though not the political rights
of citizens, upon those persons.74 Upon occasion, however, these harsh
doctrines are modified in deference to human rights and self-deter-
mination. Sometimes a plebiscite is employed to determine whether
a transfer of territory is in accord with the wishes of the majority of
the inhabitants concerned.7 5 More frequently, state practice-as em-
bodied in many treaties of cession or of peace-seeks to allow indi-
vidual inhabitants of the ceded territory an option on nationality,
including the retention of the original nationality. 6 Thus, the Inter-
71. See P. WEIS, supra note 1, at 114.
72. See, e.g., the nationality laws of Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Ceylon,
Ecuador, Great Britain, Ghana, Greece, India, Luxembourg, Malaya, Monaco, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Syria, Sudan, Thailand, Venezuela, and Union of South
Africa, in LAWS CONCERNING NATIONALITY, supra note 1.
73. See P. WEIS, supra note 1, at 139-64; Hudson, supra note 1, at 8-10; Mann,
The Effects of Changes of Sovereignty upon Nationality, 5 MODERN L. REV. 218 (1942).
74. See P. JFssUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 76 (1952); cf. H. BRIGGS, supra note
10, at 501-05.
75. On plebiscites, see generally H. JOHNSON, SELF-DETERMINATION WITHIN THE COM-
MUNITY OF NATIONS (1967); J. MATTERN, THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE PLEBISCITE IN THE
DETERMINATION OF SOVEREIGNTY (1920); 1 & 2 S. WAMBAUGH, PLEBISCITES SINCE THE WORLD
WAR (1933); S. WAMBAUGH, A 'ONOGRAPH OF PLEBISCITES (1920); Chen & Reisman, Who
Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title, 81 YALE L.T. 599, 660-69 (1972).
76. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 551 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955) [here-
inafter cited as Oppenhein-Lauterpachtl; Gettys, The Effect of Changes of Sovereignty
on Nationality, 21 AM. J. INT'L L. 268, 271 (1927); Hudson, supra note 1, at 9-10;
Kunz, Nationality and the Option Clauses in the Italian Peace Treaty, 41 AM. J.
INT'L L. 622 (1947).
Lord McNair observed:
The hardship of an involuntary change of nationality has led with increasing fre-
quency in recent years to the adoption of one of the following forms of mitigation:
(a) Plebiscite. The treaty may stipulate for the cession of particular pieces of ter-
ritory to depend upon the result of a plebiscite by the nationals of the ceding
State inhabiting the territory; such a provision occurs in several articles of the
Peace Treaties of 1919-1920, but it was not generalized;
(b) Option of nationality. The treaty may give the nationals of the ceding State
inhabiting the territory ceded an option to retain the nationality of the ceding
State; if they exercise that option, the acquiring State may, in default of contrary
stipulation, expel them as any aliens may be expelled;
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American Convention on Nationality concluded at Montevideo in
1933 contains the following provision in article 4:
In case of the transfer of a portion of the territory on the part of
one of the States signatory hereof to another of such States, the
inhabitants of such transferred territory must not consider them-
selves as nationals of the State to which they are transferred, un-
less they expressly opt to change their original nationality.77
One harsh qualification is that "failing a stipulation expressly for-
bidding it, the acquiring State may expel those inhabitants who have
made use of the option and retained their old citizenship, since other-
wise the whole population of the ceded territory might actually con-
sist of aliens and endanger the safety of the acquiring State."' 8 It
would appear vital from a human rights perspective, nevertheless,
that those individual inhabitants who have chosen not to acquire the
new nationality be free to reside on the ceded territory.
One important concession in favor of human rights is that states
are not regarded as competent to impose nationality upon individuals
who are not physically present within a territory at the time of its
transfer.79 It is said that the nationality of the successor state can be
conferred upon nationals of the predecessor state only if they submit
voluntarily to its jurisdiction, by virtue of an explicit declaration or
voluntary return to their land of origin. This position was spotlighted
in United States ex rel. Schwarzkopf v. Uhl, District Director of Im-
migration,"o where the court held that an Austrian national who had
been resident in the United States when Germany annexed Austria
had not acquired German nationality.
With respect to the converse dimension of the naturalization prob-
lem, we must note that some of the most significant deprivations of
human rights are a consequence of the denial of naturalization to
people who actively seek it. Doctrine holds that naturalization is a
privilege within the discretion of the state, not a right of the applicant.
As the United States Supreme Court put it,
(c) Option to emigrate. The treaty may give the inhabitants an option to emigrate
within a certain time and also retain their nationality.
The growth of the principle of self-determination tends to favour the adoption
of one or more of these palliatives. It must, however, be emphasized that the law
does not enjoin them and they do not apply unless the high contracting parties
choose to adopt them.
A. McNAIR, LEGAL EFFECTS OF WVAR 388-90 (3d ed. 1948).
77. 6 M. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 593 (1937); LAWS CONCERNING NA-
TIONALiTy, supra note I, at 585.
78. 1 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, supra note 76, at 552.
79. See Hudson, supra note 1, at 9.
80. 137 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1943).
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Naturalization is a privilege, to be given, qualified, or withheld
as Congress may determine, and which the alien may claim as of
right only upon compliance with the terms which Congress im-
poses.81
States differ widely in the scope and severity of limitations imposed on
voluntary naturalization. These limitations may include residence,
age, moral character, race, political character, health, skill, and wealth
of the applicant. 82 These preconditions for naturalization, including
as well administrative hurdles, are so onerous, unfortunately, that
people who seek naturalization are often denied it.
For example, residence, regarded as the most significant indicator
of a person's factual attachment to a territorial community, is a common
precondition for naturalization. The overriding importance of the
residence requirement as an inhibition upon naturalization derives
from the fact that access to territory, with appropriate immigrant
status, is a precondition to fulfilling the residence requirement; such
access is itself subject to many difficult and arbitrary conditions.83
States differ, moreover, in the requirements they impose with respect
to length of residence and the necessity of physical presence. The length
of residence requirements range from two to ten years. While there has
been a trend toward greater uniformity (typically three or five years),
some states still demand a longer period of residence8 4
Some states require that an applicant for naturalization be of good
character at the time his petition is filed.8 The United States, how-
ever, insists further that the applicant demonstrate "good moral char-
acter" throughout the required "probationary period" of residence.8 6
The requirement of good moral character, elusive and susceptible of
arbitrary application, has proved to be the principal source of litiga-
tion concerning naturalization in the United States.87 Though good
81. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 615 (1931). See also Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707-08 (1893).
82. Cf. Harvard Research, supra note 1, at 83-100.
83. We will explore this problem in connection with the claims to freedom of
movement, including claims of access to territory.
84. Harvard Research, supra note 1, at 89-91.
85. See, e.g., Norway, art. 6(3), Nationality Act No. 3 of 8 December 1950, LAws
CONCERNING NATIONALITY, supra note 1, at 352, 353; Japan, art. 4(3), Nationality Law
of 4 May 1950, id. at 271, 272; British Nationality Act of 30 July 1948, Second Schedule,
Sec. 1(c), id. at 468, 482.
86. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3) (1970) provides:
No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be naturalized
unless such petitioner . . . (3) during all the period referred to in this subsection
[usually five years] has been and still is a person of good moral character, attached
to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the
good order and happiness of the United States.
87. See Developments in the Law-Immigration and Nationality, 66 HARV. L. REv.
643, 710 (1953).
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moral character was made a requirement for naturalization as early
as 1790,88 the term was undefined by statute until 1952. In 1952,
Congress sought to mitigate the confusing and controversial state of
the law by enumerating specific grounds, such as drunkenness, adul-
tery, polygamy, prostitution, and gambling, that would preclude a
finding of good moral character.89 Nevertheless, the good moral char-
acter test has remained a source of uncertainty for persons seeking
naturalization and the Immigration and Naturalization Service and
the courts continue to enjoy wide discretion in applying it. Even if an
applicant for naturalization has committed none of the proscribed
acts, a court is not barred from "finding that for other reasons such
person is or was not of good moral character."'9 0 The arbitrary and
inconsistent application of this requirement is amply illustrated by
the controversies concerning the sexual behavior of unmarried aliens
and the suitability of homosexuals for citizenship."' A commentator
has thus critically observed that
intelligibility is one of the finest attributes of law, if not its es-
sence; and that on these grounds alone a statutory requirement
[good moral character] destined to be empty of legal meaning for
its entire legal existence should not properly be part of law.92
The net effect, as before 1952, is significant deprivations of human
rights. The requirement of good moral character has become the fore-
most obstacle to naturalization.
Equally susceptible of abuse are requirements relating to political
activities. It has been a common practice of states to require aliens
seeking naturalization to take an oath of allegiance. Some states have
gone further to stipulate that the commission of certain political acts
by an applicant would operate to bar his naturalization. While some
states couch this requirement generally in terms of conduct detri-
mental to the interests of the state,93 some have undertaken specific
formulations. The United States, in particular, is most explicit in this
regard. Thus, in addition to requiring adherence to the principles of
88. See Note, Good Moral Character in Naturalization Proceedings, 48 COLUM. L.
REv. 622 (1948).
89. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (1970).
90. Id.
91. See Newton, On Coherence in the Law: A Study of the "Good Moral Character"
Requirement in the Naturalization Statute, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 40, 43-59 (1972); Note,
Naturalization and the Adjudication of Good Moral Character: An Exercise in Judicial
Uncertainty, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 545, 560-82 (1972).
92. Newton, supra note 91, at 70.
93. See, e.g., Albania, art. 7(5), Nationality Act No. 377 of 1946, LAWS CONCERNING
NATIONALITY, supra note 1, at 4, 5; France, art. 70, Nationality Code of 1945, id. at
152, 161; Hungary, art. 4(b), Nationality Act LX of 1948, id. at 219,'220.
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the Constitution and a favorable disposition to the United States,94
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 specifically prohibits the
naturalization of persons opposed to government or law, persons who
favor totalitarian forms of government,9" and persons who have de-
serted from the United States Armed Forces.9
In sum, it is apparent that conferment of nationality at birth is not
a volitional act of the individual concerned. Though states give con-
sent greater emphasis in connection with conferment of nationality
after birth, involuntary naturalization is far from a rare occurrence
and efforts toward voluntary acquisition of nationality often fail.
Given the differential distribution of resources and opportunities for
value shaping and sharing about the globe, the instability and fragility
of the inherited organizations of territorial communities, and the
ever increasing mobility of people and frequency of transnational
interactions, every individual person should be free to effect a volun-
tary change in his nationality and thus to identify with the political
community of his own choice. The fact that a person possesses a par-
ticular nationality at birth, or after birth, should not condemn him
in perpetuity to membership in a body politic which may be perceived
by him to be more oppressive than protective. As a matter of human
rights every person should be free to change his nationality. Thus,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that "[n]o one
shall be arbitrarily . . . denied the right to change his nationality. ' '0 7
Similarly, the American Convention on Human Rights provides that
"[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived . . . of the right to change
[nationality]." g Unfortunately, however, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human
Rights lack comparable provisions.
C. Claims Relating to Withdrawal of Nationality
The nationality of an individual may be withdrawn or lost upon
the initiative of the individual or of the state conferring nationality
and with or without the individual's consent. When an individual
takes the initiative to terminate a nationality, he is said to engage in
voluntary expatriation.99 When a state conditions its withdrawal of
94. 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (1970).
95. Id. § 1424.
96. Id. § 1425.
97. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 2 (art. 15(2)).
98. BAsic DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTEcTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (L. Sohn ,
r. Buergenthal eds. 1973) (art. 20(3)) [hereinafter cited as BASIC DOCUMENTS].
99. As Maxey has pointed out, "the word 'expatriation' tends to be used indis-
criminately, in both judicial discussion and popular speech, as comprehending all losses
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nationality upon the genuine consent of the individual, no problem
concerning human rights arises. The difficulty is that the line between
genuine consent and involuntary withdrawal is often difficult to per-
ceive. For purposes of economy, we follow the traditional categoriza-
tions of (1) voluntary expatriation, (2) withdrawal upon consent (gen-
uine or constructive), and (3) involuntary withdrawal, noting the dif-
ficulties as we progress.
1. Voluntary Expatriation
It has already been observed that the right to change a nationality
is increasingly regarded as a fundamental human right. 00 It is only by
guaranteeing this right that the world community affords individuals
opportunity to escape the bondage of the effective elites of any par-
ticular community. The right to renounce nationality-"voluntary ex-
patriation"-is of course an indispensable component of the right to
change it. Similarly, just as open access to territory is a precondition
to any realistic right to acquire nationality, so here a right of egress
is a necessary condition to any effective right of voluntary expatria-
tion. 01 Unless an individual can escape the bounds of a country, he
may find it impossible to free himself from the shackles of its na-
tionality. There would appear to be a slow trend toward protecting
a right of voluntary expatriation.
The demand for a right of voluntary expatriation has, despite the
long insistence by states upon indissoluble allegiance, a very ancient
history. Its roots are deep in Greek and Roman thought. Thus, a
United States Senator, citing Plato as authority, stated that
[a]t Athens it was permitted to each person upon examining the
laws and customs of the republic, if there was nothing found to
his charge, to retire with all of his goods, wherever else it pleased
him.102
of national status, however brought about. Failure to observe sharply demarcated
terminological boundaries has frequently been a source of confusion in this area of
inquiry; this is especially true in the United States, where the concept of voluntary
expatriation, through constant distortion, bears little, or no resemblance to the orig-
inal notion, as expressed in the statutory declaration of 1868." Maxey, Loss of Na-
tionality: Individual Choice or Government Fiat?, 26 ALBANY L. REV. 151, 151.52 (1962).
See also 5 J. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 42 44 (1972). For our
purposes, expatriation refers strictly to "voluntary expatriation" (in which a person takes
initiative to terminate a nationality) and is to be distinguished from loss of nation-
ality resulting from imputed consent and from involuntary withdrawal of nationality.
100. See p. 928 supra.
101. See H. LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN 129-33
(1945); H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTs 346-50 (1950).
102. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 4232 (1868) (remarks of Senator Patterson).
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Similarly, Hersch Lauterpacht, in making a strong case for the right
of expatriation, builds upon the thought of Socrates and Cicero.10 3
In the words of Socrates,
if any one does not like the city and its constitution, there is no
law to hinder or prevent him from going away whenever he likes,
either to the colonies or to some foreign country and taking his
property with him. 04
Notwithstanding his deference to state sovereignty, Vattel was eloquent
in defense of the right of expatriation. He stated that
every man is born free, and therefore the son of a citizen, when
arrived at the age of reason, may consider whether it is well for him
to join the society in which he happens to be by birth. If he does
not find that it is to his advantage to remain in it, he has the right
to leave it .... A citizen may therefore leave the State of which he
is a member, provided it be not at a critical moment when his with-
drawal might be greatly prejudicial to the State. 10
The right of the individual to expatriation was incorporated in the
French Constitution of September 3, 1791.106 It is, however, the United
States that has been the foremost champion of the right of voluntary
expatriation. In 1868, with a view to freeing recently naturalized Ameri-
cans from the allegiance demanded by the states from which they had
emigrated, the United States Congress proclaimed that
the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all peo-
ple, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness; ...
[a]ny declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision of any
officers of this government which denies, restricts, impairs, or ques-
tions the right of expatriation, is hereby declared inconsistent with
the fundamental principles of this government.10 7
The purpose of the Act of 1868, in the words of Hyde, was
to make clear the doctrine, first, that the freedom of an alien to
change his nationality through naturalization, in so far as he had
any part in the matter, was not dependent upon the consent of his
103. H. LAUTERPAcHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF IMAN 130-31 (1945).
104. Quoted in id. at 131.
105. 3 E. DE VATrTL, supra note 7, at 89.
106. See C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 185
(P. Corbett transl. rev. ed. 1968).
107. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223 (1868). The Fourteenth Amendment
was passed in the same year.
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sovereign beyond whose control he had placed himself; secondly,
that naturalization within the United States served to dissolve the
tie of allegiance with respect to that sovereign; and thirdly, that
by such process the individual acquired a new national character
entitled to recognition upon his return to the country of origin. 05
Similarly, departing from the doctrine of "indissoluble allegiance,"
Great Britain acknowledged a limited right of voluntary expatriation
in its Naturalisation Act of 1870, declaring:
Any British subject who has at any time . . . when in a foreign
state and not under any disability voluntarily become naturalized
in such state, shall . . . be deemed to have ceased to be a British
subject.1 09
At the 1930 Hague Conference for the Codification of International
Law, the United States Delegation made a strong plea for the incorpora-
tion of the principle of voluntary expatriation in these words:
For a century past, it has been the policy of my country that the
right of expatriation is an inherent and natural right of all persons.
It is true that allegiance is a duty, but it is not a chain that holds a
person in bondage and that he carries with him to a new life in a
new land. It is a duty and an obligation that a free man casts off
when he voluntarily assumes allegiance to the country of his new
home, and takes over the duties and the rights of a national there.
When he accepts the new tie, the old one is loosed and gone. This
principle is not a small matter. It is not a question of language, or
of formulae, or of phrases. It is a principle of the rights of man and
of the liberty of the human race.' 1 0
Though exhibiting some ambivalence, the delegates to the Conference
did not fully accept this policy. Thus, the Final Act of the Conference
noted that it was desirable
that States should apply the principle that the acquisition of a
foreign nationality through naturalization involves the loss of the
previous nationality,
108. 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE
UNITED STATES 1147-48 (2d rev. ed. 1945) (footnote omitted). The policy embodied in
the 1868 Act found further expression in a series of treaties, known as Bancroft Treaties,
the United States had concluded respectively with Badden (1868), Bavaria (1868), Hesse
(1868), Belgium (1868), Sweden and Norway (1869), Austro-Hungary (1870), Great Britain
(1872), Ecuador (1872), and Denmark (1872).
109. Sec. 6, British Naturalisation Act of 1870, reprinted in J. JONES, BRITISH NA-
TIONALITY LAW AND PRACTICE 88 (1947). See C. PARRY, NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP LAWS
OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 78-80 (1957).
110. 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS, ACTs OF THE CONFERENCE FOR THE CODIFICATION OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW, MEETINGS OF ThE CoMMITrEEs: NATIONALITY 80 (1930).
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and that,
pending the complete realization of the above principle, States
before conferring their nationality by naturalization should en-
deavor to ascertain that the person concerned has fulfilled, or is
in a position to fulfil, the conditions required by the law of his
country for the loss of its nationality.11'
This same ambivalence is apparent in state practice. Many states still
do not recognize that an individual lias the right, without condition,
voluntarily to withdraw his nationality and to sever his ties with the
country which claims him."12 So many conditions are commonly im-
posed that "conditional," rather than "voluntary," expatriation would
appear to be the appropriate descriptive label. In a world in which
people are still important bases of power, states are understandably
reluctant to yield their controls.
Even where voluntary expatriation is nominally recognized, difficult
barriers are erected. Notable among such barriers are the following:
(1) Exacting and carefully prescribed procedures must be followed to
renounce nationality. For instance, a United States national, in volun-
tarily renouncing his nationality "when in a foreign state," is required
to make a statement before a United States diplomatic or consular
officer in the form prescribed by the Secretary of State." 3 On the other
hand, when the renunciation is made in the United States during a
state of war, the individual must make a formal written renunciation
pursuant to the form stipulated by, and before such officer as may be
designated by, the Attorney General, who must determine that such
renunciation is not contrary to the interests of national defense." 4
(2) An individual may not expatriate himself while he is in the terri-
tory of the state of expatriation. It is a practice for many countries,
such as Germany and Switzerland, not to honor the individual's volun-
tary expatriation if the renunciation is made within the expatriating
state." 0 That expatriation is expected to occur abroad is also suggested
by the frequent discussion of the right of voluntary expatriation in
terms of automatic loss of nationality upon foreign naturalization.'"
111. Final Act of the Conference for the Codification of International Law, LrAGUE
OF NATIONS PUBLICATION SERIES 1930.V.7 (C.228.M.I15.1930.V.), at 14 [hereinafter cited
as Final Act of the Hague Conference].
112. Cf. Harvard Research, supra note 1, at 45-48, 100-06.
113. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6) (1970).
114. Id. § 1481(a)(7).
115. Sec. 25, (West German) Nationality Act of 22 July 1913, LAws CONCERNING NA-
TIONALITY, supra note 1, at 178, 183; art. 42, Swiss Nationality Act of 29 September
1952, id. at 443, 449.
116. Cf. 2 C. HYDE, supra note 108, at 1143-70; P. WEIS, supra note 1, at 131-38.
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The fact that expatriation often must occur abroad also reinforces the
point that the right of voluntary expatriation and the right of emigra-
tion are closely linked.
(3) An individual may not expatriate himself while the expatriating
state is at war. For example, Great Britain and many other Common-
wealth countries specifically prohibit expatriation in a "foreign" (non-
Commonwealth) state in time of war so as to prevent their nationals
from evading military service. 117 Naturalization when in an enemy
state may be regarded as an act of treason."18
(4) Expatriation is conditional on release by the expatriating state.
Increasingly, the achievement of expatriation is made contingent upon
the grant of official permission by the expatriating state. And most
states will not grant such permission unless and until the individual has
fulfilled certain obligations, especially military service and payment of
taxes. The "conditional expatriation" under the Soviet Union and its
fraternal states is especially harsh, for the conditions to be met in order
to obtain the required official permission are not publicly disclosed." 9
In Jordan, conditions of release are related to ethnic origin. Though
Jordanians not of Arab origin may renounce voluntarily their Jor-
danian nationality without state permission, those of Arab origin
are required to secure release from the Council of Ministers unless
they possess the nationality of another Arab state.' 20
(5) The effect of voluntary expatriation is made contingent upon
acquisition of another nationality. This widespread practice is justified
on the basis of protecting the individual from becoming stateless. Thus,
article 7 of the Hague Convention on Nationality provides in part:
In so far as the law of a State provides for the issue of an expa-
triation permit, such a permit shall not entail the loss of the
nationality of the State which issues it, unless the person to whom
it is issued possesses another nationality or unless and until he ac-
quires another nationality. An expatriation permit shall lapse if
117. See, e.g., Australia, Nationality and Citizenship Act No. 83 of 1948, art. 18(5),
LAWS CONCERNING NATIONALITY, supra note 1, at 13, 19; Canada, Citizenship Act of
1946, sec. 15(2), id. at 69, 75; Ceylon, Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948, sec. 18, id. at
83, 86, New Zealand, British Nationality and New Zealand Citizenship Act No. 15
of 1948, art. 21(2), id. at 337. 345; United Kingdom, Nationality Act of 1948, sec.
32(l), id. at 468, 480; Ghana, Nationality and Citizenship Act of 1957, sec. 15(1), SUPPLE-
MENT To LAWS CONCERNING NATIONALITY, supra note 1, at 126, 129; India, Citizenship
Act No. 57 of 1955, art. 8(l), id. at 133, 136; Malaya, Constitution of 1957, Art. 23(2),
id. at 36, 39.
118. See Rex v. Lynch, [1903] 1 K.B. 444.
119. See, e.g., art. 12, Decree No. 202 of October 29, 1924 of the U.S.S.R., in R.
Flournoy & M. Hudson, supra note 1, at 514.
120. Jordan, Nationality Law No. 6 of 4 February 1954, arts. 15-17, LAws CON-
CERNING NATIONALITY, supra note 1, at 277, 279.
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the holder does not acquire a new nationality within the period
fixed by the State which has issued the permit.' 2 '
Similarly, Article 7(l)(a) of the Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness provides:
If the law of a Contracting State permits renunciation of nation-
ality, such renunciation shall not result in loss of nationality
unless the person concerned possesses or acquires another na-
tionality.122
The professed objective underlying these provisions seems commend-
able. However, given the difficulties involved in securing naturaliza-
tion, as noted above, the requirement of acquiring another national-
ity has sometimes become more deprivatory than protective of the
individual. Hence the significance of Article 7(l)(b) of the Conven-
tion on the Reduction of Statelessness:
The provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph shall not
apply where their application would be inconsistent with the
principles stated in Articles 13 and 14 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights approved on 10 December 1948 by the
General Assembly of the United Nations. 123
Articles 13 and 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which we will explore elsewhere, deal with the freedom of movement,
transnational as well as internal, and the right of asylum. 24
Despite the various conditions mentioned above, it appears that
in increasing degree strong community expectations support the
121. 179 L.N.T.S. 89, 101.
122. The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness was adopted on August 30,
1961, by a Conference of Plenipotentiaries which convened in 1959 and reconvened in
1961 pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 896 (IX) of 4 December 1954. As of June
30, 1973, it had not yet entered into force. For its historical background and commen-
tary, see Weis, The United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961,
11 INT'L &: Comp. L.Q. 1073 (1962). For its text, see U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS,
supra note 70, at 55.
123. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 55.
124. Article 13 reads:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the
borders of each State.
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country.
And Article 14 reads as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum
from persecution.
2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising
from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of
the United Nations.
Id. at 2.
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individual's right of voluntary expatriation. As may be recalled,
both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American
Convention on Human Rights provide that no one shall be "arbi-
trarily" denied the right to change his nationality. 12 5 Unhappily both
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
European Convention on Human Rights fail to protect this right.
In formulating prescriptions in the future, proponents of human
rights might well keep in mind Hersch Lauterpacht's admonition
that the prohibition of arbitrary denial of change alone is not
enough:126 The right that is "inherent in the human person"' l2 7 and
gradually taking its place among "'the general principles of law rec-
ognized by civilized nations'" is more simply and comprehensively
that the "right of emigration and expatriation shall not be denied."' 2
2. Withdrawal with Consent (Genuine or Constructive) for
Promoting Harmonious Relations Between States
When withdrawal of nationality is with the genuine consent of the
individual, such withdrawal may approximate voluntary expatriation
and involve no problems of human rights. In the interest of promot-
ing harmonious relations among themselves and avoiding situations
of potential conflict, states may, however, disregard the question of
genuine consent and impose loss of nationality upon an individual
because of the "voluntary" performance of a variety of acts. The basic
policy question with respect to expatriation in such contexts is whether
the common interest of states in the avoidance of conflict is sufficiently
substantial to justify the severe deprivations imposed upon noncon-
senting individuals.
In historic practice states have, in pursuit of various policies, im-
posed loss of nationality upon individuals because of a wide variety
of acts, ranging from the most explicit renunciation of nationality to
instances in which consent is entirely fictitious. A brief itemization
of this range includes: execution of formal instruments of renuncia-
tion, deliberate acquisition of the nationality of another state, taking
an oath of allegiance to another state, protracted residence abroad,
military service in the forces of foreign governments, voting in foreign
political elections, employment by foreign governments, marriage to
an alien man, and the naturalization of parents by another government.
125. See p. 928 supra.
126. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RiGHTs 348-49, 423 (1950).
127. C. DE VISSCHER, supra note 106, at 185.
128. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 126, at 347; H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 103, at 129.
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With respect to some of these acts, the withdrawal of nationality
occurs under conditions which clearly approximate genuine consent
and recognition of withdrawal in such circumstances may indeed be
necessary for making effective the human rights policies intimately
connected with honoring voluntary expatriation. This is certainly
true with respect to the execution of formal instruments of renuncia-
tion, the deliberate acquisition of the nationality of another state, and
the taking of an oath of allegiance to another state. Execution of a
formal instrument of renunciation, as indicated above, is the most
explicit form of accomplishing voluntary expatriation. 129 In the case
of naturalization in another state, the emphasis is on deliberate choice:
Imposed naturalization, as mentioned above, obviously lacks volun-
tariness. 130 Taking an oath or other formal declaration of allegiance
to a foreign state, it is said, means less than total allegiance to an in-
dividual's own state, and places him in a peculiar position where his
services might be claimed by more than one state, thereby making
it practically impossible for his state of nationality to provide him
protection vis-At-vis that foreign state.' 3 ' The policy consideration
favoring presumption of voluntariness in regard to taking an oath of
allegiance to a foreign state is understandable; the difficulty lies in
ascertaining what constitutes an oath of allegiance, for the types of
oath may vary from "ironbound pledges of allegiance to vague and
ambiguous affirmations of fealty or obedience."' 32 Criteria for ascer-
tainment have been suggested by Secretary of State Hughes in these
words:
It is the spirit and meaning of the oath, not merely the letter,
which is to determine whether it results in expatriation. It is not
a mere matter of words. The test seems to be the question whether
the oath taken places the person taking it in complete subjection
to the state to which it is taken ... so that it is impossible for him
to perform the obligations of citizenship to [the country of na-
tionality]. 33
Taking an oath of allegiance does not necessarily lead to naturaliza-
tion. Hence, some states, such as Canada and Sudan, make taking an
oath or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state a
129. See pp. 929-35 supra.
130. See pp. 920-28 supra.
131. H.R. Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1906).
132. Roche, The Loss of American Nationality-The Development of Statutory Ex-
patriation, 99 U. PA. L. Ray. 25, 32 (1950).
133. 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 219 (1942) (Secretary Hughes
to Frank L. Polk, March 17, 1924).
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ground for withdrawal of nationality only when such an oath would
result in the acquisition of the foreign nationality. 34
Many states view military service in a foreign state as a ground for
withdrawal of nationality in certain cases. Since an individual's entry
into military service in a foreign state may be either voluntary or
involuntary, and since the foreign state in which he serves may or
may not be hostile to his state of nationality, great care should be
taken in inferring voluntariness on his part. In Nishikawa v. Dulles
the United States Supreme Court held that voluntariness should be
proved by "clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence."' 135 While
voluntary service in the armed forces of a state hostile to the indi-
vidual's state of nationality may be clearly inimical to his duty of
loyalty, military service in a state friendly to his own is quite a differ-
ent matter. Similar considerations would also apply to the case of
public employment by a foreign government. 136
Voting in a foreign political election as a ground for loss of nation-
ality is perhaps unique to the practice of the United States.'37 Justifi-
cation is sought on the ground that participation in the public affairs
of another state involves a political attachment to the foreign state in
a manner incompatible with continued allegiance to the United States.
The constitutionality of this particular imposition, first sustained
by the Supreme Court in Perez v. Brownell, 3s was rejected in Afroyim
v. Rusk.13 9
In Perez the petitioner, Perez, was a native-born United States na-
tional who had resided in Mexico for a number of years and had voted
in political elections in Mexico. 140 Upon his retura to the United
States, he was ordered excluded by immigration officials on the
ground that he had expatriated himself. Perez .sought a declaratory
judgment that he was a United States national, challenging the gen-
134. Canada, The Citizenship Act of 1952, art. 15(l), SUPPLEMENT TO LAWS CON-CERNING NATIONALITY, supra note 1, at 15, 21; Sudan, The Nationality Act No. 22 of
1957, art. 12(c), id. at 71, 73.
135. 356 U.S. 129, 135 (1958).
136. See S. Greenleigh & R. Margenau, supra note 1, at 245-49; Harvard Research,
supra note I, at 104.
137. Section 349(a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (as amended)
provides:
From and after the effective date of this Act a person who is a national of the
United States whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by-
(5) voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election
or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory, ....
8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1970).
138. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
139. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
140. Perez was a dual national of both the United States and Mexico and had
resided in Mexico apparently to avoid military service in the United States.
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eral proposition that the United States could apply a doctrine of
"constructive volition" in depriving him of his nationality. The
Supreme Court, by a five-to-four vote, upheld the Congress in with-
drawing nationality from a native-born national for having voted in
the political elections of a foreign country. Speaking for the majority,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that the congressional power to control
and regulate foreign affairs includes the necessary competence to ex-
patriate any United States national for voting in foreign political
elections. Because the power over foreign affairs involves more than
"the maintenance of diplomatic relations ...and the protection of
American citizens," the government "must also be able to reduce to
a minimum the frictions that are unavoidable in a world of sovereigns
sensitive in matters touching their dignity and interests."' 41 Harmo-
nious relations with other states would be jeopardized
when a citizen of one country chooses to participate in the political
or governmental affairs of another country. The citizen may by his
action unwittingly promote or encourage a course of conduct con-
trary to the interests of his own government; moreover, the people
or government of the foreign country may regard his action to be
the action of his government, or at least as a reflection if not an
expression of its policy. 142
Afroyim v. Rusk 4 3 involved a naturalized American citizen who
was denied a United States passport on the ground that he had ex-
patriated himself by voting in an Israeli legislative election. The cen-
tral issue was the same as in Perez. In reaffirming the view that United
States citizenship could be lost only "by the voluntary renunciation
or abandonment by the citizen himself,"'144 Mr. Justice Black, speak-
ing for a majority of five, rejected the notion that Congress has any
general power, explicit or implicit, to denationalize, as was suggested
by Perez. He emphasized that "the people are sovereign and the
Government cannot sever its relationship to the people by taking
141. 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958).
142. Id. at 59. Mr. Justice Frankfurter further stated:
The critical connection between this conduct and loss of citizenship is the fact
that it is the possession of American citizenship by a person committing the act
that makes the act potentially embarrassing to the American Government and
pregnant with the possibility of embroiling this country in disputes with other
nations. The termination of citizenship terminates the problem. Moreover, the
fact is not without significance that Congress has interpreted this conduct, not
irrationally, as importing not only something less than complete and unswerving
allegiance to the United States but also elements of allegiance to another country
in some measure, at least, inconsistent with American citizenship.
Id. at 60-61.
143. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
144. Id. at 266.
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away their citizenship.' u45 Citizenship, he continued, "is no light trifle
to be jeopardized any moment Congress decides to do so under the
name of one of its general or implied grants of power."1 46 He con-
cluded by pointing out that the decision of the Court
does no more than to give to this citizen that which is his own, a
constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless
he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship.147
Nationality is sometimes withdrawn, in an expression of policies
converse to those involved in the "genuine link" requirement for
naturalization, if a national has continuously resided abroad over an
extended period, normally ranging from two to 10 years. 148 Though
it is most often made applicable to naturalized nationals, in some coun-
tries this policy applies to all nationals, by birth or naturalization.149
As was observed decades ago:
It is difficult to see why a person who becomes permanently
established in a foreign country and identified with the life of
the community in which he lives, should be allowed to continue
to carry the badge of allegiance of a country with which he has
little or no effective contact.150
Nevertheless, special care is again required in inferring consent to ex-
patriation by the mere fact of protracted residence abroad, especially
in view of the diversity in the requirements of length of stay and the
growing frequency of transnational interactions.
With reference to the effect of marriage on the wife's nationality,
national laws vary widely.' 5 ' Just as a woman may automatically or
by certain action acquire the nationality of her alien husband upon
marriage, she may automatically or by certain action lose her original
nationality as a consequence of marriage to a foreign national.5 2 For
the sake of family unity and undivided allegiance, in most states a
woman automatically lost her original nationality and acquired in-
stead her husband's upon marriage to a foreign national. The loss of
nationality was also justified on a theory of implied consent-i.e., a
woman, in marrying an alien, "consents" to abandon her original
145. Id. at 257.
146. Id. at 267-68.
147. Id. at 268.
148. See Harvard Research, supra note 1, at 104-05.
149. See UNITED NATIONS, A STUDY OF STATELESSNESS 139 (1949); P. WEIS, supra note
1, at 123; Hudson, supra note 1, at 18.
150. Sandifer, supra note 45, at 278.
151. See pp. 922-23 supra.
152. See NATIONALITY OF MARRIED WOMEN, supra note 66, at 8-18, 29-125.
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nationality. This theory of implied consent was formulated in the
famous case, Mackenzie v. Hare,153 where the United States Supreme
Court held that the marriage of an American woman to a British sub-
ject resulted in the loss of her United States nationality because she
"voluntarily entered into [the marriage], with notice of the conse-
quences." 5 4
More recently, however, many states have ceased imposing auto-
matic loss of a woman's original nationality upon marriage to an
alien. 55 This trend reflects in part dissatisfaction with the fiction
of implied consent and in part contemporary concern about dis-
crimination. It is in keeping with contemporary demands for the pro-
tection of the human person, as previously noted, that a woman na-
tional retain her nationality upon marriage to an alien unless she
explicitly and voluntarily expatriates herself.
The nationality laws of states with respect to minor children have
not been uniform. Conversely to the acquisition of nationality, a mi-
nor's nationality may be withdrawn upon the foreign naturalization of
his father or widowed mother. 56 Though the primary rationale is again
the unity of family allegiance, genuine consent on the minor's part,
if he is capable of such consent, may be missing. This was observed in
Perkins v. Elg, 157 in which the United States Supreme Court held that
the American-born child of naturalized parents, who later resumed
their former nationality and took her with them to Sweden, had not
lost her nationality. In the words of Chief Justice Hughes,
Expatriation is the voluntary renunciation or abandonment of
nationality and allegiance. It has no application to the removal
from this country of a native citizen during minority. In such a
case the voluntary action which is of the essence of the right of
expatriation is lacking 58
Hence, it appears that the trend in practice is toward the retention
of the minor's nationality after the foreign naturalization of his parents,
even if he may find himself in possession of multiple nationality.
If, however, the minor must automatically lose his nationality upon
the foreign naturalization of his parents, many commentators increas-
153. 239 U.S. 299 (1916).
154. Id. at 312.
155. NATIONALITY OF MARRIED WOMEN, supra note 66, at 122-25.
156. See S. Greenleigh 9. R. Margenau, supra note 1, at 265-71; Sandifer, supra
note 45, at 269-71; Harvard Research, supra note 1, at 105-06.
157. 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
158. Id. at 334.
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ingly urge that the minor be accorded a right of option regarding his
nationality upon attaining majority.1' 9
3. Withdrawal Without Consent as Punishment
It is sometimes asserted that the state has the unlimited competence
to withdraw nationality. In the words of Manley Hudson,
In principle, the power of States to cancel or withdraw nation-
ality is, in the absence of treaty obligations, not limited by inter-
national law . ... 160
In practice states have acted only on certain relatively restricted
grounds. Question has been raised about the permissibility of with-
drawal even upon these grounds. Within the United States it is in-
creasingly urged that the withdrawal of nationality as a sanction for
inimical conduct having no particular relation to the common in-
terests of states in the management of people may be "cruel and
unusual punishment" and, hence, unconstitutional."6 Enquiry is
equally relevant whether international law does, or should, tolerate
so extreme a sanction which serves no purpose in securing the com-
mon interests of states.
The grounds upon which states seek in contemporary times to im-
pose loss of nationality as an internal sanction may be summarized
under three headings:
(a) crimes against the state, including evasion of military service or
desertion from the armed forces in time of war;
(b) hostile political affiliations and activities; and
(c) possession of certain racial, ethnic, or religious characteristics.
We briefly examine each of these grounds:
It is not uncommon for states to impose loss of nationality for con-
viction of crimes regarded as serious attacks upon the state. Some con-
duct is regarded as so inimical to the security of the basic values of
the community that it is incompatible with continued enjoyment of
the benefits and discharge of the responsibilities of community mem-
bership.'02 - The range of conduct sometimes so characterized includes
159. Cf., e.g., S. Greenleigh & R. Margenair, supra note 1, at 269-71; Sandifer, supra
note 45, at 269-71; Harvard Research, supra note 1, at 105-06.
160. Hudson, supra note 1, at 10.
161. The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution provides:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted.
162. See S. Greenleigh & R. Margenau, supra note 1, at 218-23.
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treason, desertion from the armed forces, and evasion of the military
draft. The Soviet Union at an early date imposed denationalization
and expulsion upon individuals convicted of being "enemies of the
toiling masses."'1 3
Within the United States it has recently been questioned whether
denationalization is an appropriate sanction for desertion or evasion
of military service. In Trop v. Dulles,0 4 the Supreme Court declared
that depriving a citizen of nationality on the basis of a court-martial
conviction for his desertion in time of war, when he had been absent
from his duty less than a day and had willingly surrendered, was
"cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment. Speaking for a majority of five, Chief Justice Warren observed
at the outset that "[d]esertion in wartime, though it may merit the
ultimate penalty, does not necessarily signify allegiance to a foreign
state."'1 6 5 "Citizenship," he continued,
is not a license that expires upon misbehavior. The duties of
citizenship are numerous, and the discharge of many of these ob-
ligations is essential to the security and well-being of the na-
tion .... But citizenship is not lost every time a duty of citizen-
ship is shirked. And the deprivation of citizenship is not a weap-
on that the Government may use to express its displeasure at a
citizen's conduct, however reprehensible that conduct may be.",,
Emphasizing that denationalization is entirely different in character
and quality from the traditional modes of criminal punishment, in-
cluding even the death penalty, 167 the Chief Justice declared that de-
nationalization as a punishment is forbidden by the Eighth Amend-
ment and, hence, unconstitutional. He stated:
There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive
torture. There is instead the total destruction of the individual's
status in organized society. It is a form of punishment more primi-
tive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political
existence that was centuries in the development.'0 8
Similarly, in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,6 9 the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional a statute purporting to denationalize persons
163. U.SS.R., Decree of April 22, 1931, reprinted in T. TAicouzlo, THE SovxEr
UNION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 121 (1935).
164. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
165. Id. at 92.
166. Id. at 92-93.
167. Id. at 93-100.
168. Id. at 101-02.
169. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
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who left or remained outside the United States to evade military
service, 170 finding such measures to be cruel and unusual punishment.
A paradoxical case is Kawakita v. United States,'7 1 in which the
petitioner would have benefited if he could have been regarded as
denationalized. He was a native-born national of the United States
and a national of Japan by virtue of Japanese parentage and had been
convicted of treason, with a death sentence, for having mistreated
American prisoners-of-war in Japan. He contended that he could not
be tried, much less convicted of treason, by the United States because
he had expatriated himself from the United States, as evidenced by his
use of a Japanese passport during the war, his employment by the
Japanese government, his acceptance of labor papers from the Japanese.
government, and the entry of his name in the Japanese Koseki (a fam-
ily census register). The Supreme Court found the implications of his
alleged acts of expatriation ambiguous and insufficient.1 72 The peti-
tioner placed special emphasis on the entry of his name in the Koseki,
but the Court held that, since he was born a dual national, this entry
did not constitute a foreign naturalization signifying renunciation of
his American citizenship, but "a reaffirmation of an allegiance to
Japan which already exists."'- 73 The conviction of treason was thus
sustained.
A no less paradoxical case, but with a converse twist, is Kuhn v.
Custodian of Enemy Property,7 4 involving a German national who
had moved to Norway in 1911 and had lived there since that time.
Because of his refusal to return to Germany upon the outbreak of
World War I, his German nationality was withdrawn under German
law. At the end of World War II he was treated as a German national
and his assets were sequestered as enemy property by the Norwegian
government. The Supreme Court of Norway held that, although the
appellant was unable to prove conclusively his loss of German nation-
ality, the court would certainly take judicial notice of the German
170. Nationality Act of 1940. § 4010), ch. 418, 58 Stat. 746 (1944), provided:
(a) From and after the effective date of this chapter a person who is a national
of the United States whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by-
(10) departing from or remaining outside of the jurisdiction of the United States
in time of war or during a period declared by the President to be a period of
national emergency for the purpose of evading or avoiding training and service
in the military, air, or naval forces of the United States. For the purposes of this
paragraph failure to comply with any provision of any compulsory service laws of
the United States shall raise the presumption that the departure from or ab-
sence from the United States was for the purpose of evading or avoiding training
and service in the military, air, or naval forces of the United States.
171. 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
172. Id. at 722-23.
173. Id. at 724.
174. [1951] I.L.R. 262 (Supreme Court, Norway 1951).
943
The Yale Law Journal
draft evasion law. Accordingly, he was found to be a stateless person,
rather than a German national, and the sequestration of his property
was declared illegal.
Deprivation of nationality for hostile political affiliations and activi-
ties has been characterized as "a twentieth century phenomenon."' 5
The affiliations and activities to which reference is here made differ
from those discussed immediately above in that, though they may
sometimes border on the criminal, they are not always categorized
as crimes and punished by criminal sanctions. Though the ancient
world knew banishment for political activities, 176 this particular form
of punishment was relatively rare before World War I. After that war
nationality was frequently deprived on such grounds as "disloyalty or
disaffection, acts prejudicial to the State or its interests, collaboration
with the enemy, [and] advocacy of subversive activities." 177
The most far-reaching denationalization measures were those under-
taken in Russia, in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution, first by the
All-Russian Soviet Socialist Republic and then by the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.)-" On December 15, 1921, the All-Russian Gov-
ernment issued the following decree:
1. Persons of the under-mentioned categories who remain outside
the confines of Russia after the publication of the present decree
are deprived of the rights of Russian citizenship:
(a) Persons having resided abroad uninterruptedly for more
than five years, and not having received before June 1, 1922,
foreign passports or corresponding certificates from representa-
tives of the Soviet Government ....
(b) Persons who left Russia after November 7, 1917, without
the authorization of the Soviet authorities.
(c) Persons who have voluntarily served in armies fighting
against the Soviet authority, or who have in any way partici-
pated in counter-revolutionary organizations.
(d) Persons having had the right to opt for Russian citizen-
ship and not having exercised that right within the period pre-
scribed for option.
175. S. Greenleigh & R. Margenau, supra note 1, at 286.
176. See P. IVEts, supra note 1, at 122.
177. Id. at 124.
178. For a critical comment, see Williams, Denationalization, 8 BRiT. Y.B. INT'L L.
45 (1927).
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(e) Persons not included under paragraph (a) of this section,
who are residing abroad and who shall not have registered
themselves at foreign representations of the R.S.F.S.R. within
the period prescribed .... 179
In 1924, the Soviet government adopted a new law, confirming the
forfeitures of nationality under prior legislation and denationalizing
all Russians abroad who failed to return upon request by competent
Soviet officials."80 These denationalization measures were obviously
aimed at Russian nationals who had opposed the Bolshevik regime
or were suspected to be so opposed. The net effect was an unprece-
dented mass denationalization of some two million people, ushering
in a tragic era of refugees.lsl
Following the Russian example, other states (e.g., Italy, Turkey, and
Germany) resorted to denationalization on political and other grounds
on a wide scale."12 After World War II several Eastern European
states prescribed denationalization for any person, if abroad, com-
mitting "any act prejudicial to the national and state interests. '1" s3
Confused by continuing expectations of violence and cold war ideo-
logical conflict, even the United States is not immune from this syn-
drome, as symbolized by the enactment of the Expatriation Act of
1954,184 purporting to denationalize individuals who advocate the
overthrow of the government in a manner proscribed by the Smith
Act.18 5 Since membership in the Communist Party per se had been
179. R. Flournoy & M. Hudson, supra note 1, at 511.
180. Decree No. 202 of October 29, 1924, reprinted in id. at 511-14.
181. See E. KULISCHER, EUROPE ON THE MOVE: WAR AND POPULATION CHANGES 1917-
1947 (1948); 2 F. NORWOOD, supra note 15, at 270-75; J. SIMPSON, THE REFUGEE PROBLFM:
REPORT OF A SURVEY (1939).
182. See Preuss, International Law and Deprivation of Nationality, 23 GEO. L.J. 250,
265-67 (1935).
183. Albania, Nationality Act No. 377 of 16 December 1946, art. 14, LAWS CON-
CERNING NATIONALITY, supra note 1, at 4, 6. See also Poland, Nationality Act of 8
January 1951, art. 12(b), id. at 386, 388; Yugoslavia, Nationality Act No. 370/331 of
I July 1946, art. 16, id. at 554, 557.
184. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(9) (1970), provides:
(a) From and after the effective date of this chapter a person who is a national
of the United States whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality
by-
(9) committing any act of treason against, or attempting by force to overthrow,
or bearing arms against, the United States, violating or conspiring to violate any
of the provisions of section 2383 of Title 18, or willfully performing any act in
violation of section 2385 of Title 18, or violating section 2384 of Title 18 by en-
gaging in a conspiracy to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Govern-
ment of the United States, or to levy war against them, if and when he is con-
victed thereof by a court martial or by a court of competent jurisdiction.
185. The Smith Act, named after its sponsor, Congressman Howard W. Smith of
Virginia, was enacted by Congress in 1940, as Title I of the Alien Registration Act,
ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670. Its principal substantive provisions, now incorporated in 18
U.S.C. § 2385 (1970), read as follows:
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held to be a violation of the Smith Act, 80 the potential threat of de-
nationalization to all American Communists was apparent. Although
the constitutionality of this enactment has not yet been tested, the
response to it was prompt and critical. Shortly after its passage, two
students wrote a powerful Note entitled "The Expatriation Act of
1954,' 18 7 later acclaimed as "pioneering and remarkably prophetic"
and having "an unmistakable impact on subsequent Supreme Court
expressions,"' 8 cogently observing that the Act's sanctions would be
cruel and unusual punishments in violation of the Eighth Amendment
and thus unconstitutional. 8 9 They further observed that the Expatria-
tion Act "would almost undoubtedly be held void under international
law,"' 9 0 since "the use of denationalization as a punishment is diamet-
rically opposed to the trend of international law towards a greater
protection of human rights."'191 The authors concluded that
the Act was not a sober response to the demands of national pol-
icy, but rather was enacted primarily to vent the nation's hatred
of citizens who have forsaken their native country by adopting
Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches tie duty,
necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government
of the United States or the government of any State, Territory, District or Pos-
session, thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein, by force
or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government; or
Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any such gov-
ernment, prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells, distributes, or publicly
displays any written or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty,
necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government
in the United States by force or violence, or attempts to do so; or
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or as-
sembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction
of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or
affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the
purposes thereof-
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years,
or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any de-
partment or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction.
If two or more persons conspire to commit any offense named in this section,
each shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or
any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction.
As used in this section, the terms "organizes" and "organize," with respect to
any society, group, or assembly of persons, include the recruiting of new members,
the forming of new units, and the regrouping or expansion of existing clubs,
classes, and other units of such society, group, or assembly of persons.
186. Cf. 1 T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN TIIL
UNITED STATES 98-147 (student ed. 19657). See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203 (1961).
187. Note, The Expatriation Act of 1954, 64 YALE L.J. 1164 (1955). The two students
were Norbert A. Schlei and Stephen J. Pollak, each of whom was to become an assistant
attorney general of the United States.
188. Gordon, The Citizen and the State: Power of Congress to Expatriate American
Citizens, 53 GEO. L.J. 315, 344 (1965).
189. Note, supra note 187, at 1187-94.
190. Id. at 1196.
191. Id. at 1197.
946
Nationality and Human Rights
communism. Actually, democracy and anti-communism would be
better strengthened by repeal of the Expatriation Act and reli-
ance upon conventional sanctions to deter and punish subver-
sion.192
Denationalization on racial, ethnic, religious, or other related
grounds is particularly notorious because of its close association with
Nazi and fascist atrocities.193 In pursuit of its racial policy, the Hitler
government first, in 1933, denaturalized a large number of naturalized
citizens, primarily Jews, and then, in 1941, denationalized all German
Jews residing abroad. Confiscation of property accompanied forfeiture
of nationality. The measures of denationalization were undertaken
as part of the National Socialist Program outlined in 1920, pursuant
to which "[o]nly those who are members of the nation can be citizens
of the State. Only those of German blood, irrespective of religion, can
be members of the German nation. No Jews, therefore, can be a mem-
ber [sic] of the nation .... All further immigration of non-Germans
is to be prevented. We demand that all non-Germans who have mi-
grated to Germany since August 2, 1914, be compelled to leave the
Reich at once."' 194 The underlying racist theory was that Aryans alone
were capable of "heroic" deeds and hence epitomized the German
nation, while non-Aryans, regarded as an alien and unassimilable race,
were to be excluded from German society.195
On July 14, 1933, the Nazi government proclaimed that "[n]aturali-
zations which have taken place between November 9, 1918 and Janu-
ary 30, 1933 may be revoked, if the naturalization is considered un-
desirable."' Who was to be considered undesirable was made clear
by a supplementary ordinance, stating that "there came especially un-
der consideration for the revocation of naturalization: (a) Eastern
Jews, unless they have fought at the front on the side of Germany dur-
ing the World War, or have rendered important services to German
interests .... ."197 Because of this and other anti-Semitic measures a
mass exodus of Jews ensued and by the fall of 1941 few Jews remained
in Germany. 98 A new decree, issued on November 15, 1941, denation-
alized all Jews residing abroad or leaving Germany after that date
192. Id. at 1200.
193. See H. SANTA CRUZ, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 244-96, U.N. Doc. E/CNA/Sub.2/
307/Rev.1 (1971); Preuss, supra note 182.
194. Preuss, supra note 182, at 251.
195. See H. SANTA CRUZ, supra note 193, at 247-52.
196. Preuss, supra note 182, at 250.
197. Id. at 252.
198. See M. VISHNIAK, THE LEGAL STATUS OF STATELESS PERSONS 24-33 (1945).
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and confiscated all of their assets.199 Denationalization was extended
not only to those who had emigrated from Germany during the Third
Reich but also to Jews of German nationality who had never set foot
in Germany. Included also were the Jewish wives and children of all
such nonresident Germans. 20 ° The satellite countries of the Axis and
those under its domination, Hungary and Rumania, for example,2 0 1
undertook similar measures against Jews. In Italy, the fascist govern-
ment revoked all naturalization certificates issued to Jews after Janu-
ary 1, 1919, by the decree of December 17, 1938.202
Following World War II, in the wake of the Nazi holocaust, Czecho-
slovakia imposed loss of nationality en masse upon persons of the Ger-
man and Hungarian "races"; Poland and Yugoslavia imposed similar
sanctions upon persons of the German "race." Pursuant to the Potsdam
Agreement persons of the German "race" were expelled to Germany. 03
Some states assert additional grounds or wider powers in imposing
loss of nationality upon naturalized nationals, as distinguished from
born nationals.2 0 4 It is a common practice to cancel a naturalization
certificate upon discovery of fraud or misrepresentation in the pro-
curement of such certificate. 20 5 Extended residence abroad, where it
is asserted as a ground for deprivation of nationality, is directed mostly
toward naturalized nationals. 20 6 In the context of denationalization,
states often require naturalized nationals to comply with a higher
standard of loyalty.20 7 Within the United States, the prohibition of
involuntary withdrawal of nationality applies to naturalized citizens
199. See Abel, Denationalization, 6 MODERN L. REv. 57, 59-61 (1942).
200. Id. at 60.
201. See P. MEYER, ET AL., THE JEWS IN THE SOvIET SATELLITES 384, 500 (1953).
202. See C. ROTH, THE HISTORY OF THE JEWS OF ITALY 524-27 (1946).
203. The relevant provision in the Protocol of Proceedings approved at Berlin
(Potsdam) August 2, 1945, reads as follows:
The three governments [U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R.], having considered the question
in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations,
or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have
to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected
in an orderly and humane manner.
3 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
1776-1949, at 1207, 1220 (C. Bevans comp. 1969).
204. See National Legislation Concerning Grounds for Deprivation of Nationality,
U.N. Doc. A/CNA/66 (1953) (memorandum prepared by Ivan S. Kerno).
205. See United States v. Genovese, 133 F. Supp. 820 (D.N.J. 1955); Maylott, & Crystal,
The Scheiderman Case: Two Views, 12 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 215 (1944); Note, Aliens:
Denaturalization for Fraud, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 449 (1947).
206. See National Legislation Concerning Grounds for Deprivation of Nationality,
supra note 204, at 3. As Justice Douglas stated in Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163,
169 (1964),
Living abroad, whether the citizen be naturalized or native born, is no badge of
lack of allegiance and in no way evidences a voluntary renunciation of nationality
and allegiance. It may indeed be compelled by family business, or other legitimate
reasons.
207. See National Legislation Concerning Grounds for Deprivation of Nationality,
supra note 204.
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as well as natural-born citizens. In Schneider v. Rusk,20 1 the Supreme
Court declared invalid the congressional enactment that authorized
denaturalization of naturalized citizens who returned for more than
three years to the country of their birth or former nationality. In the
words of Justice Douglas,
This statute proceeds on the impermissible assumption that nat-
uralized citizens as a class are less reliable and bear less allegiance
to this country than do the native born. This is an assumption
that is impossible for us to make .... A native-born citizen is free
to reside abroad indefinitely without suffering loss of citizenship.
The discrimination aimed at naturalized citizens drastically limits
their rights to live and work abroad in a way that other citizens
may. It creates indeed a second-class citizenship. 20 9
Despite insistence by some distinguished authors, such as Manley
Hudson 2 10 and Paul Weis, 21 1 that international law imposes no limi-
tation upon the competence of states to deprive individuals of nation-
ality, general community expectations would today appear to be mov-
ing toward restricting such allegedly "unlimited" competence. Though
the views of Hudson and Weis may accurately reflect the expectations
of the past, they certainly do not represent community expectations
of the present and probable future. Even historically, international
law would appear to have established some restraints and, as the con-
temporary concern for human rights becomes more intense, additional
restraints on such competence will evolve. It has long been agreed
that a state could not deprive individuals of nationality and then
expel them to other states. The fundamental community policy of
minimizing statelessness has had general and intensifying support.
The emerging peremptory norm (jus cogens) of nondiscrimination
will, as previously noted, make unlawful many types of denationaliza-
tion. In sum, the whole complex of more fundamental policies for
208. 377 U.S. 163 (1964). See generally Note, Constitutional Limitations on the
Naturalization Power, 80 YALE L.J. 769 (1971).
209. 377 U.S. at 168-69. By way of contrast, in Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971),
the Supreme Court held that Congress can provide for denationalization of a United
States national who is born abroad to an American parent, who is not naturalized
in the United States, and who fails to reside in the United States for five years be-
tween the ages of 14 and 28. In the opinion of the Court, the Fourteenth Amendment
is not applicable to this type of national. The Court indicated its readiness to sus-
tain conditions that are "not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unlawful." Id. at 831. Four
dissenting Justices found no basis for distinguishing nationals who acquire their na-
tionality by birth abroad to an American parent from those who acquire it by being
born or naturalized in the United States. For comments on this decision, see Gordon,
The Power of Congress to Terminate United States Citizenship-A Continuing Con-
stitutional Debate, 4 CONN. L. REV. 611 (1972); Ulman, Nationality, Expatriation and
Statelessness, 25 AD. L. Rav. 113 (1973).
210. Hudson, supra note 1, at 10.
211. P. WEis, supra note 1, at 126-29.
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the protection of human rights, as embodied, for instance, in the
United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenants on Human Rights and other related
instruments and programs, global as well as regional, may eventually
be interpreted to forbid use of denationalization as a form of "cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment."212 Decisions about
nationality are as much within the reference of human rights prescrip-
tions as any other decisions.
The principle that one state could not by denationalization force
individuals upon another state was established before any serious con-
cern for human rights figured significantly in the international law
about nationality. Writing nearly half a century ago, Sir John Fischer
Williams stated that
while positive international law does not forbid a state unilat-
erally to sever the relationship of nationality so far as the indi-
vidual is concerned, even if the person affected possesses or ac-
quires no other nationality, still a state cannot sever the tie of
nationality in such a way as to release itself from the international
duty, owed to other states, of receiving back a person denation-
alized who has acquired no other nationality, should he be ex-
pelled as an alien by the state where he happens to be.213
Similarly, as urged by an advocate in a famous case,
it was a universally recognized principle of international law that
a State could not simply deprive of their nationality citizens who
are out of sympathy with the regime and so force them on other
States.21
4
212. See The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5:
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.
U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 1.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, reads:
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent
to medical or scientific experimentation.
Id. at 9.
The European Convention on Human Rights, art. 3, states:
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.
BAsic DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 126.
The American Convention on Human Rights, art. 5(2), provides:
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punish-
ment or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.
Id. at 211.
213. Williams, supra note 178, at 61.
214. Lempert v. Bonfol, [1933-1934] Ann. Dig. 290, 292 (No. 115) (Federal Tribunal,
Switzerland). See p. 954 infra.
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The perverse reasoning underlying this humane law was that a state
has the sovereign competence to control and regiment people within
its territory, of which "the power of expulsion" is an essential com-
ponent.215 If one state should be at liberty to render stateless its na-
tionals residing in another state, so it was reasoned, it would encroach
upon the right of the state of sojourn and interfere with the exercise
of the latter's right to expel aliens. Should the parent state and other
states refuse to accept denationalized persons, the state of sojourn
would end up bearing the burden of accommodating them.21" One of
the participants in the International Law Commissions debate has said
that "deprivation of nationality involved deprivation of protection;
with the implication that the individual affected might become a
charge on other states." 217 Indeed, one commentator asked bluntly,
"By what right [does one treat] a foreign state as a sort of sewer into
which one is entitled to discharge his social detritus?"218 The para-
mount policy of this modest restraint on the state's competence was
clearly more state-centered than humanistic; it was, nevertheless, a
widely accepted and useful restraint.
The policy of minimizing statelessness began to gain recognition
after World War I, as the transnational impact of this unfortunate
status became pronounced. Before that war stateless persons were rela-
tively few and national frontiers were usually open. The collective
denationalizations executed after that war by Russia, Turkey, Ger-
many, Austria, and Italy, however, aroused widespread community
concern about the plight of stateless persons..2 19 The policy for the
minimization of statelessness manifested itself in the common state
practice of making loss of a woman's nationality upon marriage to a
foreigner contingent upon acquisition of the husband's nationality. 220
In almost every international conference on nationality there have
been condemnations of denationalization measures causing stateless-
ness
-
.
2 21
215. Preuss, supra note 182, at 272.
216. Id. at 269-76.
217. [1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 196, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A (1959).
218. Philonenko, Expulsion des Heimatlos, LX JOURNAL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1161,
1177 (1933), quoted in Preuss, supra note 182, at 273.
219. See A STUDY OF STATELESSNESS, supra note 149, at 5-7, 34-38, 75-122, 142-45;
Holborn, The Legal Status of Political Refugees, 1920-1938, 32 AM. J. INr'L L. 680 (1938).
220. See pp. 922-23, 939-40 supra.
221. Commentators are no less emphatic and unanimous in denouncing denationali-
zation measures without regard for the potential consequences of statelessness. Williams
stated emphatically that it was a violation of international law for a state to de-
nationalize any person who had not already acquired a second nationality. Williams,
supra note 178, at 52. See also E. BORCHARD, supra note 5, at 591-92; C. FENWICK,
INTERNATIONAL LAw 263 (3d ed. 1948); Abel, supra note 199, at 63; Preuss, supra note
182, at 274.
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In 1896, the Institute of International Law resolved that
No one can lose his nationality or renounce it unless he shows that
he has fulfilled the conditions required to obtain his admission
into another state. Denationalization can never be imposed as a
penalty.222
In the wake of the mass denationalization by the Soviet Union, the
International Law Association in 1924 made a broader recommenda-
tion, seeking to prohibit denationalization by executive order and
thus to protect individuals from being denationalized and expelled.223
In 1928, the Institute of International Law strengthened its earlier
recommendation by urging states to refrain from actions leading to
statelessness. 224 Reacting to the denationalization measures of the Nazis,
the Grotius Society proposed in 1942 that no loss of nationality should
be imposed by a state unless and until the individual concerned ac-
quired another nationality. 225 At the Hague Conference for the Codifi-
cation of International Law in 1930, reduction and elimination of
statelessness was a major concern. Aside from efforts to eliminate pro-
visions imposing statelessness at birth22 6 the conference adopted pro-
visions seeking to prevent loss of nationality in cases where the indi-
vidual had not acquired another nationality. The Conference consid-
ered in this connection expatriation permits, 2 27 the effect of marriage
upon nationality, 228 the effect of naturalization of the parents on the
nationality of minor children 229 the effect of legitimation, recogni-
tion, and adoption on nationality, 230 and readmission of former na-
tionals.231 The Final Act of the Conference proclaimed:
The Conference is unanimously of the opinion that it is very
desirable that States should, in the exercise of their power of
regulating questions of nationality, make every effort to reduce
as far as possible cases of statelessness, and that the League of
222. J. ScoTT, RESOLUTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (1916).
223. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE THIRTY-THRD CONFERENCE 32
(1925).
224. [1928] ANNUAIRE DE LINSTIT.UT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 760.
225. 28 TRANSACTIONS, GROTIUS SOC'Y 157 (1943).
226. See Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness, signed April 12, 1930,
179 L.N.T.S. 115.
227. See Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality
Laws, signed April 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89, 101 (Art. 7).
228. Id. at 101-03 (Arts. 8-11).
229. Id. at 103 (Arts. 13-15).
230. Id. at 105 (Arts. 16-17).
231. Special Protocol Concerning Statelessness, League of Nations Publications Series
1930.V.6. (C.227.M.114.1930.V.).
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Nations should continue the work which it has already undertaken
for the purpose of arriving at an international settlement of this
important matter.232
This profound concern for the minimization of statelessness has
found further concrete expression in the human rights programs in
general, in the work of refugee organizations (especially the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) in particular, 23 3 and, above
all, in the adoption of the Convention on the Reduction of Stateless-
ness, 234 the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons,2 35
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 236 and the Pro-
tocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 237 The detailed impact of
these various conventions will be appraised in our more general dis-
cussion of statelessness. 238
232. Final Act of the Hague Conference, supra note 11, at 14.
233. See the literature concerning international protection of refugees cited in note
15 supra. See also Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 27
U.N. GAOR Supp. 12, U.N. Doc. A/8712 (1972).
234. The Convention was adopted and opened for signature on August 30, 1961,
by the United Nations Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future State-
lessness, convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under General As-
sembly resolution 896 (IX) of 4 December 1954. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS,
supra note 70, at 53. As of December 31, 1972, it had not yet come into force. UNITED
NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PER-
FORMS DEPOSITORY FUNCTIONS: LIST OF SIGNATURES, RATIFICATIONS, ACCESSIONS, ETC. AS
oF 31 DECEMBER 1972, at 112, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.D/6 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as MULTILATERAL TREATIES 1972].
235. The Convention was adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Status
of Stateless Persons, held in New York in September 1954, pursuant to ECOSOC resolu-
tion 526A (XVII) of 26 April 1954. It has been in effect since June 6, 1960. U.N.
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 57. As of December 31, 1972, 27 states
had ratified or acceded to it; MULTILATERAL TREATIES 1972, supra note 234, at 105. For
its text, see 360 U.N.T.S. 117; U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra at 57-63.
236. The Convention was adopted by the United Nations Conference of Plenipoten-
tiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, convened under General As-
sembly resolution 429 (V) of 14 December 1950 at Geneva in July 1951. It came into
force on April 22, 1954. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 63. As
of December 31, 1972, 63 states (including the Holy See) had ratified or acceded to
the Convention. MULTILATERAL TREATIES 1972, supra note 234, at 93-94. For its text,
see 189 U.N.T.S. 137; U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 63-70.
237. The draft Protocol was submitted by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees to the General Assembly, through the Economic and Social Council, upon
the recommendation of the Executive Committee of the Programme of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The Economic and Social Council noted
with approval the draft Protocol in its resolution 1186 (XLI) of 18 November 1966.
Later, the General Assembly, noting the draft Protocol in its resolution 2198 (XXI) of
16 December 1966, requested the Secretary-General "to transmit the text of the Pro-
tocol to the States mentioned in article V thereof, with a view to enabling them to
accede to the Protocol." It became operative' on October 4, 1967. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 70. For its text, see 606 U.N.T.S. 267; U.N. HUMAN
RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 70-72. As of December 31, 1972, 52 states (in-
cluding the Holy See) had ratified or acceded to the Protocol. MULTILATERAL TREATIES
1972, supra note 234, at 114-15. For its legislative history, see Weis, The 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees and Some Questions of the Law of Treaties, 42
BrIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 39 (1969).
238. See pp. 960-81 infra.
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It is, however, one thing to condemn a state for acts of denationaliza-
tion causing statelessness, and quite another to assuage the actual and
potential consequences upon the individuals affected: Indeed, "the
presumption against statelessness" may in certain circumstances work
against the protection of purportedly stateless persons.23 0 "It will not
help the individual," Ian Brownlie has observed, "to attribute a na-
tionality which will be nominal and leave him de facto stateless."24 ,
Thus, in ascertaining the effect of a particular'denationalization meas-
ure, decisionmakers have not infrequently sought to interpret and
apply the measure and relevant international law in such a manner as
to afford individuals "genuine" protection. For example, in Lempert v.
Bonfol,2 4' decided by the Swiss Federal Court, the issue was whether
the child of a Swiss mother and of a father who had lost his Russian
nationality under the Soviet Decree of 1921 was to be deemed a Swiss
national. Swiss law provided that the child of a stateless father and a
Swiss mother is a Swiss national. The court decided that the child was
a Swiss national. In the words of the court,
It is not necessary to express any opinion as to whether the
fundamental sovereign right of an individual State to prescribe,
according to its own discretion, the conditions of acquisition and
of loss of its nationality is in any way limited by considerations
of international intercourse; nor as to how far there are to be
gathered from international law precise and relevant principles
which would permit of the designation of a provision of this na-
ture as inadmissible. For even if this were the case here, this would,
in view of the essential nature of international law, as an order-
ing between States, at the most constitute a breach of duties
towards other States prejudiced by the decision in question. The
idea of such a breach of duties is practically meaningless if the
foreign State has no legal means of compelling the former home
State to revoke the deprivation of citizenship and receive back
the person affected. It will not alter the fact that he is stateless
according to the law which is thus criticised, that is, that his for-
mer home State does not regard him as a citizen.242
Similarly, in United States ex rel. Schwarzkopf v. Uhl,243 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided that
an Austrian national residing in the United States when Germany
annexed Austria in 1938 was not to be regarded as a German national
239. See Brownlie, supra note 1, at 337-38.
240. Id. at 338.
241. [1933-19341 Ann. Dig. 290 (No. 115) (Federal Tribunal, Switzerland).
242. Id. at 293-94.
243. 137 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1943).
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and hence sustained his application for a writ of habeas corpus against
his detention as an enemy alien. The court found good reason for al-
lowing "former nationals, who have fled from the invader and estab-
lished a residence abroad, the right of voluntarily electing a new
nationality and remaining 'stateless' until they can acquire it."244 It
added that "an invader cannot under international law impose its
nationality upon non-residents of the subjugated country without their
consent, express or tacit."245
In this connection, the observation made by the Supreme Court of
Israel in Casperius v. Casperius246 is particularly telling. The issue was
whether the testator was a German national or a stateless person. The
will would be governed by German law in the former case and by
Israeli law in the latter. The answer was closely linked to the Ger-
man denationalization law of 1941 .247 In response to the contention
that the court could not recognize that law because of its inherent
evil, the court said that
this idea, in itself, is sound; however, it is not competent to enable
our testator to acquire the nationality of the Nazi State. This is not
like any other legal question. Otherwise, we would reach the
ridiculous conclusion that, precisely because of the barbarism
of the Nazi laws, a man in Israel will have to be regarded as a citi-
zen of that barbarian State. It goes without saying that all the
Nazi racial laws stand condemned in our eyes, but we are not
prepared to rely on that invalidity in order to recognize, so far as
concerns a Jew, the legal nexus with that base regime. Our opin-
ion, therefore, is that despite the unconcealed anti-semitic motives
of that law, it was capable of snapping the legal tie between the
State and the citizen.2 48
The mass denationalizations upon racial, ethnic, religious, and
related grounds under the Nazi and fascist regimes were so shocking
that they were widely condemned. While conceding that the state
had the competence to denationalize individually, commentators had
no difficulty in denouncing such a wholesale discriminatory denation-
alization as "an abuse of rights" 249 and "a violation of international
law constituting international liability." 250 In the same vein, Hannah
Arendt has observed,
244. Id. at 902.
245. Id.
246. [1954] I.L.R. 197.
247. See pp. 947-48 supra.
248. [1954] I.L.R. 197, 197-98.
249. See, e.g., H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COM-
MUNITY 300 (1933); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 280 (6th ed. 1940).
250. Abel, supra note 199, at 65.
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One is almost tempted to measure the degree of totalitarian in-
fection by the extent to which the concerned governments use
their sovereign right of denationalization .... 251
Recently, the German Federal Supreme Court in a number of cases
has held the Nazi denationalization decree of 1941 "null and void
ab initio" on the theory that because of its arbitrariness and abusive-
ness it was a "non-law" lacking "the quality of law."2 52 "It may have
been lex, but it was not jus. ' ' 253 In 1968, the Federal Constitutional
Court of Germany emphatically declared that the 1941 decree "violated
fundamental principles. It is to so intolerable a degree irreconcilable
with justice that it must be considered to have been null and void
ex tunc.
' 25 4
It was in large measure in revulsion against the Nazi and fascist
atrocities that the contemporary concern for human rights found
concrete expression in the Charter of the United Nations.25 Building
upon the Charter provisions regarding human rights, the world com-
munity has in recent decades moved toward greater protection of
human rights, including protection against deprivations of national-
ity. Foremost among the developing human rights prescriptions is
the cardinal principle of nondiscrimination. As Judge Tanaka ob-
served in his dissenting opinion in South West African Cases (Second
Phase), 1966, "the norm of nondiscrimination ... on the basis of race
has become a rule of customary international law." 256
It will suffice to spotlight some of the more pertinent provisions of
international documents. The Charter of the United Nations declares
that promotion and encouragement of "respect for human rights and
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion" is one of the major purposes of that organiza-
tion,257 a policy in evidence elsewhere in the Charter.258 The first
paragraph of Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
declares:
251. H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 278 (1958).
252. Mann, The Present Validity of Nazi Nationality Laws, 89 L.Q. REv. 194, 199(1973).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 199-200.
255. See L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO 9- A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 34-35, 370-447 (3d rev. ed. 1969); R. RUSSELL, A HISrORY
OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 303-29 (1958); E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 24-29 (1964); Sohn, A Short History of United Nations
Documents on Human Rights, in COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE,
THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 18TH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 39, 43-59(1968).
256. [1966] I.C.J. 284.
257. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
258. Id. arts. 13(1)(b), 55, 56.
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Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status. 25 9
Comparable provisions can be found in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights,2 60 the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights,26' the European Convention on
Human Rights, 2 2 and the American Convention on Human Rights. 263
Of special relevance in the present context are the International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 264
the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, 21 and the Genocide Convention. 26
According to the Convention against Racial Discrimination, "States
Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in
all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction
as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the
law, notably in the enjoyment of, [inter alia], the right to national-
ity. '26 7 "Particular efforts shall be made," pursuant to the Declaration
against Racial Discrimination, "to prevent discrimination based on
race, colour or ethnic origin, especially in the fields of, [inter alia],
access to citizenship."268 The policies both against racial discrimination
and for the protection of national affiliation deeply infuse the Geno-
cide Convention, which provides:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a na-
tional, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
259. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 1.
260. Id. at 8, 9, 12 (Arts. 2(1), 4(l), 26).
261. Id. at 4 (Art. 2, para. 2).
262. BAsIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 130 (Art. 14).
263. Id. at 210, 218, 219 (Arts. 1(1), 24, 27(1)).
264. The Convention was adopted and opened for signature and ratification by the
U.N. General Assembly in its resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965. It has been
in effect since January 4, 1969. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 23.
For its text, see 660 U.N.T.S. 195; U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 23.
265. The Declaration was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in its resolution
1904 (XVIII) of 20 November 1963. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70,
at 21.
266. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in its resolution 260 (III) of 9 December
1948. It has been in effect since January 12, 1951. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS,
supra note 70, at 39. For its text, see 78 U.N.T.S. 277; U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS,
supra note 70, at 39.
267. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 24 (Art. 5(d)(iii)).
268. Id. at 22 (Art. 3).
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(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life cal-
culated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part;
209
Article 9 of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness is par-
ticularly direct:
A Contracting State may not deprive any person or group of per-
sons of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political
grounds.270
It thus appears incontrovertible that denationalization measures based
on racial, ethnic, religious, or other related grounds are impermissible
under contemporary international law.
Denationalization is equally impermissible as a form of punishment.
It may be recalled that both the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights contain
specific proscription against "arbitrary" deprivation of nationality.2 1'
In addition, article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment."272 Similar provisions
are embodied in the principal human rights conventions, including
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,2 73 the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, 274 and the American Convention
on Human Rights.273 Deprivation of nationality as a measure of pun-
ishment may easily be seen as a form of "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment."
The policy illuminated by Chief Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles
27 6
in the context of United States constitutional law is becoming equally
authoritative in the international domain. Within their legal systems,
states have at their disposal a whole arsenal of criminal sanctions,
including fines, imprisonment, and even death, to combat criminal
conduct; there is no need for their resorting to denationalization for
269. Id. at 39. On the Genocide Convention, see N. ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE CON-
VENTION (1960); Reisman, Responses to Crimes of Discrimination and Genocide: An
Appraisal of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 1 DENVER J.
INT'L L. & POLICY 29 (1971).
270. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 55.
271. See p. 928 supra.
272. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 1.
273. Id. at 9 (Art. 7).
274. BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 126 (Art. 3).
275. Id. at 211 (Art. 5(2)).
276. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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punishment as such.277 In the contemporary world of nation-states,
the right to nationality remains in essence "the right to have rights. ' 278
Denationalization as a form of punishment is neither necessary nor
proportionate for the purpose of criminal sanction.
In his comprehensive commentary on the application of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights, Fawcett defines "inhuman
treatment" as
the deliberate infliction of physical or mental pain or suffering,
against the will of the victim, and, when forming part of crim-
inal punishment, out of proportion to the offence.2 79
Viewed in this light, the interpretation that denationalization as a
punishment constitutes a cruel, inhuman treatment or punishment
will in all likelihood gain increasing recognition and acceptance.
Through such an interpretation and development the unfortunate
omission of an explicit provision against deprivation of nationality in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights may, fortunately, be remedied. 280
277. See Note, supra note 187, at 1179-80.
278. The words of Chief Justice Warren eloquently describe what we refer to:
The punishment strips the citizen of his status in the national and interna-
tional political community. His very existence is at the sufferance of the country
in which he happens to find himself. While any one country may accord him
some rights, and presumably as long as he remained in this country he would
enjoy the limited rights of an alien, no country need do so because he is stateless.
Furthermore, his enjoyment of even the limited rights of an alien might be subject
to termination at any time by reason of deportation. In short, the expatriate has
lost the right to have rights.
This punishment is offensive to cardinal principles for which the Constitution
stands. It subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress. He
knows not what discriminations may be established against him, what proscrip-
tions may be directed against him, and when and for what cause his existence in
his native land may be terminated. He may be subject to banishment, a fate
universally decried by civilized people. He is stateless, a condition deplored in the,
international community of democracies. It is no answer to suggest that all the
disastrous consequences of this fate may not be brought to bear on a stateless
person. The threat makes the punishment obnoxious.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958).
279. J. FAwcEr, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
35 (1969).
Contemporary theories about the sanctioning process raise the question whether
there are any acceptable community policies in terms of which "denationalization"
might be "proportionate" as a punishment; cf. Dession, Sanctions, Law, and Public
Order, I VAND. L. REV. 8 (1947); Dession & Lasswell, Public Order Under Law: The
Role of the Advisor-Draftsman in the Formation of Code or Constitution, 65 YALE L.J.
174 (1955); Comment, Professor George H. "Dession's Final Draft of the Code of Cor-
rection for Puerto Rico, 71 YALE L.J. 1050 (1962).
280. The denationalization and forcible exile on February 13, 1974, of Alexander I.
Solzhenitsyn by the Soviet Union have focused world attention anew upon the enor-
mous human deprivations inherent in denationalization and exile. This action by the
Soviet Union was apparently precipitated by the publication in December 1973 in
Paris of Solzhenitsyn's latest book, The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956, a comprehensive,
historical expos6 of the secret police, prison camp, and terror system in the Soviet
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D. Claims Relating to Statelessness
The status of statelessness entails a most severe and dfamatic depriva-
tion of the power of an individual. Just as within the state nationality
is the "right to have rights," so also on the transnational level nation-
ality is the right to have protection in rights. The stateless person has
no state to "protect" him and lacks even the freedom of movement to
find a state that is willing to protect him. His participation in the
value processes of any territorial community is highly restricted. As
aptly stated in the preamble of one Draft Convention, statelessness
often results in suffering and hardship shocking to conscience and
offensive to the dignity of man, ...
is frequently productive of friction between States....
is inconsistent with the existing principle which postulates na-
tionality as a condition of the enjoyment by the individual of
certain rights recognized by international law .... 281
Most importantly, nationality is commonly regarded as essential
for a state to protect an individual vis-h-vis other entities in the trans-
national arena. In the words of Oppenheim-Lauterpacht,
Union. The official charge against Solzhenitsyn was that of "systematically performing
actions incompatible with being a citizen," a charge apparently regarded as an equivalent
of treason. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1974, at 1, col. 8 (city ed.); id., Feb. 15, 1974, at
I, col. 5 (city ed.); Wash. Post, Feb. 15, 1974, at A24, col. 5.
Some question has been raised about the conformity of the Soviet edict to Soviet
law; cf. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1974, at 16, col. 1 (city ed.); id., Feb. 16, 1974, at 3,
col. 1 (city ed.); THE EcoNoMisT, Feb. 16, 1974, at 18. It is clear nonetheless that the
Soviet action is in direct contravention of the emerging general community expecta-
tions that denationalization and exile are impermissible as "cruel and unusual punish-
ment." Both the detailed circumstances attending the denationalization and forcible
exile of Solzhenitsyn and their longer-term consequences indicate this conclusion. See
TiME, Feb. 25, 1974, at 34-40; Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 14, 1974, at 1, col. 1,
at 2, col. I; id., Feb. 15, 1974, at 1, col. 1. In confirmation of Solzhenitsyn's own
subjectivities, one of his fictional characters describes exile as "spiritual castration."
A. SOLZHENITSYN, THE FIRST CIRCLE 356 (T. Whitney transl. Bantam ed. 1969). The
wave of protest about the world indicates that those subjectivities are not idiosyn-
cratic, but widely shared. It Can be added that the emerging human rights norm of
nondiscrimination, described above, forbids discrimination not only on grounds of
race, color, religion, and sex, but also on grounds of political opinion.
The principle that one state cannot by denationalization force an individual upon
other states would, paradoxically, not appear to be available here to serve the cause
of humanity. Too many other states have expressed willingness to accept so re-
doubtable an anti-communist into their own communities. It may be recalled that in
1929 Trotsky suffered the same fate that has now befallen Solzhenitsyn, and the press
abounds with rumors of further deprivations. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1973,
§ 1, at 12, col. 3; id., Dec. 12, 1973, at 4, col. 4 (city ed.); id., Feb. 14, 1974, at 16,
col. 1 (city ed.); id., Feb. 19, 1974, at 3, col. 1 (city ed.); NEWSWEEK, Feb. 25, 1974, at 38.
281. Alternative Convention on the Elimination of Present Statelessness, in Cordova,
Third Report on the Elimination or Reduction of Statelessness, [19543 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N 26, 36, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/81 (1954).
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Since stateless individuals do not own a nationality, the principal
link by which they could derive benefits from International Law
is missing, and thus they lack protection as far as this Law is con-
cerned. 282
Thus, a stateless person has been compared to "a res nullius, 283 a
"flotsam, '" 2 4 a vessel "on the open sea not sailing under the flag of
a State, "'28 5 "a caput lupinum,"128 "a bird that flies alone,"28 7 and
"an international vagabond. '28 8 The hardship visited upon a state-
less person is dramatically evident in the Dickson Car Wheel Company
Case,28 9 in which the Special Claims Commission between the United
States and Mexico declared in 1931:
A State . . . does not commit an international delinquency in in-
flicting an injury upon an individual lacking nationality, and
consequently no State is empowered to intervene or complain on
his behalf either before or after injury.2 90
In short, statelessness means "the loss of a community willing and
able to guarantee any rights whatsoever." 291
The powerlessness of the stateless person is most apparent in the
limitation upon his freedom of movement, both of egress and of re-
turn. Because of widespread, rigorous requirements for travel docu-
ments (e.g., a valid passport, an entry visa), a stateless person, lacking
necessary documents, usually experiences great difficulty in locating
a state willing to receive him. Unable to enter the territory of a state
lawfully, he is often compelled to do so clandestinely. His illegal entry
continues to haunt him. "He will then," as has been observed, "lead
an illegal existence, avoiding all contact with the authorities and liv-
ing under the constant threat of discovery and expulsion." 292 In his
presidential address in 1801, Thomas Jefferson said that "[e]very man
has a right to live somewhere on the earth";293 a stateless person, how-
ever, has no such right.
282. 1 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, supra note 76, at 668.
283. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 171 (2d ed. 1949).
284. Weis, supra note 122, at 1073.
285. 1 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, supra note 76, at 668.
286. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 103, at 126.
287. The description from Aristotle is quoted in C. SECKLER-HUDSON, STATELESSNESS:
VITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE UNITED STATES 244 (1934).
288. The description is by De LapradeIle and Niboyet, quoted in id. at 15.
289. [1931-1932] Ann. Dig. 228 (No. 115).
290. Id. at 230 n.1.
291. H. ARENDT, supra note 251, at 297.
292. A STUDY OF STATELESSNSS, supra note 149, at 20.
293. Quoted in C. SECKLER-HuDSON, supra note 287, at 248.
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Other deprivations are visited upon the stateless individual. He is
denied general participation, such as voting and office-holding, in the
internal power process of any body politic. He often cannot obtain
documents certifying his personal status (e.g., age, relationships)
because no state is in a position to give that information. He may not
be properly protected by the processes of authoritative decision and
may be denied access to the courts of any state. He may be subject
to taxation and military service in any state where he is found.
Stateless persons are also subjected to deprivations, sometimes in
common with other aliens and sometimes more severely, in value
processes other than power. The stateless individual may be discrim-
inated against in every territorial community because of his alienage;
he is not properly recognized as a person and is thus denied respect.
His opportunities for education are more limited; so also are his op-
portunities to shape enlightenment through the mass media of com-
munication. He is often denied the benefits of public health and other
welfare programs. His right to property, to employment, and to en-
gage in business enterprises may be curtailed; certain professions and
occupations exclude nonnationals. In the exercise of professional skills
a stateless person may be denied the opportunity for fullest expression.
He may encounter a great deal of difficulty in marriage because he
cannot obtain authentic documents certifying his status. 294
The important causes of statelessness quite obviously derive from
the formulation and application of the nationality laws of states in
contravention of human rights. The traditional myth that the regula-
tion of nationality is a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of
states295 and the resultant diversity of nationality laws has created
many gaps in the conferment of nationality both at birth and subse-
quent to birth.
Statelessness at birth generally arises from the inadequacy and di-
versity of nationality laws, which usually employ both jus soli and
jus sanguinis, but not always jus soli and different versions of jus
sanguinis. The main features of this problem are apparent in a "synop-
294. For descriptions of the plight of stateless persons, see id. at 11-22, 244-53; A
STUDY OF STATELESSNESS, supra note 149, at 17-31; A. Mutharika, International Regula-
tion of Statelessness, 1970, at 12-17 (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Yale Law School).
295. For a general survey of such views, see P. WVEIs, supra note 1, at 65-94.
In the well-known Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees case, a more enlightened view
was intimated. The court held that nationality could be made a matter of "inter-
national concern" by agreement: "The question whether a certain matter is or is
not solely within the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question; it de-
pends upon the development of international relations. Thus, in the present state of
international law, questions of nationality were, in the opinion of the Court, in
principle within this reserved domain." [1923] P.C.I.J., ser. B., No. 4, at 24.
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tic chart of possible sources of statelessness" offered by a United Na-
tions study: 2 6
Statelessness at Birth
A. Children born abroad. 1. In jus sanguinis country of
parents of strict jus soli coun-
try.
2. In jus sanguinis country from
a second or third generation
of parents nationals of a jus
sanguinis country.
B. Child born in a jus san- 1. Legitimate (Stateless if father
guinis country with one stateless).
parent stateless. 2. Illegitimate (Stateless if moth-
er stateless).
C. Born in jus sanguinis country of stateless father and mother or
without known nationality.
D. Born in jus sanguinis country of unknown parents.
E. Foundlings.
F. Born on ship or aircraft. 1. In high seas.
2. In territorial sea.
3. In foreign port.
4. In air above foreign territory.
G. Born from stateless parents with diplomatic immunity.
Statelessness subsequent to birth, simply put, arises from the fact
that a person loses his nationality or nationalities without acquiring
another. Loss of nationality may be caused by: (1) explicit, voluntary
expatriation; 297 (2) withdrawal of nationality by the state upon the
"constructive" and often fictitious consent of the individual; 2 S (3)
deprivation of nationality as punishment;299  and (4) territorial
changes.300 The United Nations study, cited above, again offers a chart
both comprehensive and economic, though using a somewhat different
classification from our own, in its indication of potential causes of
statelessness after birth:301
296. Cordova, Report on the Elimination or Reduction of Statelessness, [1953] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. Co mm'N 167, 195, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/64 (1953).
297. See pp. 929-35 supra.
298. See pp. 935-41 supra.
299. See pp. 941-59 supra.
300. Cf. 1 D. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 497-528 (1967); P. WEIs, supra note 1, at 139-64; Hudson, supra note 1, at 11.
301. Cordova, supra note 296, at 195.
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Statelessness Subsequent to Birth
I. Inade-
quacy and
Conflict of
National
Legisla-
tions.
A. Effect of marriage
on the national-
ity of women.
1. Effect of marriage
itself.
2. Husband's change
of nationality.
3. Dissolution of
marriage:
(a) Widow of na-
tional;
(b) Invalid or fic-
titious mar-
riage;
(c) Divorce.
(a) As a
penalty
II. Depriva-
tion of
nation-
ality (b) based on:
racial,
religious,
political
grounds
B. Legitimation of illegitimate child.
C. Adoption.
D. Voluntary Renunciation.
E. Change of nationality of the spouse or
of a parent.
F. Naturalization of the spouse or of
a parent.
(a) Residence abroad of nationalized
citizens.
(b) Service in foreign government or
armed forces.
(c) Departure abroad.
(d) Evasion of military duties by ex-
patriation or otherwise.
(e) Disloyal attitude or activities.
(f) Aid to enemies.
(g) Naturalization by fraud.
(h) Penal offense of naturalized citi-
zens.
Only if the State of origin deprives of its
nationality; otherwise there is not a de
jure statelessness, but only de facto.
III. Inadequacy of treaties on territorial settlements.
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1. Minimization of Statelessness
In a succession of efforts since World War I, the international com-
munity has sought both to eliminate or reduce statelessness and, by
mitigating hardships, to improve the position and treatment of stateless
persons. During the era of the League of Nations, the landmark
action was the 1930 Hague Conference for the Codification of Inter-
national Law, which adopted a Convention on Certain Questions Re-
lating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws302 and a Protocol Relating
to a Certain Case of Statelessness.30 3 Convention provisions relevant
to statelessness dealt with a number of matters: expatriation per-
mits, 30 4 the nationality of married women, 30 5 the nationality of chil-
dren,30 6 and adoption. 30 7 The Protocol is concerned with the avoidance
of statelessness at birth under certain circumstances.3 08 The profound
sense of urgency for further work in the minimization of statelessness,
though expressed in the Final Act of the Conference,30 0 was not fol-
lowed up by the League.
Efforts to minimize statelessness were renewed after the founding
of the United Nations. In 1947, the Human Rights Commission of the
United Nations urged consideration of nationality questions.3 10 This
proposal received concrete expression in article 15 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of December 1948, which proclaims:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor
denied the right to change his nationality.3 11
As a first step in clarifying this right, in 1949 the Secretary-General,
at the request of the Economic and Social Council, prepared a study
on statelessness. 31 2 This study called for the universal acceptance of the
302. Signed on April 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89.
303. Signed on April 12, 1930. 179 L.N.T.S. 115.
304. 179 L.N.T.S. 101 (Art. 7).
305. Id. at 101-03 (Arts. 8-9).
306. Id. at 103-05 (Arts. 13, 16).
307. Id. (Art. 17).
308. Article I of the Protocol provides:
In a State whose nationality is not conferred by the mere fact of birth in its
territory, a person born in its territory of a mother possessing the nationality
of that State and of a father without nationality or of unknown nationality shall
have the nationality of the said State.
179 L.N.T.S. 117.
309. Final Act of the Hague Conference, supra note 111, at 14.
310. 6 U N. ECOSOC, Supp. 1, at 13-14, U.N. Doc. E/600 (1947).
311. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 2. For a brief commentary
on this article, see N. ROBINSON, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 123-24
(1958); cf. Griffin, The Right of a Single Nationality, 40 TEMP. L.Q. 57 (1966).
312. A STUDY OF STATELESSNES, supra note 149.
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following two principles: (1) nationality is to be conferred on every
child at birth; (2) no person should lose his nationality during his
lifetime unless and until he has acquired a new one. 313 In August 1950,
the Economic and Social Council urged the International Law Com-
mission to prepare at the earliest possible time the necessary draft
international convention or conventions for the minimization of state-
lessness.3 14
From its inception in 1949, the International Law Commission in-
cluded "nationality, including statelessness" in its list of topics to be
considered for codification. 39 It dealt with this problem from the
fourth to the sixth sessions (1952-1954), appointing Professors Manley
0. Hudson and Roberto Cordova, successively, as special rapporteurs
on the subject.310 The Commission decided to focus its attention on
the problem of statelessness. On the basis of Professor Cordova's draft
Conventions on the Elimination of Future Statelessness and on the
Reduction of Future Statelessness317 and his annual reports, the Com-
mission adopted the texts of draft Cdnventions on the Elimination and
Reduction of Future Statelessness.318 Both drafts were transmitted to
governments for comments and, in the light of these, the Commission
redrafted some of the articles in 1954.319 These two draft conventions
were designed to facilitate acquisition of the nationality of a state by
virtue of birth within its territory and to avoid the loss of nationality
prior to acquisition of another. When the question of statelessness
came before the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly,
some delegates voiced strong objections to the draft Conventions on
the ground that they encroached upon the domestic jurisdiction of
states in matters of nationality.32 0 Nevertheless, at the recommendation
of the Sixth Committee, the General Assembly decided in December
1954, to convene an international conference of plenipotentiaries to
conclude a convention for the reduction or elimination of future
313. Id. at 170.
314. ECOSOC Res. 319B III, 11 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 1, at 52, U.N. Doc. E/1849
(1950).
315. Report to the General Assembly, [19491 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 277, 280-81.
316. For the Report submitted by Professor Hudson at the Fourth Session of the
International Law Commission in 1952, see Hudson, supra note 1. For the Reports
submitted by Professor Cordova, see Cordova, supra note 296; Cordova, Second Report
on the Elimination or Reduction of Statelessness, [19531 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 196,
U.N. Doc. A/CNA/75 (1953); Cordova, supra note 281; Cordova, Report on Multiple
Nationality, [1954] 2 Y.B. INTL L. COMt'N 42, U.N. Doc. A/CNA/83 (1954).
317. Cordova, supra note 296; Cordova, Second Report, supra note 316.
318. See Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of Its
Fifth Session, [1953] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. Coima'N 200, 220-30, U.N. Doc. A/2456 (1953).
319. See Relhort of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of Its
Sixth Session, [1954] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 140, 141-48, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954).
320. [1954] YE.ARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 418 [hereinafter cited as Y.B.U.N.].
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statelessness as soon as at least 20 states had communicated to the
Secretary-General their willingness to join in such an undertaking.3 21
A sufficient number of states ultimately expressed such willingness
and the Conference was finally convened in Geneva during 1959. The
Conference, with 35 states participating, adopted provisions designed
to reduce statelessness at birth but failed to reach agreement upon how
to limit the competence of states to deprive an individual of na-
tionality.322 The Conference was reconvened in 1961, with 30 states
in attendance. A compromise was reached on the controversial pro-
vision regarding deprivation of nationality and the other provisions
that had failed adoption in the previous conference were also accepted.
The Conference adopted a Convention on the Reduction of Stateless-
ness, which was open for signature in 1962.323 As of this writing, the
Convention has not yet come into effect.324
The Commission on the Status of Women has played a significant
role in the minimization of statelessness for married women. A prin-
cipal source of statelessness is marriage of women to foreign nation-
als.323 As a consequence of the persistent efforts of the Commission,
the General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Nationality of
Married Women in January 1957. The Convention has been in opera-
tion since August 11, 1958.326 An earlier regional convention, the
Montevideo Convention on the Nationality of Women signed on
December 26, 1933, was, however, the first to prescribe the principle
of equality of sexes regarding nationality.3 27
The foregoing efforts, viewed in sum, are far from inconsequential.
They have been directed at the various causes of statelessness and
have helped to crystallize expectations for the minimization of state-
lessness. We briefly discuss the main features of these proposed reme-
dies by reference to each of the causes of statelessness.
(a) Statelessness at Birth
The important policy for the elimination of statelessness at birth
has been succinctly phrased by Manley Hudson in these words:
321. G.A. Res. 896, 9 GAOR Supp. 21, at 49-50, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954).
322. See [19591 Y.B.U.N. 413-14; Weis, supra note 122, at 1078-80.
323. See note 234 supra. For a commentary on the Convention, see Weis, supra note
122.
324. See note 234 supra.
325. See pp. 939-40 supra.
326. See note 70 supra.
327. 6 M. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 589 (1937); LAws CONCERNING NA-
TIONALITY, supra note 1, at 584. Article 1 of the Convention reads:
There shall be no distinction based on sex as regards nationality, in their legis-
lation or in their practice.
The Yale Law Journal
If no other nationality is acquired at birth, the individual should
acquire the nationality of the State in whose territory he is born.328
This policy has found authoritative expression in both general and
specific formulations of various conventions. The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights provides, as we have seen, most generally that
"everyone has the right to a nationality."3 2 The International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights, though lacking a nationality
provision applicable to everyone, provides that "every child has the
right to acquire a nationality." 330 More specifically, the American Con-
vention on Human Rights states that
[e]very person has the right to the nationality of the state in whose
territory he was born if he does not have the right to any other
nationality. 31
These recent developments were of course preceded by certain
historic efforts to eradicate statelessness, efforts which attempted to
make jus soli and jus sanguinis supplement and reinforce each other.332
A provision of critical importance of the 1930 Hague Convention on
Nationality, article 15, states:
Where the nationality of a State is not acquired automatically by
reason of birth on its territory, a child born on the territory of
that State of parents having no nationality, or of unknown na-
tionality, may obtain the nationality of the said State. The law
of that State shall determine the conditions governing the acquisi-
tion of its nationality in such cases.333
According to article 14, the nationality of the state of birth is to be
conferred upon a child of unknown parents; once his parentage is
established, his nationality will be governed by "the rules applicable
in cases where the parentage is known."3 34 A foundling is "presumed
to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found."
Furthermore, the Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness
(1930) provides:
In a State whose nationality is not conferred by the mere fact of
birth in its territory, a person born in its territory of a mother
328. Hudson, supra note 1, at 20.
329. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 2 (Art. 15 (1)).
330. Id. at 12 (Art. 24(3)).
331. BASIc DOCUMENTS, supra note 98, at 217 (Art. 20(2)).
332. See A STUDY ON STATELESSNESS, supra note 149, at 145-60.
333. 179 L.N.T.S. 89, 103.
334. Id.
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possessing the nationality of that State and of a father without
nationality or of unknown nationality shall have the nationality
of the said State. 33 5
Its main purpose was to ensure the conferment of nationality upon a
legitimate child or a recognized illegitimate child whose father alone
is stateless.
The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness3 36 deals
with the question of statelessness at birth in articles one to four, re-
flecting "a compromise between jus soli and jus sanguinis States, not
a compromise between the jus soli and jus sanguinis principles."337
A contracting state is required to "grant its nationality to a person
born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless." 338 However,
a contracting state may attach conditions to the conferment of such
nationality, including age, residence, and absence of criminal record. 39
A "child born in wedlock in the territory of a Contracting State, whose
mother has the nationality of that State, shall acquire at birth that
nationality if it otherwise would be stateless."3 40 A foundling present
in the territory of a contracting state is presumed to have been born
within that territory and of parents possessing the nationality of that
state.341 This is a reaffirmation of the similar principle contained
in the Hague Convention3 42 and the nationality laws of numerous
states. Birth "on a ship or in an aircraft" will be regarded as having
occurred "in the territory of the State whose flag the ship flies or in
the territory of the State in which the aircraft is registered," irrespec-
335. 179 L.N.T.S. 117 (Art. 1).
336. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 53. See also note 234 supra.
337. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.9/C.I/SR.3, at 4 (1961) (remark of the Swiss Delegate).
338. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTMUMENTS, supra note 70, at 54 (Art. 1(1)).
339. Id. (Art. 1(2)).
340. Id. (Art. 1(3)). A comparable provision is found in a Recommendation adopted
by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe:
The Assembly ...
Recommends that the Committee of Ministers:
1. Invite the Member Governments concerned to take the necessary measures so
that legitimate children born in their territory of a marriage between a stateless
father and a mother who is a national of their country automatically acquire by
right the latter's nationality;
2. Suggest that these Governments draft the legal provisions which will be adopted
on this matter in such a manner that the said children, if born in a territory
other than that of the mother, do.not acquire dual nationality nor become stateless;
3. Keep the Assembly informed of measures which may be taken to this end by
the Governments concerned.
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recommendation 194 of April 23, 1959.
341. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 54 (Art. 2).
342. The second paragraph of article 14 of the Hague Convention on Nationality
reads:
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the
territory of the State in which it was found.
179 L.N.T.S. 107.
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tive of the location, within territorial space or otherwise, of the ship
or the aircraft at the time of birth.343 Subject to certain conditions, a
contracting state must confer its nationality on a person, not born in
its territory, who would otherwise be stateless, if at the time of his
birth one of his parents possessed the nationality of that state.34 4
(b). Statelessness Subsequent to Birth
The parallel policy with respect to statelessness subsequent to birth
has been stated, with equal brevity, by Hudson:
Loss of nationality subsequent to birth shall be conditional on
the acquisition of another nationality.345
The movement toward this policy in general community perspectives
is made explicit in prescriptions about the consequences of voluntary
renunciation of nationality. Article 7 of the Hague Convention pro-
vides that an expatriation permit issued by a state "shall not entail
loss of the nationality of the State which issues it, unless the person to
whom it is issued possesses another nationality or unless and until he
acquires another nationality." "An expatriation permit shall lapse if
the holder does not acquire a new nationality" within the prescribed
period, unless he "already possesses a nationality other than that of
the State" issuing the permit. 46 Similarly, the Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness provides:
If the law of a Contracting State entails loss of [sic] renunciation
of nationality, such renunciation shall not result in loss of nation-
ality unless the person concerned possesses or acquires another
nationality.3 47
Of course, the otherwise commendable policy of minimizing state-
lessness, embodied in these provisions, might sometimes operate to tie
an individual, against his will, to a political community with which
he has lost all sense of identification and loyalty and from which he
expects no genuine protection. For this reason the Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness provides that enforcement of the policy of
preventing statelessness should not interfere with the freedom of move-
343. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 54 (Art. 3).
344. Id. (Art. 4).
345. Hudson, supra note 1, at 20.
346. 179 L.N.T.S. 89, 101.
347. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSMTUMENTS, supra note 70. at 55 (Art. 7(l)(a)).
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ment, including ingress and egress, and with the right of asylum pro-
tected by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.348
One intriguing question is whether an individual should be al-
lowed to become stateless, if he so chooses, in defiance of the ordi-
narily benign policy of minimizing statelessness. In keeping with the
overriding policy of honoring freedom of choice, there would appear
no reason why an individual should not be allowed to render himself
stateless, if the decision is freely made, with full appreciation of the
resultant consequences.
Of more fundamental importance, however, for the realization of
the policies of voluntary expatriation and minimization of stateless-
ness, is the liberalization of states' requirements for conferring nation-
ality subsequent to birth. This is an area for improvement, as neglected
as it is important.
Although naturalization has long been perceived as the key to re-
duction of existing statelessness,3 49 states are notoriously reluctant to
undertake the necessary humanitarian measures. At the 1930 Hague
Conference for the Codification of International Law, the subject
was barely considered, not because it was regarded as unimportant
but because it raised serious problems arising from conflicts of nation-
ality laws.350 Following the 1930 Hague Conference, international ef-
forts were directed toward improving the status and treatment of refu-
gees (de jure and de facto stateless persons) rather than toward enabling
stateless persons to acquire some nationality.351
Community interest in improving naturalization laws was renewed
in connection with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948. To give meaning to "the right to a nationality" proclaimed in
the Universal Declaration, both the Secretary-General of the United
Nations352 and the Economic and Social Council353 urged governments
to facilitate acquisition of nationality by stateless persons through their
respective naturalization procedures. Some states have shown reluc-
tance to discuss reforms which they regard as related to present, as
contrasted with future, statelessness on the ground that naturalization
348. Id. (Art. 7(1)(b)).
349. See pp. 925-28 supra; A. Mutharika, supra note 294, at 92-100.
350. This is evidenced by the official title of the Convention on Nationality adopted
at the Conference, i.e., Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws, 179 L.N.T.S. 89.
351. See pp. 976-78 infra.
352. A STUDY OF STATELESSNESS, supra note 149, at 171.
353. In its resolution 319B III of 16 August 1950, the Economic and Social Council
invited "States to examine sympathetically applications for naturalization submitted by
stateless persons habitually resident in their territory." 11 U.N. ECOSOC 3, Supp. 1,
at 59, U.N. Doc. E/1849 (1950).
The Yale Law Journal
is too "political" a matter.3 54 Thus, the International Law Commission
had initially instructed its Special Rapporteur on "nationality, includ-
ing statelessness," Roberto Cordova, to address himself only to future
statelessness, not present statelessness. He soon discovered that it was
impossible to focus on one to the exclusion of the other.3 5 Although
he persuaded the International Law Commission to let him proceed
by giving equal attention to both aspects of the problem, his proposals
for reducing statelessness through naturalization were given little
attention and support.3 5 6 As a consequence, the Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness, adopted in 1961, 3 5 7 is concerned primarily
with the question of future statelessness. Its limited concern for the
reduction of statelessness through naturalization is expressed in article
4, according to which a contracting state may grant its nationality,
upon application in compliance with certain prescribed conditions, to
a person not born in its territory "who would otherwise be stateless,
if the nationality of one of his parents at the time of the person's birth
was that of that State."
In this connection, a significant step is taken by article 32 of the
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons of 1954, which
provides:
The Contracting State shall as far as possible facilitate the assim-
ilation and naturalization of stateless persons. They shall in par-
ticular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings
and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of such pro-
ceedings. 358
A comparable provision is found in article 34 of the Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees. 3 9 Since both Conventions are widely
accepted and have been in operation for some time, it is possible that
more states will undertake serious efforts in this direction.
The general policy of making loss of one nationality contingent
upon acquisition of another applies to various situations in which
withdrawal of nationality is based on the individual's real or construc-
354. See Cordova, supra note 281, at 27-28.
355. These words "future" and "present" obviously have no reference to modalities
by which people become stateless. Measures such as liberalizing naturalization laws,
which states refuse to consider because they could be related to existing stateless per-
sons, may of course be of the utmost importance for alleviating future statelessness
arising from the whole range of modalities by which people are made stateless.
356. Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of Its Sixth
Session, supra note 319, at 147.
357. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 53.
358. 360 U.N.T.S. 117; U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 61.
359. 189 U.N.T.S. 137; U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 63, 68.
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tive consent, that is, consent inferred from such acts as deliberate
acquisition of the nationality of another state, taking of an oath of
allegiance to another state, protracted residence abroad, marriage to
an alien man, naturalization of parents by another government, legiti-
mation, and adoption. 360
Thus, the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness provides
that a national seeking "naturalization in a foreign country shall not
lose his nationality unless he acquires or has been accorded assurance
of acquiring the nationality of that foreign country." 36 With certain
limited exceptions, a national shall not be made stateless because of
"departure, residence abroad, failure to register or on any similar
ground. '3 2 The stated exceptions are meant to be exclusive. Thus,
article 7(6) of the Convention states emphatically:
Except in the circumstances mentioned in this article, a person
shall not lose the nationality of a Contracting State, if such loss
would render him stateless, notwithstanding that such loss is not
expressly prohibited by any other provision of this Convention.3 3
The effect of marriage on the nationality of women, as noted, has
been a matter of continuing interest.364 As a manifestation of the
policy of minimizing statelessness, the trend has been away from the
woman's automatic loss of her nationality upon marriage to an alien.3 65
Thus, the Hague Convention makes the loss of nationality of a woman
married to a foreign national, by virtue either of the marriage or of
her husband's change of nationality during marriage, conditional on
"her acquiring the nationality of the husband."3 6 Similarly, under
the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, the loss of a woman's
nationality because of marriage or her husband's loss of nationality
is "conditional upon [her] possession or acquisition of another nation-
ality."3 67
These prescriptions, though protective, are less than adequate, espe-
cially from the perspective of equality of men and women. Thus, a
critical focus in the ongoing world-wide movement for women's libera-
tion has been equality of the sexes in the context of nationality; the
principle of equality is perceived to be the fundamental, positive
360. See pp. 936-41 supra.
361. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 55 (Art. 7(2)).
362. Id. (Art. 7(3)).
363. Id. (Art. 7(6)).
364. See pp. 922-23, 939-40 supra.
365. See p. 940 supra.
366. 179 L.N.T.S. 89, 101 (Art. 8).
367. U.N. HUMIAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 55 (Art. 6).
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answer to the question of the statelessness of married women. 3 8 This
policy first found concrete expression in the international arena in
1933, when the Montevideo Convention on the Nationality of Women
declared that "no distinction" shall be "based on sex as regards nation-
ality" 369 and the Montevideo Convention on Nationality of the same
date further provides that "neither matrimony nor its dissolution
affects the nationality of the husband or wife."370
More recently, the policy has been crystallized by the adoption and
application of the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women
of 1957, 371 which proclaims that
neither the celebration nor the dissolution of a marriage between
one of its nationals and an alien, nor the change of nationality
by the husband during marriage, shall automatically affect the
nationality of the wife372
and that
neither the voluntary acquisition of the nationality of another
State nor the renunciation of its nationality by one of its na-
tionals shall prevent the retention of its nationality by the wife
of such national.373
The United Nations Declaration on Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women of 1967374 reaffirms this policy in these words:
Women shall have the same rights as men to acquire, change or
retain their nationality. Marriage to an alien shall not automat-
ically affect the nationality of the wife either by rendering her
stateless or by forcing upon her the nationality of her husband.370
The naturalization of parents, as mentioned above, ordinarily ex-
tends its effect to minor children. 376 "In cases where minor children
do not acquire the nationality of their parents as the result of the
naturalization of the latter," the Hague Convention provides, "they
shall retain their existing nationality." 377 A similar protection is of-
368. See, e.g., NATIONALITY OF MARRIED WOMEN, supra note 66, at 6-7, 14-18.
369. 49 Stat. 2957, 2960; T.S. No. 875 (effective Aug. 29, 1934).
370. NATIONALITY OF MARRIED WOMEN, supra note 66, at 24 (Art. 6).
371. 309 U.N.T.S. 65; U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 52.
372. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 52 (Art. 1).
373. Id. (Art. 2).
374. The Declaration, prepared by the Commission on Status of Women and the
Third Committee of the General Assembly, was adopted unanimously by the United
Nations General Assembly on November 7, 1967. G.A. Res. 2263, 22 GAOR Supp. 16, at
35, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967). For the text see BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 183
(I. Brownlie ed. 1971).
375. BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 374, at 183, 185.
376. See pp. 924, 940.41 supra.
377. 179 L.N.T.S. 89, 103 (Art. 13).
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fered by the Hague Convention in connection with legitimation of an
illegitimate child and with adoption.378 Moving beyond these pro-
visions, the Convention on Reduction of Statelessness has formulated
an all-inclusive protection clause, seeking to embrace all cases of
change of personal status and to remove change of status as a cause
of statelessness. Article 5(1) of the Convention states:
If the law of a Contracting State entails loss of nationality as a
consequence of any change in the personal status of a person such
as marriage, termination of marriage, legitimation, recognition or
adoption, such loss shall be conditional upon possession or acquisi-
tion of another nationality.37 9
The growing general community condemnation of discriminatory
and punitive denationalizations 38 0 would appear to be establishing a
comparable policy of minimizing statelessness in connection with such
denationalizations. Article 8(l) of the Convention on the Reduction
of Statelessness broadly pronounces that a "Contracting State shall not
deprive a person of its nationality if such deprivation would render
him stateless." 38'I From this broad policy, unfortunately, some deroga-
tions-for acts "prejudicial to the vital interests of the State"-
are permitted.38 2 In light of the interpretations presently being given
to the community prohibition of "cruel and inhuman punishment
and treatment," 38 3 these derogations could come to be regarded as
impermissible.
Acquiring states have historically mitigated statelessness arising
from territorial changes by conferring their nationality upon the in-
habitants of the transferred territory or by giving such inhabitants
the option of retaining their original nationality or accepting that of
the acquiring state.384 Some protection from statelessness in this con-
text is now specifically afforded by article 10 of the Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness:
1. Every treaty between Contracting States providing for the
transfer of territory shall include provisions designed to secure
that no person shall become stateless as a result of the transfer.
A Contracting State shall use its best endeavours to secure that
any such treaty made by it with a State which is not a party to this
Convention includes such provisions.
378. Id. at 105 (Arts. 16-17).
379. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 55.
380. See pp. 941-59 supra.
381. U.N. HUM AN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 55.
382. Id. (Art. 8(3)).
383. See pp. 958-59 supra.
384. See A STUDY ON STATELESSNESS, supra note 149, at 150-53; Hudson, supra note
1, at 19.
975
The Yale Law Journal
2. In the absence of such provisions the Contracting State to
which territory is transferred or which otherwise acquires territory
shall confer its nationality on such persons as would otherwise
become stateless as a result of the transfer or acquisition.3 5
A policy of utmost voluntarism would of course afford the inhabitants
the right of option as well. Unfortunately, such a proposal, though
submitted by the International Law Commission, was not incorporated
into the Convention.38
6
2. Mitigations of Statelessness
Turning from efforts to avoid or reduce statelessness to those de-
signed to mitigate or improve the treatment of stateless persons, we
call attention to the fact that this subject is commonly considered in
conjunction with the treatment of refugees. 38 7 Viewed strictly from
the perspective of legal technicality, the concept of statelessness (having
no nationality) and the concept of being a refugee (fleeing one's coun-
try in fear) are different. 388 Just as stateless persons may or may not
be refugees, so refugees may or may not be stateless persons. In terms
of lack of governmental protection, refugees who nominally have a
nationality may, however, be in no better position than stateless per-
sons. Those refugees who legally have a nationality but in fact do not
enjoy the protection of the government of their country of nationality
are usually called de facto stateless refugees, to distinguish them from
de jure stateless refugees.38 9 The majority of today's refugees are de
facto rather than de jure stateless. Such refugees and stateless persons
thus share one fate-they are "unprotected persons." 390  This close,
though not entirely identical, relationship between stateless persons
and refugees is vividly illustrated by the substantially identical pro-
visions of two parallel conventions: the Convention Relating to the
Status of Stateless Persons3 ' and the Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees. 39 2
The first contemporary international effort to protect and assist
385. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 56.
386. Weis, supra note 122, at 1084.
387. See, e.g., Weis, The Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 10
INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 255 (1961); A STUDY OF STATELESSNESS, supra note 149; authorities
cited in note 15 supra.
388. See 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 73-78
(1966); A STUDY OF STATELESSNESS, supra note 149. at 9-10; Van Heuven Goldhart, The
Problem of Refugees, 82 HAGUE RECUEIL 265, 267-71 (1953).
389. A STUDY OF STATELESSNESS,. supra note 149, at 8-9.
390. P. WEIS, supra note 1, at 168.
391. 360 U.N.T.S. 117; U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 57.
392. 189 U.N.T.S. 137; U.N. HUMAN RICHTS INSRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 63.
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stateless persons and refugees commenced in 1921 when the League of
Nations created the Office of High Commissioner for Russian Refu-
gees, responding to the critical needs of those refugdes rendered state-
less, as may be recalled, by the mass denationalization measures under-
taken in Russia in the wake of the revolution.393 This was followed by
the conclusion of the Convention Relating to the International Status
of Refugees39 4 in 1933 and the establishment of the Office of the
League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 1938.315 Since
World War II, the need to protect and assist stateless persons and refu-
gees has grown.306 Under the auspices of the United Nations, the Of-
fice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
was created in 1950. 397 Shortly thereafter the Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees of July 28, 1951, and the Convention Relating
to the Status of Stateless Persons of September 24, 1954, successively
came into existence. The scope of the 1951 Refugees Convention was
greatly expanded by the adoption of the Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees in 1967.398
The Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, together
with the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (frequently
called the Magna Carta of Refugees), appear to afford comprehensive
protection for stateless persons and refugees. The need for a separate
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons was dictated by
the consideration, in the words of its preamble, that "only those state-
less persons who are also refugees are covered by the Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, and that there are
many stateless persons who are not covered by that Convention."3 99 A
major difference between the two conventions relates to the role of
393. See pp. 944-45 supra.
394. Signed at Geneva on October 28, 1933, the Convention defined the legal status
of those refugees covered by the Convention, i.e., Russian, Armenian, and assimilated
refugees. 159 L.N.T.S. 199, 201.
395. For this and subsequent developments, see Van Heuven Goldhart, supra note
388, at 271-75.
396. See generally L. HOLBORN, supra note 15; J. VERANANT, supra note 15.
397. The Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in its resolution 428 (V) of 14
December 1950. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 72. For the work
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, see A MANDATE TO PRoTEcT
AND ASSIST REFUGEES, supra note 15; Report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, supra note 233; Weis, The Office of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees and Human Rights, 1 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 243 (1968).
398. 606 U.N.T.S. 267; U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 70. See
note 237 supra. The purpose of the Protocol is to expand international protection
for refugees by removing the temporal and geographical restrictions inherent in article
I of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The substantive pro-
visions (articles 2 to 34 inclusive) of the 1951 Convention are made part of the
Protocol in art. 1(1).
399. 360 U.N.T.S. 117, 130; U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 57.
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UNHCR: While article 35 of the Refugees Convention explicitly en-
trusts to the Office of the High Commissioner the task of coordinating
with the contracting states and supervising the application of the Con-
vention, 400 there is no comparable provision in the other Convention.
Otherwise, in terms of substantive protection and actual wording, the
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons is essentially
patterned after the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
Hence, an examination of treatment of stateless persons also reveals
the treatment being accorded to refugees.
Under the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons,
the treatment afforded for stateless persons is divided in convention
terms into five broad and overlapping categories:
(I) General protection: undelimited provisions for protection with-
out specifying "national treatment," "alien treatment" and so on;41
(II) National treatment: "treatment at least as favorable as that
accorded to their nationals"; 402
(III) Favorable alien treatment: "treatment as favorable as possible,
and in any event, not less favorable than that accorded to aliens gen-
erally in the same circumstances"; 40 3
(IV) Treatment accorded to nationals of the country of habitual
residence: "the treatment granted to a national of the country of his
habitual residence, ' 40 4 "the same protection as is accorded to nation-
als" of the country of "habitual residence"; 40 5
(V) Alien treatment: "the same treatment as is accorded to aliens
generally," 40 6 "subject to regulations applicable to aliens generally in
the same circumstances. 407
The following chart may indicate the kind and scope of treatment
specified in different value processes:
400. Article 35 of the Refugee Convention reads:
1. The Contracting States undertake to co-operate with the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the United Na-
tions which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and shall in particular
facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention.
2. In order to enable the Office of the High Commissioner or any other agency
of the United Nations which may succeed it, to make reports to the competent
organs of the United Nations, the Contracting States undertake to provide them
in the appropriate form with information and statistical data requested concerning:
(a) The condition of refugees,
(b) The implementation of this Convention, and
(c) Laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force re-
lating to refugees.
U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 68.
401. Id. at 58-61 (Arts. 3, 5, 12, 16(l), 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, and 32).
402. Id. at 58-60 (Arts. 4, 14, 16(2), 20, 22(1), 23, and 24).
403. Id. at 59-60 (Arts. 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, and 22(2)).
404. Id. at 59 (Art. 16(3)).
405. Id. (Art. 14).
406. Id. at 58 (Art. 7(1)).
407. Id. at 61 (Art. 26).
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CATEGORY OF TREATMENT
IV. Treatment
Accorded to
Nationals of
III. Favorable the Country
VALUE I. General II. National Alien of Habitual V. Alien
CATEGORY Protection Treatment Treatment Residence Treatment
rights granted
apart from the
Convention
(art. 5)
access to
courts (art. 16
(1))
administrative
assistance
(art. 25)
identity
papers (art. 27)
travel docu-
ments (art. 28)
nonexpulsion
(art. 31)
naturalization
(art. 32)
nondiscrimi-
nation (art. 3)
transfer of
assets (art. 30)
access to
courts (art.
16(2))
elementary
education (art.
22(l))
rationing (art.
20)
artistic rights
and industrial
property (art.
14)
general pr6-
vision (art.
7(1))
freedom of
movement
(art. 26)
access to
courts (art.
16(3))
right of non-
political associ-
ation (art. 15)
non-elemen-
tary education
(art. 22(2))
housing (art.
21)
movable and
immovable
property (art.
13) artistic rights
and industrial
property (art.
14)
public relief wage-earning
(art. 23) employment
(art. 17)
labor legisla- self-employ-
tion and so- ment (art. 18)
cial security
(art. 24)
liberal profes-
sions (art. 19)
personal status
(art. 12)
religion (art.
4)
Power
Respect
Enlighten-
ment
Well-Being
Wealth
Skill
Affection
Rectitude
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This chart demonstrates that stateless persons are accorded sub-
stantial protection even in power processes.40 8 Of special importance
are provisions for access to courts,40 9 administrative assistance, 410 iden-
tity papers, 411 travel documents, 412 and nonexpulsion.41 3 If, however,
408. But see A. Mutharika, supra note 294, at 159-61.
409. Article 16 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons reads:
1. A stateless person shall have free access to the Courts of Law on the territory
of all Contracting States.
2. A stateless person shall enjoy in the Contracting State in which he has his
habitual residence the same treatment as a national in matters pertaining to access
to the Courts, including legal assistance and exemption from cautio judicatum solvi.
3. A stateless person shall be accorded in the matters referred to in paragraph
2 in countries other than that in which he has his habitual residence the treatment
granted to a national of the country of his habitual residence.
U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 59.
410. Article 25 of the Convention states:
1. When the exercise of a right by a stateless person would normally require
the assistance of authorities of a foreign country to whom he cannot have recourse,
the Contracting State in whose territory he is residing shall arrange that such as-
sistance be afforded to him by their own authorities.
2. The authority or authorities mentioned in paragraph 1 shall deliver or cause
to be delivered under their supervision to stateless persons such documents or cer-
tifications as would normally be delivered to aliens by or through their national
authorities.
3. Documents or certifications so delivered shall stand in the stead of the of-
ficial instruments delivered to aliens by or through their national authorities
and shall be given credence in the absence of proof to the contrary.
4. Subject to such exceptional treatments as may be granted to indigent per-
sons, fees may be charged for the services mentioned herein, but such fees shall be
moderate and commensurate with those charged to nationals for similar services.
5. The provisions of this article shall be without prejudice to articles 27 and 28.
Id. at 60-61.
411. Article 27 of the Convention reads:
The Contracting States shall issue identity papers to any stateless person in their
territory who does not possess a valid travel document.
Id. at 61.
412. Article 28 of the Convention provides:
The Contracting States shall issue to stateless persons lawfully staying in their
territory travel documents for the purpose of travel outside their territory, unless
compelling reasons of national security or public order otherwise require, and the
provisions of the Schedule to this Convention shall apply with respect to such
documents. The Contracting States may issue such a travel document to any other
stateless person in their territory; they shall in particular give sympathetic con-
sideration to the issue of such a travel document to stateless persons in their ter-
ritory who are unable to obtain a travel document from the country of their
lawful residence.
Id.
413. Article 31 of the Convention reads:
1. The Contracting States shall not expel a stateless person lawfully in their
territory save on grounds of national security or public order.
2. The expulsion of such a stateless person shall be only in pursuance of a
decision reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling
reasons of national security otherwise require, the stateless person shall be al-
lowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be represented
for the purpose before competent authority or a person or persons specially
designated by the competent authority.
3. The Contracting States shall allow such a stateless person a reasonable pe-
riod within which to seek legal admission into another country. The Contracting
States reserve the right to apply during that period such internal measures as
they may deem necessary.
Id. In this regard, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees affords more
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they were given full participation in the power process-with all the
attendant rights and responsibilities in voting and office-holding--
they would in effect be full-fledged nationals. Hence, naturalization
would appear, as emphasized above and by this Convention, 14 to re-
main an important remedy for powerlessness.
All of these protections uniquely tailored for stateless persons do
not preclude them from claiming the benefit of other prescriptions for
protecting the rights of all human beings.415 What is most needed for
the protection of stateless and other human beings is wider acceptance
and application of all of the many prescriptions already designed for
such protection. 41 6
E. Claims Relating to Multiple Nationality
The principal thrust of inherited international law relating to mul-
tiple nationality has been toward the protection of state interests rather
than the protection of individual human rights. Multiple nationality
differs from statelessness in that it may confer some benefits upon
individuals. Thus it may provide multiple protectors in the external
arena 4"' or afford physical access to more than one country, with oppor-
tunities to participate in the internal value processes of all such coun-
tries.
Such benefits may, however, be accompanied, and even outweighed,
by severe burdens and responsibilities. Thus, a person of multiple
nationality may, like a stateless person, be deprived of all protectors
in the external arena. Traditional doctrine holds that one state of
nationality cannot protect an individual against another state of his
nationality.418 If the party imposing deprivations happens to be a state
comprehensive protection in its article 31 (refugees unlawfully in the country of refuge),
article 32 (expulsion), and article 33 (prohibition of expulsion or return ("refoulement")).
Id. at 68.
414. Article 32 of the Convention provides:
The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and nat-
uralization of stateless persons. They shall in particular make every effort to ex-
pedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and
costs of such proceedings.
Id. at 61.
415. For compilations of human rights prescriptions, see U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS IN-
STRUMENTS, supra note 70; BAsic DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 374.
416. It is especially important that wider acceptance be accorded to the Convention
on the Reduction of Statelessness so that it can soon go into effect and command
wide application.
417. Vis-it-vis a third state, a person having multiple nationality enjoys multiple
protectors:
But against third States each of them appears as his [dual national's] sovereign,
and it is therefore possible that each of them can exercise its right of protection
over him within third States.
I Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, supra note 76, at 666.
418. See p. 987 inf!ra.
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of his nationality, the individual having multiple nationality may
never get a hearing on the merits of his claim.
A multiple national may in fact be exposed to deprivations in-
imical to human rights throughout all the different value processes.410
He may be subjected to the civil and criminal jurisdiction, which
follows a national wherever he goes, of two or more states; he may
be subject to the laws relating to treason,420 enemy status, military
service and security clearance of more than one state. More than one
state may have jurisdiction to tax him, to expropriate his property, to
impose restrictions on his trading activities, and to restrict disposition
of his property. More than one state may discriminate against him;
he may be discriminated against on different grounds in different
communities. He may be subjected to physical and psychological in-
security in more than one state. He may be subjected to compulsory
education in more than one state. More than one state may seek to
impose restrictions on his practice of certain professions. More than
one state may assert jurisdiction with respect to his family life, includ-
ing marriage, children's up-bringing, education and welfare. Finally,
more than one state may seek to restrict his religious affiliations and
activities.
The causes of multiple nationality, as of statelessness, are to be
found in the wide diversity of state laws about the conferment and
withdrawal of nationality. "The most frequent case of double nation-
ality at birth," observed Hudson, "is caused by the application of jus
soli and jus sanguinis to the same individual: a person born in a
country which has the jus soli, of parents who have the nationality of
a country which employs jus sanguinis, becomes a double national or
sujet mixte."42 1 The same result may follow when states employ vary-
ing combinations of jus soli and jus sanguinis. Multiple nationality
419. As declared in Inouye Kanao v. The King,
if a person possesses dual nationality . . . it does not mean that he owes any the
less allegiance to this country than a person who is only a British subject. Dual
nationality is not half one nationality and half another but two complete na-
tionalities so far as our law is concerned ....
[1947] Ann. Dig. 103, 106 (No. 39) (Appellate Jurisdiction, Hong Kong).
420. As Bar-Yaacov puts it, "The legal status of an individual who happens to
possess the nationalities of two belligerent States carries with it serious disadvantages.
If both States require of such an individual the fulfilment of the duties of allegiance,
he is likely to commit the criminal offence of treason with regard to one of them." He
"may be compelled to fight against one of the belligerents; or may voluntarily adopt
the cause of one country and commit acts which are treasonable as regards the other
country; or he may assist one of the parties without committing acts amounting to
treason against the other party." N. BAR-YAACOV, DUAL NATIONALITY 54, 57 (1961).
See also Orfield, The Legal Effects of Dual Nationality, 17 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 427,
429 (1949); Vilkov, The Settlement of Problems of Dual Nationality under International
Law, 1959 SOVIET Y.B. INT'L L. 371 (1960).
421. Hudson, supra note 1, at 10.
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will also occur when an individual acquires subsequent to birth an-
other nationality-by virtue of application, certain events (e.g., mar-
riage, naturalization of parents, legitimation, adoption), or territorial
changes-without losing his original nationality. 422
International efforts to regulate multiple nationality have, again as
with statelessness, been twofold: to minimize the occurrence of mul-
tiple nationality and to ameliorate the deprivations imposed upon
people of multiple nationality. The Inter-American Convention on the
Status of Naturalized Citizens concluded at Rio de Janeiro in 1906
dealt with naturalized persons returning to the state of their original
nationality.42 3 Under the terms of the Convention, a naturalized per-
son taking up "residence in his native country without the intention
of returning to the country in which he has been naturalized . . .will
be considered as having reassumed his original citizenship, and as hav-
ing renounced the citizenship acquired by the said naturalization."'4 24
Unless proved to the contrary, further, "the intention not to return
will be presumed to exist when the naturalized person shall have
resided in his native country for more than two years." 425 In their
respective peace treaties with the Allied Powers after World War I,
Germany, Austria, and Hungary undertook to recognize any new na-
tionality acquired by their nationals pursuant to the laws of the Allied
and Associated Powers, regarding "such persons as having in conse-
quence of the acquisition of such new nationality, in all respects sev-
ered their allegiance to their country of origin. ' 426
Responding to the urgent problems of multiple nationality (and
also statelessness) in the aftermath of World War I, the Hague Con-
ference for the Codification of International Law of 1930 still repre-
sents the most important effort to deal with the problem of multiple
nationality. Theoretically, multiple nationality at birth could be elim-
inated by an outright, universal adoption of a single principle for
conferment. Such a potentially promising approach, however, was ob-
viously unacceptable to various governments, for, in the words of the
Dutch delegation,
422. See Survey of the Problem of Multiple Nationality Prepared by the Secretariat,
[1954] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 52, 64-85, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/84 (1954); N. BAR-YAACOV,
supra note 420, at 437-42.
423. See R. Flournoy & M. Hudson, supra note 1, at 645.
424. Id. Art. 1.
425. Id. Art. 2.
426. Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, art. 278, 2 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN
HISTORY 1648-1967, at 1265, 1433 (F. Israel ed. 1967); Treaty of St. Germain, September
10, 1919, art. 230, 3 id. at 1535, 1647; Treaty of Trianon, June 4, 1920, art. 213, 3 id.
at 1863, 1971.
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it would be easier to obtain unanimity for a rule which admitted
situations in which an individual had no nationality or two na-
tionalities and regulated the resulting conflicts, tharl to establish
a formula which would result in restricting to some extent the
State's power of legislation.427
Attention was, hence, centered merely on minimizing the number of
cases of multiple nationality.
Though the desire for the minimization of "dual" nationality was
unanimously expressed in the Final Act of the Conference, 428 solu-
tions to the question of multiple nationality, as finally adopted, were
limited in scope. Article 6 of the Hague Convention states:
Without prejudice to the liberty of a State to accord wider
rights to renounce its nationality, a person possessing two nation-
alities acquired without any voluntary act on his part may re-
nounce one of them with the authorisation of the State whose
nationality he desires to surrender.
The authorisation may not be refused in the case of a person
who has his habitual and principal residence abroad, if the con-
ditions laid down in the law of the State whose nationality he
desires to surrender are satisfied.429
A special provision was made with respect to children born to persons
enjoying diplomatic immunities. 430
The proposal that a person having multiple nationality at birth be
afforded a right of option failed to gain support. 431 Instead the Con-
ference recommended in its Final Act that
427. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, CONFERENCE FOR THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAw:
BASES OF DISCUSSION, League of Nations Publication Series 1929.V.1 (C.73. M.38. 1929.V.),
at 11 [hereinafter cited as BASES OF DISCUSSION].
428. Final Act of the Hague Conference, supra note 111, at 14.
429. 179 L.N.T.S. 89, 101.
430. Article 12 reads:
Rules of law which confer nationality by reason of birth on the territory of a
State shall not apply automatically to children born to persons enjoying diplomatic
immunities in the country where the birth occurs.
The law of each State shall permit children of consuls de carriere, or of officials
of foreign States charged with official missions by their Governments, to become
divested, by repudiation or otherwise, of the nationality of the State in which
they were born, in any case in which on birth they acquired dual nationality, pro-
vided that they retain the nationality of their parents.
Id. at 103.
431. The delegation of Finland proposed to "make it the duty" of the possessor
of double nationality "to opt for one or other of the nationalities." BASES OF DISCUSSION,
supra note 427, at 83.
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States should adopt legislation designed to facilitate, in the case
of persons possessing two or more nationalities at birth, the renun-
ciation of the nationality of the countries in which they are not
resident, without subjecting such renunciation to unnecessary con-
ditions . . .
and that
States should apply the principle that the acquisition of a foreign
nationality through naturalisation involves the loss of the previous
nationality.432
Recently, the Council of Europe adopted the Convention of Reduc-
tion of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases
of Multiple Nationality.433 Article 1 of this Convention reads in part:
1. Nationals of the Contracting Parties who are of full age and
who acquire of their own free will, by means of naturalisation,
option or recovery, the nationality of another Party shall lose their
former nationality. They shall not be authorised to retain their
former nationality.
2. Nationals of the Contracting Parties who are minors and ac-
quire by the same means the nationality of another Party shall also
lose their former nationality if, where their national law provides
for the loss of nationality in such cases, they have been duly em-
powered or represented. They shall not be authorised to retain
their former nationality.434
432. Final Act of the Hague Conference, supra note 11, at 14.
433. Europ. T.S. No. 43 (1963).
434. Id. at 2. The remainder of this article reads as follows:
3. Minor children, other than those who are or have been married, shall likewise
lose their former nationality in the event of the acquisition ipso jure of the na-
tionality of another Contracting Party upon and by reason of the naturalisation or
the exercise of an option or the recovery of nationality by their father and mother.
Where only one parent loses his former nationality, the law of that Contracting
Party whose nationality the minor possessed shall determine from which of his parents
he shall derive his nationality. In the latter case, the said law may make the loss
of his nationality subject to the prior consent of the other parent or the guardian
of his acquiring the new nationality.
However, without prejudice to the provisions of the law of each of the Con-
tracting Parties concerning the recovery of nationality, the Party of which the
minor referred to in the foregoing paragraph possessed the nationality may lay
down special conditions on which they may recover that nationality of their own
free will after attaining their majority.
4. In so far as concerns the loss of nationality as provided for in the present
Article, the age of majority and minority and the conditions of capacity and rep-
resentation shall be determined by the law of the Contracting Party whose na-
tionality the person concerned possesses.
Id. at 2-3.
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A person having "the nationality of two or more Contracting Parties
may renounce one or more of these nationalities, with the consent of
the Contracting Party whose nationality he desires to renounce.' 43
To restrain the contracting state from arbitrarily withholding such
consent, the Convention further provides:
Such consent may not be withheld by the Contracting Party
whose nationality a person of full age possesses ipso jure, pro-
vided that the said person has, for the past ten years, had his or-
dinary residence outside the territory of that Party and also pro-
vided that he has his ordinary residence in the territory of the
Party whose nationality he intends to retain.
Consent may likewise not be withheld by the Contracting Party
in the case of minors who fulfil the conditions stipulated in the
preceding paragraph, provided that their national law allows them
to give up their nationality by means of a simple declaration and
provided also that they have been duly empowered or repre-
sented. 436
In addition to such multilateral treaties, 437 a number of bilateral
treaties have been concluded to minimize double nationality. Of spe-
cial importance are a series of treaties, generally known as Bancroft
treaties, concluded in 1868 and shortly thereafter between the United
States and some of the European countries.438 These treaties either
stipulate which of the nationalities possessed is to prevail as between
the contracting states or seek to facilitate revision of pertinent na-
tionality laws to avoid instances of double nationality.
In the late 1950's the Soviet Union concluded a series of bilateral
treaties with its fraternal states regarding the matter of double na-
tionality. 439 According to these treaties, persons possessing the nation-
ality of both contracting states and residing in the territory of one of
them may opt for the single nationality of the other by filing a dec-
laration to that effect with the latter state's embassy within one year
from the effective date of the respective treaty. The declaration of
option is subject to scrutiny by the competent officials to whom it has
been communicated. The contracting states pledge to inform each other
of the applications accepted, and, in some instances, rejected. Persons
435. Id. at 3 (Art. 2(1)).
436. Id. (Art. 2(2)).
437. See Survey of the Problem of Multiple Nationality Prepared by the Secretariat,
supra note 422, at 90-94.
438. Id. at 91-92. See note 108 supra.
439. See Sipkov, Settlement of Dual Nationality in European Communist Countries,
56 Am. J. INT'L L. 1010 (1962).
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failing to exercise their right of option are regarded solely as na-
tionals of the state of residence. 44 0
The demand for further effort, as expressed at the Hague Con-
ference, to solve the problem of multiple nationality has thus elicited
little effective response. In connection with its work on "nationality
including statelessness," the International Law Commission paid only
scant attention to the matter of multiple nationality.441 In 1954, after
a general debate in which divergent views were aired, the Commission
decided to defer further consideration of the topic, due partly to the
lack of a sense of urgency and partly to the reluctance of governments
to undertake effective measures of solution. 442
The need for amelioration of the plight of individuals having mul-
tiple nationality is well illustrated by the decisions that deny such in-
dividuals protection by one state of their nationality against the acts
of another state of their nationality. This restrictive doctrine was
formulated in article 4 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Nationality
in these words:
A State may not afford diplomatic protection to one of its nationals
against a State whose nationality such person also possesses.443
The International Court of Justice, in the Reparation for Injuries
Case, refers to this article as embodying an "ordinary practice whereby
a State does not exercise protection on behalf of one of its nationals
against a State which regards him as its own national . . . 444
When an individual claimant is alleged to be a national of both the
claimant state and the respondent state, an international tribunal
would ordinarily decline jurisdiction pursuant to article 4 of the
Hague Convention. 445 Recently, however, this restrictive doctrine has
to a considerable degree been qualified, for the benefit of individuals,
by the principle of effective (i.e., active, dominant) nationality. That is
440. See treaties concluded by the Soviet Union with, respectively, Yugoslavia, May
22, 1956, 259 U.N.T.S. 155; Hungary, Aug. 24, 1957, 318 U.N.T.S. 35; Romania, Sept.
4, 1957, 318 U.N.T.S. 89; Albania, Sept. 18, 1957, 307 U.N.T.S. 251; Czechoslovakia, Oct.
5, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 111; Bulgaria, Dec. 12, 1957, 302 U.N.T.S. 3; the Democratic
Republic of Korea, Dec. 16, 1957, 292 U.N.T.S. 107; Poland, Jan. 21, 1958, 319 U.N.T.S.
277; and Mongolia, Aug. 25, 1958, 322 U.N.T.S. 201.
441. The Commission's Special Rapporteur had submitted a report, Report on Mul.
tiple Nationality, supra note 316, and the U.N. Secretariat a memorandum, Survey of
the Problem of Multiple Nationality Prepared by the Secretariat, supra note 422.
442. Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of Its Sixth
Session, supra note 319, at 148-49.
443. 179 L.N.T.S. 89, 101 (Art. 4).
444. Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations, [1949] I.C.J. 173, 186.
445. 179 L.N.T.S. 89, 101.
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to say, if the claimant state is found to be the state of the individual's
effective nationality, the claim will not be dismissed for lack of juris-
diction. On the other hand, if the respondent state is found to be the
state of his effective nationality, the claim will be dismissed and ar-
ticle 4 applied in its pristine severity.
The substantive content of "effective nationality" is intimated in
article 5 of the Hague Convention on Nationality in its specification
of the criterion to be applied by a third state in a case of dual na-
tionality. The article reads:
Within a third State, a person having more than one nationality
shall be treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the
application of its law in matters of personal status and of any
conventions in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities which
any such person possesses, recognise exclusively in its territory
either the nationality of the country in which he is habitually and
principally resident, or the nationality of the country with which
in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely con-
nected.440
Considerably more detail is offered in the unfortunate Nottebohm
case, 447 in which, though multiple nationality was not involved, the
International Court of Justice attempted to build upon the analogy
of dual nationality and formulated the concept of effective nationality
in words which bear repetition:
International arbitrators have decided in the same way numerous
cases of dual nationality, where the question arose with regard to
the exercise of protection. They have given their preference to the
real and effective nationality, that which accorded with the facts,
that based on stronger factual ties between the person concerned
and one of the States whose nationality is involved. Different fac-
tors are taken into consideration, and their importance will vary
from one case to the next: the habitual residence of the individual
concerned is an important factor, but there are other factors such
as the centre of his interests, his family ties, his participation in
public life, attachment shown by him for a given country and in-
culcated in his children .448
446. Id.
447. Nottebohm Case, [1955] I.C.J. 4.
448. Id. at 22. In regard to territory and resources, the doctrine of historical use
has been well established. It would appear that a comparable doctrine could be devel-
oped to serve the acquisition of nationality. Individuals should be able to acquire
nationality by effective participation in the social process. When individuals have lived
in a territory for a long period of time, they become effective members of that par-
ticular community. They may in effect be more active community members, in the
sense of participation in value processes, than many nominal nationals of that community.
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The most beneficient employment, from the perspective of human
rights, of the concept of "effective nationality" has been in according
an individual of multiple nationality a protector against deprivations
by a state of his nationality. When the claimant state is proved to be
the state of the claimant's effective nationality, this concept has been
successfully invoked against another state of the claimant's nationality,
thereby overcoming the non-protective restriction inherent in article
4 of the Hague Convention on Nationality and facilitating a hearing
on merits of claims asserted by a multiple national claimant.
In the well-known Apostolidis v. The Turkish Government,449 Tur-
key challenged the jurisdiction of the Franco-Turkish Mixed Arbitral
Tribunal on the ground that all the claimants had retained Turkish
nationality under Turkish law, which denied the validity of the foreign
naturalization of Turkish nationals without Turkish authorization.
The claimants had been naturalized as French nationals in 1912. The
Tribunal rejected the Turkish contention, noting that
all other judicial authorities, including the Mixed Arbitral Tri-
bunal,-which, as regards public international law, is not bound
by the municipal legislation of one of the contracting States-are
bound to recognize the validity of the change of nationality and
to recognize the claimants as French nationals. 450
This judgment has been properly construed to mean that "the Tri-
bunal simply disregarded the Turkish nationality for the purposes of
the claim, thus attributing to the French nationality of the claimant
a predominant character in order to establish jurisdiction. ' ' 451
In the case of Barthez de Monfort v. Treuhander Hauptverwal-
tung4 52 before the Franco-German Mixed Tribunal, the claimant pos-
sessed both French and German nationality, the latter of which she
acquired through the naturalization of her husband in Germany; she
had never abandoned her domicile in France. It was held that
the principle of active nationality, i.e., the determination of na-
tionality by a combination of elements of fact and of law, must
be followed by an international tribunal, and that the claimant
was accordingly a French national and was entitled to judgment
accordingly. 453
449. Franco-Turkish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, 1928, 8 RECUEIL DES DECISIONS DES
TRIBUNAUx ARBITRAUX MixTs 373 (1929), translated and abbreviated in H. BRIGGS, supra
note 10, at 513.
450. Id. at 514.
451. N. BAR-YAACOV, supra note 420, at 215.
452. [1925-1926] Ann. Dig. 279 (No. 206).
453. Id.
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In the Georges Pinson case, 45 4 decided by the French-Mexican Mixed
Claims Commission in 1928, France asserted a claim on behalf of an
individual alleged to be a French national jure sanguinis and a Mexi-
can national jure soli. The individual had ties to both countries and
the laws of both countries had been construed to confer nationality.
In response to the Mexican contention, based on article 4 of the Hague
Convention on Nationality, the Commission held that
even if the case were recognised as one of double nationality from
the strictly legal point of view, it would be very doubtful if the
claimant could not have invoked the Convention notwithstanding,
owing to the fact that the Mexican government itself had always
considered him, officially and exclusively, as a French subject.4 ii
The concept of effective nationality is, unhappily, sometimes em-
ployed to deny the individual a protector on the merits when the
defendant state is found to be the state of stronger ties. Thus, the
Canevaro case,456 brought in 1912 by Italy against Peru before the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration and often cited as a leading case defining
the concept of effective nationality,457 involved three brothers, two of
whom were Italian nationals; the third, Rafael Canevaro, possessed
Peruvian nationality jure soli and Italian nationality jure sanguinis.
In response to the Peruvian contention that Rafael Canevaro could
not be considered an Italian claimant, the tribunal noted that he had
on several occasions acted as a Peruvian citizen: He ran as a candidate
for the Senate (the membership of which was open only to Peruvian
citizens) and, more importantly, he accepted the office of Consul
General to the Netherlands, upon the authorization of both the Peru-
vian government and the Peruvian Congress. Hence, the tribunal
concluded, "whatever Rafael Canevaro's status as a national may be
in Italy, the Government of Peru has a right to consider him a Peru-
vian citizen and to deny his status as an Italian claimant.""4 8
In the Alexander Tellech claim before the Tripartite (United Sta'tes-
Austro-Hungarian) Claims Commission in 1928, 459 the claimant, a
United States national jure soli and an Austrian national jure sanguinis,
had resided in Austria for nearly 30 years since age five when his par-
454. 5 U.N.R.I.A.A. 327; [1927-1928] Ann. Dig. 299 (No. 195).
455. [1927-1928] Ann. Dig. 299, 300 (No. 195).
456. 1 Hague Court Reports (Scott) 284 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1912); 11 U.N.R.I.A.A. 397;
H. BRIGGS, supra note 10, at 512.
457. See, e.g., P. WEIs, supra note 1, at 173.
458. H. BRIGGS, supra note 10, at 512.
459. 6 U.N.R.IA.A. 248.
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ents moved to live in Austria. After being interned "as an agitator
engaged in propaganda in favor of Russia," he was drafted into mili-
tary service by the Austrian government.460 The Commission dismissed
the United States claim for compensation on Tellech's behalf on the
ground that he was a national of Austria as well as of the United
States and that he had voluntarily taken "the risk incident to residing
in Austrian territory and subjecting himself to the duties and obliga-
tions of an Austrian citizen arising under the municipal laws of
Austria." 401
In the Merge case, 40 2 the claimant possessed the nationality both of
the claimant state, the United States, and of the respondent state,
Italy. In its opinion, the Italian-United States Conciliation Commis-
sion noted the possibility of finding effective nationality in the claim-
ant state in unequivocal terms:
The principle, based on the sovereign equality of States, which
excludes diplomatic protection in the case of dual nationality, must
yield before the principle of effective nationality whenever such
nationality is that of the claiming State. But it must not yield
when such predominance is not proved, because the first of
these two principles is generally recognized and may constitute a
criterion of practical application for the elimination of any pos-
sible uncertainty.4 3
After detailed examination of the facts, however, the Commission
found that the claimant's family "did not have its habitual residence
in the United States and the interests and the permanent professional
life of the head of the family were not established there." 464 Hence,
it concluded that the claimant "can in no way be considered to be
dominantly a United States national."465
The most dramatic deprivation for a person of multiple nationality
relates to the burdens of military service. Intense demands for military
service have appeared to be the principal source of frictions between
states in their competing claims to control individuals having mul-
tiple nationality. Hence, a paramount concern at the 1930 Hague
Conference was to alleviate the burdens of "multiple" military service
460. Id. at 249.
461. Id.
462. Merge Claim, [1955] I.L.R. 443 (Italian-United States Conciliation Commis-
sion 1955); 14 U.N.R.I.A.A. 236.
463. [1955] I.L.R. 443, 455.
464. Id. at 456.
465. Id. at 457.
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for people of multiple nationality and thus to help lessen frictions
among states. This profound concern found concrete expression in
the Protocol Relating to Military Obligations in Certain Cases of
Double Nationality adopted at the Conference. 40 According to the
Protocol, a person having multiple nationality "who habitually resides
in one of the countries whose nationality he possesses, and who is in
fact most closely connected with that country, shall be exempt from
all military obligations in the other country or countries." 4 7 If such
a person has the right, under the law of any of these states, "on at-
taining his majority, to renounce or decline the nationality of that
State, he shall be exempt from military service in such State during
his minority." 468 If he has lost one nationality and acquired another,
he "shall be exempt from military obligations in the State of which
he has lost the nationality." 469
Elaborate provisions regarding military obligations are found in the
European Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality
and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality. 470 "Persons
possessing the nationality of two or more Contracting Parties shall be
required to fulfill their military obligations in relation to one of
those Parties only," under special arrangements to be made between
any of the contracting states.4 71
466. The Protocol was signed at the Hague on April 12, 1930, 178 L.N.T.S. 227.
467. Id. at 229 (Art. 1).
468. Id. at 231 (Art. 2).
469. Id. (Art. 3).
470. Europ. T.S. No. 43 (1963).
471. Id. at 4. Pursuant to article 6, in the absence of a special agreement, the
following provisions are applicable to a person possessing the nationality of two or
more Contracting Parties:
1. Any such person shall be subject to military obligations in relation to the
Party in whose territory he is ordinarily resident. Nevertheless, he shall be free to
choose, up to the age of 19 years, to submit himself to military obligations as a
volunteer in relation to any other Party of which he is also a national for a total
and effective period at least equal to that of the active military service required
by the former Party.
2. A person who is ordinarily resident in the territory of a Contracting Party of
which he is not a national or in that of a State which is not a Party may choose
to perform his military service in the territory of any Contracting Party of which
he is a national.
3. A person who, in accordance with the rules laid down in paragraphs 1 and 2,
shall fulfil his military obligations in relation to one Party, as prescribed by the
law of that Party, shall be deemed to have fulfilled his military obligations in re-
lation to any other Party or Parties of which he is also a national.
4. A person who, before the entry into force of this Convention between the
Parties of which he is a national, has, in relation to one of those Parties, fulfilled
his military obligations in accordance with the law of that Party, shall be deemed
to have fulfilled the same obligations in relation to any other Party or Parties
of which he is also a national.
5. A person who, in conformity with paragraph 1, has performed his active
military service in relation to one of the Contracting Parties of which he is a
national, and subsequently transfers his ordinary residence to the territory of the
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With the exception of military obligations, there is little, in terms
of amelioration of value deprivations for people of multiple national-
ity, comparable in scope to the treatment accorded to stateless persons.
Treaties are sometimes concluded to eliminate or reduce double taxa-
tion.472 Mention may also be made of article 3 of the European Con-
vention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality which states:
The Contracting Party whose nationality a person desires to re-
nounce shall not require the payment of any special tax or charge
in the event of such renunciation. 473
From this brief survey it can be seen that the efforts of states both
to minimize the occurrence of multiple nationality and to provide
ameliorations for the burdens it imposes are far from adequate. The
individual is still not given full opportunity to choose between re-
tention of multiple nationality or renunciation of nationalities which
may impose burdens upon him incompatible with human rights. Multi-
lateral conventions might be devised which would afford individuals
more freedom of choice in the retention of benefits and in the re-
nunciation of burdens, when such renunciation is not inimical to an
appropriate community responsibility. Certainly the traditional doc-
trine that one state cannot protect an individual against another state
of his nationality should be abandoned. It can only serve to deny
human rights and to exaggerate state interests at the expense of the
individual. The appropriate amelioration of burdens with respect to
other values must of course depend upon many variables in the con-
text in which such values are pursued.
IV. Appraisal and Recommendations
The fundamental problem with which we have been concerned is
that of how the individual secures access to arenas of authoritative de-
cision external to his own state for the vindication of his basic, sub-
stantive rights. Ancillary problems relate to the humanity with which
the laws of nationality are shaped for affecting this access to protection
other Party of which he is a national, shall be liable to military service in the re-
serve only in relation to the latter Party.
6. The application of this Article shall not prejudice, in any respect, the na-
tionality of the persons concerned.
7. In the event of mobilisation by any Party, the obligations arising under this
Article shall not be binding upon that Party.
Id.
472. See S. Greenleigh & R. Margenau, supra note 1, at 412-14.
473. Europ. T.S. No. 43, at 3 (1963).
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and for determining which state may subject the individual to the
community burdens of military service, taxation, expropriation, and
criminal and civil jurisdiction. The basic, substantive rights which the
individual may seek to vindicate are now importantly clarified and
articulated in all the emerging human rights prescriptions. The myth,
however, is still far too prevalent that the individual is not an ap-
propriate subject of international law for the protection of these
rights474 and must have a special protector in the form of a state of
nationality. It is through "nationality" only that the individual ac-
quires much of what access he has to transnational processes of au-
thoritative decision. Hence, it remains important to appraise trends
in the degree to which the laws of nationality do afford the individual
the necessary protection and other human rights and to consider al-
ternatives for improvement in the protection of all rights.
Some modest movement toward human rights may be observed, as
our summaries indicate, in the laws concerning conferment and with-
drawal of nationality. In terms of conferment of nationality, there has
been a widening use of both jits soli and jus sanguinis to ensure that
an individual is born with at least one nationality. There has been
some obvious loosening of rigorous requirements, at least for certain
categories of people, for facilitating acquisition of nationality subse-
quent to birth. The imposition of nationality upon individuals with-
out their consent is commonly regarded as contrary to international
law. The right to change nationality, notably the right of voluntary
expatriation, has been increasingly recognized in general community
expectation as a fundamental human right. In regard to withdrawal
of nationality based on imputed consent, decisionmakers appear in:
creasingly to require a genuine consent or a close relation to important
policies in the maintenance of harmonious relations between states.
There is a growing expectation, further, that denationalization as a
punishment, having no necessary relation to the maintenance of har-
monious relations between states, is cruel and inhumane and, hence,
unlawful. In particular, there appears to be an emerging peremptory
norm of nondiscrimination which would outlaw denationalization upon
474. For a general survey of views about the role of the individual in international
law, see P. Jassup, supra note 74, at 15-26; H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 126, at 3-72;
C. NORGAARD, THE POSITION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1966); L. SOHN
& T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1-21 (1973); J. Jefferies,
The Individual and International Law, 1954 (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Yale Law
School); Amon, The Individual in International Law, 13 FAR EASTERN L. REv. 185 (1966);
Manner, The Object Theory of the Individual in International Law, 46 AM. J. INT'L L.
428 (1952); Tucker, Has the Individual Become the Subject of International Law?, 34
U. CIN. L. REV. 341 (1965).
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racial or ethnic grounds. Many prescriptions have been enunciated
both to minimize the occurrence of statelessness and to ameliorate the
treatment accorded to stateless persons. 475 More limited progress has
been made in measures to minimize the occurrence of multiple na-
tionality and to lessen the burdens imposed upon people possessing
multiple nationality.
The flow of state decisions about nationality and the regime of
international regulation continue, however, to disregard important
human rights criteria, particularly with respect to affording the in-
dividual real choice. Nationality is conferred on a person at birth by
jus soli, jus sanguinis, or both; nationality is, further, sometimes thrust
upon him subsequent to birth without his consent. States are not re-
quired to confer nationality upon any set of specified grounds and
the requirements and procedures even for accepted grounds are often
arbitrary. All too often the individual is allowed to change nationality
only with the consent of the state from which he seeks to escape.
Conversely, the individual may still have his nationality arbitrarily
taken from him. The withdrawal of nationality may be based on
largely fictitious consent and may have little relation to maintaining
harmonious relations between states. Deprivation of nationality is still
used as a form of punishment for political or other reasons. Insuf-
ficient effort has been made to rectify the diversities in state laws
that have the consequence of rendering many stateless; individuals may
thus still find themselves without a nationality and unable to obtain
one. Finally, the international law of multiple nationality remains
largely designed to protect state, and not individual, interests; many
individuals continue to find themselves subject to multiple burdens,
but without protection against a most important category of deprivors,
states of their nationality.476
475. We are aware that the mere enunciation of prescriptions may not serve to pro-
tect the human rights of people, but we do regard such enunciation as an indis-
pensable first step toward protection. When policies are clarified and predispositions
toward conformity mobilized, the potentialities for enforcement are increased. In evi-
dence we would submit the general community experience with the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights.
476. Our review of the doctrines and procedures connected with the traditional
notion of nationality has spotlighted yet another sector of the vast corpus of inter-
national law that won acceptance in an historical setting where the dominant task
was to find workable ways of resolving occasions for friction among members of the
largely European world state system. The established myth was understood to impose
no obligation on a state to act for the protection or assistance of nationals who ad-
vanced a claim on another state. By abstaining from intervention in these circumstances
a state was in a position to avoid a potentially irritating confrontation with other
states. At the same time, if the target state was politically weak and isolated, and
especially if it sought to apply non-European prescriptions to its internal affairs, a
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The first and most fundamental recommendation we would make
is that individuals be authorized to protect themselves. The substan-
tive human rights prescriptions can never be made effective if the
individual human being is not himself accorded competence to invoke
them under appropriate conditions. The individual should be made
a full subject of international law, with that access to all arenas, both
international and national, which is necessary for him to protect
himself.
Given continued state priority and domination, a second recommen-
dation is that much greater effect be given, in the laws permitted by
international law for the conferment or withdrawal of nationality, to
the free choice of the individual in associating himself with a state.
A most important move in this direction would be to accord the in-
dividual, contrary to the holding in the Nottebohm decision, a free-
dom of choice among potential state protectors. If the individual is
able to find a state willing and able to protect him, with or without
pecuniary inducement, that state should be authorized to protect
him.4 77 This change could easily be effected by a presumption of the
validity of a certification of nationality for purposes of suit.
A third recommendation is some centralization, or organized inter-
European state could champion the claims of its nationals with great vigor, and with
minimum risk of loss.
The world situation has changed and will continue to change in ways that affect the
flow of transactions among states. In many parts of the globe the number of indi-
viduals whose value indulgences and deprivations are affected by transnational ac-
tivities has greatly multiplied. These new participants in world community process are
sensitive to the failures of their own state, or of other states, to act on behalf of
the integrity of the growing system of involvement. In recent years a body of demand
and expectation has steadily intensified on behalf of doctrines and procedures that
might fill the conspicuous gaps that were left in the prevailing order. These new
perspectives identify much more extensively than before with the rights of individual
human beings. This carries with it a series of changes that are at present in full
course of evolution, and to which we seek to contribute both by re-defining the con-
ceptions and operations referred to by the rubric of nationality and by suggesting
new institutional practices and procedures.
477. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Inter-
nationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (U.N. Doc. AIRES/3166
(XXVIII) of 5 February 1974, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 41 (1974)), which was adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly and open for signature on February 5, 1974,
would appear to make an important advance in this direction. Article 6(2)(a) provides
that an alleged offender, "if he is a stateless person," shall be entitled "to communicate
without delay with the nearest appropriate representative of the State . . . which he re-
quests and which is willing to protect his rights." 13 I.L.M. 46 (1974).
The recommendation we make for ameliorating the condition of stateless per-
sons and persons possessing multiple nationality with respect to all values is simply
that they be accorded basic human rights as formulated in contemporary prescriptions.
Apart from nationality problems, their problems are the same as those of people having
one nationality: They share all the same demands, identifications, and expectations and
are subject to all the same finite limitations. For an excellent statement of this per-
spective, see Kellogg, Refugees and Human Rights: The Path Ahead, 69 DEP'T STATE BuLL,
375 (1973).
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nationalization, of the protection function on the global level. A rela-
tively unorganized internationalization of the function would be to
permit states to volunteer to protect individuals, somewhat in the
fashion provided for signatories of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights.478 A more organized form would be a centralized inter-
national ombudsman within the framework of the United Nations.
The concept of "United Nations citizenship" might be given sub-
stance by a specialized United Nations agency for the protection of
the disfranchised people of the world. The establishment "within the
framework of the United Nations" of "a body" to which a stateless
person "may apply for the examination of his claim and for assistance
in presenting it to the appropriate authority," as envisaged in article
11 of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 479 together
with the experience of the Office of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in protecting and assisting refugees
(especially in helping them obtain identity papers and travel docu-
ments from governments concerned 48°), may suggest the rudiments of
a model that could be expanded and improved. Instead of merely
using its good offices to secure the cooperation of national govern-
ments and leaving the ultimate decision in these governments, as is
presently the case with the Office of UNHCR,48 1 the proposed U.N.
agency could be empowered to confer, under its own authority, "world
citizenship" (a "United Nations citizenship") upon individuals and
thus itself perform the necessary protective function. Pending the
achievement of a world commonwealth of free persons in open fron-
tiers, United Nations citizenship could be made to coexist with the
existing nationalities of states. All human beings should be eligible-
478. The reference is to the state-to-state complaint system developed under article
24 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Under this provision a contracting
state may refer to the European Commission of Human Rights alleged violations of
the Convention, regarding not only its own nationals, but also nonnationals. See COUN-
CIL OF EUROPE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 12-13 (1968); EUROPEAN
COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, STOCK-TAKING ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS (DH (72) 7) 4-11 (1972); A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 58-62 (1963);
L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 474, at 1050-90; Fawcett, supra note 279, at
275-77. Also relevant are the state-to-state complaint systems embodied under article 11
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion and article 41 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. U.N.
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 25-26, and 14 respectively.
479. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 56.
480. See articles 27 and 28 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
U.N. HuMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 70, at 67-68.
481. Identity papers and travel documents are issued by the respective governments
of the contracting parties to the Refugee Convention or to the Protocol to the Refugee
Convention, not by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
The Office of the UNHCR is not empowered to do so.
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whether out of necessity or out of choice-for such United Nations
citizenship.
Nationality is a concept created in the past to promote a minimum
organization of the world under past conditions. The reference and
function of the concept cannot remain static: It must be as dynamic
as the changing demands and identifications of peoples and the chang-
ing configuration of the world and national constitutive processes.
In the words of the Harvard Research on the Law of Nationality,
Nationality has no positive, immutable meaning. On the contrary
its meaning and import have changed with the changing character
of states. Thus nationality in the feudal period differed essentially
from nationality, or what corresponded to it, in earlier times be-
fore states had become established within definite territorial limits,
and it differs now from what it was in the feudal period. It may
acquire a new meaning in the future as the result of further changes
in the character of human society and developments in interna-
tional organization. 482
As human beings seek greater fulfilment of all values, through ever
increasing transnational interactions and ever more frequent mobility,
in a world of intimate interdependences and the universalizing cul-
ture of science and technology, nationality must be made to serve the
development and happiness of human beings, and not to perpetuate
human bondage by anchoring people, against their will, in a particular
territorial community or alternatively casting them adrift when it is
withdrawn. The time has come to make the law of nationality defend
and fulfill the human rights of the individual.
482. Harvard Research, supra note 1, at 21.
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